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Abstract To a substantial degree, governments provide private goods to their citizens –
like education, health care, or child care. In this thesis, the theory of publicly provided
private goods is extended by insights from sociology, social psychology, and the recent
literature on behavioral economics. The implications of two types of non-standard
preferences are studied: concerns for social status and present-bias. The thesis includes
both normative and politico-economic contributions.
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Kurzzusammenfassung Staaten stellen in erheblichem Umfang private Güter bereit –
wie etwa Bildung, Gesundheitsleistungen oder Kinderbetreuung. In dieser Dissertation
wird die Theorie der staatlichen Bereitstellung privater Güter um Ansätze aus der
Soziologie und Verhaltensökonomik erweitert. Insbesondere werden die Auswirkungen
von Statusmotiven und einer übermäßigen Gegenwartspräferenz (sog. “Present-Bias”)
untersucht. Die Arbeit liefert sowohl politökonomische als auch normative Beiträge.
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In most countries, a significant share of the public budget is devoted to the provision of
private goods, i.e., goods that are excludable and rival in consumption. Prominent ex-
amples include education, health care, or old-age consumption, but many governments
also provide child care, housing, nutritional assistance, transportation, or care of the
elderly. The volume of public spending on private goods ranges from 5 percent of GDP
in developing countries up to 25 percent in some members of the OECD (Bearse et
al., 2000; Currie and Gahvari, 2008). Typically, government-provided goods are made
available free of charge and at a uniform level. Most of them are (or in principle can be),
however, also traded on markets. For example, people can send their children to private
schools or kindergartens, buy private health insurance and consult private physicians.
A fundamental question is then whether there are any rationales for the public provision
of specific private goods.
From a traditional economic perspective, the answer is negative (see, e.g., Aaron and
von Fürstenberg, 1971). The standard argument against public provision is based on the
observation that it is an in-kind transfer and may constrain consumption choices: people
might choose different levels of a publicly provided good if they receive the value of the
in-kind transfer in cash. Replacing public provision by equal-valued cash payments
should thus (weakly) increase welfare – as people could then select the consumption
bundles that best fit their preferences.
In the past decades, a number of possible rationales for public provision have been
put forward, including both normative and politico-economic arguments (see Currie
1.1. MOTIVATION
and Gahvari, 2008, for a survey). Most existing explanations follow the convention
of traditional economic theory and assume “standard” preferences: people are only
interested in their own consumption of goods and services and are fully rational and
make no systematic errors. However, insights from sociology, social psychology, and
the recent literature on behavioral economics suggest that actual preferences deviate
from what is assumed in standard economic models. There is now a substantial body of
empirical evidence in line with the idea that people have status concerns. I.e., beyond
absolute levels of consumption, individuals care about relative positions (of income,
wealth, or the consumption of particular goods) and about how they are perceived and
evaluated by others (Truyts, 2010; Frank and Heffetz, 2011). In addition, evidence
from laboratory and field experiments documents various biases in individual decision
making (DellaVigna, 2009). In particular, when faced with intertemporal decisions,
many people are biased towards the present and assign higher relative weight to well-
being in the current period than they did if asked in any period before (Fredrick et al.,
2002).
The aim of this thesis is to study how status concerns and present-biased preferences
affect the theory of publicly provided private goods. As shown by a growing theoretical
literature, allowing for non-standard preferences can considerably alter the policy con-
clusions of standard economic models (see, for example, Bernheim and Rangel, 2007).
The vast majority of previous work focuses on issues of taxation or the provision of
public goods. However, status seeking and present-bias may also have important impli-
cations for private good provision.
First, many government-provided goods can alternatively be purchased on markets.
Status concerns – i.e., feelings of distinction, prestige, or even stigma – affect the choice
between a publicly provided good and its private alternatives. For instance, taking one’s
children out of public schools and sending them to private institutions may satisfy needs
of elitism and exclusiveness or conspicuously signal higher status. Conversely, take-up
of social housing, nutritional assistance, and public transportation is often stigmatized.
As levels for publicly provided goods are determined politically, status concerns may
have repercussions on the political economy of public provision.
Second, individuals who strive for status will spend resources to achieve (or maintain)
it. This spending is inherently positional as each individual’s status depends on how
much others consume of goods that confer a high relative standing – like cars, jewelry,
or expensive clothes (Frank and Heffetz, 2011). If one individual buys a new car to im-
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prove her status, others’ well-being is negatively affected as their relative positions will
ceteris paribus decline. Status consumption therefore imposes negative externalities,
and people devote inefficiently high shares of their budgets to conspicuous or status
goods while spending “too little” on other, non-status items. Public provision of in-
conspicuous goods might serve as an instrument to correct such under-consumption:
by providing a certain level of a private good and financing it through incomes taxes,
governments can alter how individuals spend their incomes and force them to consume
less of status goods and more of non-status goods. Available empirical evidence views
most publicly provided goods as rather less important for status reasons (Alpizar et al.,
2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Charles et al., 2009). Concerns for relative standing
may therefore provide a normative rationale for the public provision of private goods
such as health care, basic education, or nutrition.
Finally, many government-provided goods possess characteristics of an investment good
– in the sense that they involve up front costs but sizeable parts of their benefits arise in
the future. For example, investments in education require considerable current expenses
in exchange for an increased prospective earnings potential. Likewise, taking preventive
medication, routine check ups, medical advice, or a proper diet mainly affect one’s health
status in the long-run. When deciding how much to consume or invest, people with
present-biased preferences have a tendency to take immediate rewards and to avoid
immediate costs, and attach lower weight to delayed benefits than they do from a more
distant or long-run perspective. Due to such self-control problems, individuals’ actual
consumption choices may be against their own long-run interests. Thus, the presence of
a present-bias might justify corrective government interventions like public provision.
1.2 Structure and summary of basic results
The thesis contributes both to the politico-economic and normative literature on public
provision and includes three further chapters. Each chapter consist of a self-contained
article. Chapter 2 is co-authored with Tobias König, Wissenschaftszentrum für Sozial-
forschung (WZB) and Humboldt University Berlin, and Andreas Wagener, Institute
of Social Policy, Leibniz University Hannover. We introduce status concerns into a
standard political-economy framework for the dual provision of private goods (see, e.g.,
Epple and Romano, 1996a). The government provides a tax-financed private good
whose provision level is decided upon by majority voting. Individuals can take up the
3
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publicly provided level or opt out of the public system and buy the private good on
a market. In addition to utility from consumption, both alternatives confer a certain
social image or reputation on their consumers. The image utility from being (observed
to be) a public system or market user is endogenous and positively depends on the
average income in the group of individuals who make the same choice. We show that
the difference in image utilities between private and public alternatives is positive. In-
tuitively, individuals who buy the private good on the market are on average richer. In
addition, the social image of individuals out of and in the public system, respectively,
increases with higher public provision: raising the provision level drives more people
into the public system, and the average income of both groups rises; choosing the public
alternative loses stigma, consuming on markets becomes even more prestigious or elitist.
If this effect is sufficiently strong, even individuals who consume the private good on
markets may support public provision or its expansion. Such a positive willingness to
pay among non-users cannot arise when consumers only care for aspects of quality or
prices. We find that image concerns can substantially affect the properties of majority
voting equilibria. First, the set of possible political structures is richer; in addition to
standard ends-against-the-middle and median income earner type equilibria, a novel
ends-against-the-ends structure can arise. In such an equilibrium, the richer “ends” of
individuals in and out of the public system (the “lower middle class” and the “rich”)
vote against an equal-sized coalition of individuals from the lower ends (the “poor” and
the “upper middle class”). Second, private goods may be publicly provided in a ma-
jority voting equilibrium even though only a minority consumes the public alternative.
Finally, individuals who buy the private good on markets may enjoy lower consumption
levels than those consuming in the public system. Concerns for social image can there-
fore help to explain why housing, nutritional assistance, or transport are often publicly
provided although a large majority consumes them in the market, and why private
schools or private transport sometimes offer a lower quality of education or commuting
than their public counterparts (see, e.g., Figlio and Stone, 1999).
Chapter 3 is co-authored with Tobias König. We formalize the idea that status con-
cerns provide an efficiency rationale for the public provision private goods. Status is
modeled as a preference for relative consumption, i.e., people care about how their own
consumption compares to that of others. We consider a framework with two types of in-
dividuals (“rich” and “poor”) who have preferences over a non-positional good for which
only absolute consumption matters, and a positional good whose absolute as well as rel-
4
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ative consumption is important. We find that under relatively mild conditions on status
preferences, the introduction of a public provision scheme can always achieve Pareto
improvements over a laissez-faire without government intervention. In line with recent
empirical evidence, these conditions hold if (i) individuals - at least to some degree –
compare themselves with members of similar groups (“within-group” comparisons) and
(ii) if people consume more of the positional good if others’ consumption levels rise
(“keeping-up with the Joneses”). To underscore the efficiency-enhancing potential of
public provision, we also study the case where a linear tax on the positional good is
available. In particular, we identify simple necessary and sufficient conditions such that
public provision can be Pareto-improving even if the positional tax is optimally chosen.
Moreover, we show that a combination of public provision and a consumption tax can
achieve Pareto efficient allocations – which is, in general, impossible if only a single
instrument is available. However, under specific circumstances, public provision can
implement efficient allocations alone, and therefore even dominate the taxation of the
positional good.
In Chapter 4, I study how governments should intervene in markets for education,
health care or old-age consumption when individuals have present-biased preferences.
In particular, I consider the relative merits of two different policy instruments: price
subsidies and public provision. This is motivated by the observation that many gov-
ernments not only publicly provide but also subsidize private goods by lowering market
prices. In Germany, for example, 30 percent of tuition fees for private schools can
be deducted from parents’ taxable income. Likewise, a number of countries offers tax
benefits for participants in private pension schemes. But if public provision and price
subsidies are simultaneously available, any government intending to address people’s
self-control problems faces the question of whether it should use only one instrument
or a combination of both. I consider a dynamic economy with two private goods. One
good is standard while the other requires immediate expenses but yields utility in the
future. Individuals have present-biased preferences and may differ in gross incomes. I
show that public provision strictly dominates price subsidies if people only differ in the
intensity of their present-bias. When people have different biases and incomes, price
subsidies and public provision can be complements. In the special case with two income
types, this happens if and only if the present-bias is stronger among the poor. In the
reverse case, the two policy instruments are substitutes: optimal policies include either
a subsidy or public provision.
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Chapter 2
The Public Provision of Private Goods with Image Concerns1
2.1 Introduction
When choosing from different varieties of goods, consumers not only care about prices
and qualities but are also concerned with how they are perceived by others. Different
varieties, brands, or labels of a good confer on their consumers different levels of dis-
tinction, prestige, esteem, or even stigma. These social evaluations are often associated
with the characteristics – say, income, wealth, status, or education – of typical users of
the varieties. Individuals pay attention to the perceptions and reputational embedding
of their consumption and, by making appropriate choices, seek to display or improve
their social standing (see, e.g., Veblen, 1899[1994]; Leibenstein, 1950; Frank, 1985a;
Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996).
Image concerns, i.e., the desire to portray and communicate oneself in a socially positive
way, not only affect the choices between the different varieties of marketed goods. They
also matter for the choice between goods provided by governments and privately sup-
plied alternatives. Governments indeed provide important (private) goods and services
to their citizens – like schooling, health care, social housing, public transportation, and
nutritional assistance – that have close substitutes commercially supplied on markets.
In substantial domains of life, citizen-consumers can decide whether to consume the
1Earlier versions of the chapter were presented at the 2011 Workshop on Public Economics (Bremen,
Germany), the 2012 CESifo Area Conference on Public Sector Economics (Munich, Germany), the 2012
MPI Econ Workshop (Bonn, Germany), the 17th Spring Meeting of Young Economists (Mannheim,
Germany), the 68th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (Dresden, Germany),
the 27th Congress of the European Economic Association (Malaga, Spain), the 2012 Annual Congress
of the German Economic Association (Göttingen, Germany) and at the 7th Nordic Behavioral and
Experimental Economics Conference (Bergen, Norway).
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publicly provided variety or purchase the good on markets – and the choice between
both options may, in addition to aspects of price, quality, and convenience, be shaped
by intangible social and reputational concerns (Ireland, 1994). For instance, sending
one’s children to a private rather than to a public school often caters for needs of dis-
tinction, elitism, and classiness, and may conspicuously signal higher status, greater
wealth, or refined tastes (see, e.g., Postlewaite, 1998; Levy and Razin, 2015). Similar
effects prevail with kindergartens or health care (Mumtaz et al., 2013). Conversely,
publicly provided varieties of a good are sometimes stigmatized, as with social housing,
nutritional assistance (food stamps), and public transportation (see Steg, 2005, or Lit-
man, 2009, on “bus stigma” in the U.S. or the UK). Then, people might choose not to
take up the public option out of the fear of being stereotyped as unsuccessful, idle, or
morally weak (see, inter alia, Moffitt, 1983; Besley and Coate, 1992).
A dual provision scheme with a choice between a publicly provided good and a pri-
vate alternative differs markedly from selecting among varieties on markets. First,
the provision levels for publicly provided goods are determined politically and not, as
on markets, by price mechanisms. In democratic regimes, where majority voting is
prominent (Epple and Romano, 1996a; Luelfesmann and Myers, 2011), all citizens –
including the non-users – have a political say in decisions on public provision. Second,
government-provided goods, which are typically made available to citizens free of charge
or at subsidized prices and at a uniform level, are tax-financed. Individuals who opt
out of the public system are still obliged to contribute, with their taxes, to financing
public provision. Ceteris paribus, the public system can be more generous, in terms of
per-capita provision levels, the fewer people choose the public option. Conversely, for
those in the private system, extensive public provision and high taxes appear more and
more undesirable.
If only the consumption of goods and services matters, each individual just weighs the
(possibly zero) benefit from higher provision levels against the additional tax burden.
Image concerns may considerably deflect political preferences for public provision. Dif-
ferent levels of public provision and taxes attract different people into the public system,
affecting the social image both of public system and market users. If, for instance, a
higher public provision level lures more people into the public system, this may reduce
the stigma from choosing the publicly provided good. It may also raise social image
rents from consuming in the private system, as such a choice now becomes more select.
In this example, image concerns generate, both with users and non-users of the pub-
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lic option, a positive willingness to pay for (more) public provision – which might be
stronger than, and in opposite direction to, standard consumption motives. Generally,
the endogenous social feedback will change individuals’ willingness to pay for the pub-
licly provided good, and hence, the political economy of public provision, compared to
a model where individuals only care for aspects of qualities and prices.
In this paper, we study the public provision of private goods under majority voting when
individuals have concerns for their social image. We build on the standard political-
economy framework for the dual provision of private goods, as proposed by Epple and
Romano (1996a): the government provides a tax-financed private good whose provision
level is decided upon by majority voting. Individuals can choose between taking up the
publicly provided good and opting out of the public system and buying their individually
most desired level in the market. To this framework, we add endogenous image concerns
in the spirit of Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011): individuals
care about their social image, which other people deduce from their consumption choice.
Specifically, consumption choices allow for inferences about income, and the ascription
of higher incomes confers on individuals higher social (or self-)esteem. The image value
of being (observed to be) a public or a private user is endogenous and, with a feedback
loop, positively depends on the average income in the group of individuals that make
the same choice. In our model, the endogenous “image gap” between individuals out
of and in the public system is positive, and the image values of both groups rise if the
level of public provision increases (Proposition 2.1).
When image concerns prevail, the citizenry is, at any given level of public provision,
partitioned into (at most) four groups with respect to their political interests: (1)
individuals who consume in the public system but would oppose a further increase in
the public provision level; (2) individuals in the public system who would favor a higher
public provision level; (3) individuals in the private system who would oppose higher
public provision; and (4) individuals in the private system who are in favor of expanding
public provision. The crucial group, compared to a situation where only consumption
levels matter, is group 4. It can emerge since an expansion of the public system may
make the private system more prestigious or elitist, thereby fueling the image concerns
of outsiders. Such a positive willingness to pay among non-users of public provision
cannot arise with standard consumption motives only.
A majority voting equilibrium is characterized by a provision level that exactly balances
the numbers of supporters and of opponents to an increase in public provision: the
8
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unions of groups 1 and 3 and of groups 2 and 4 must each contain half of the population
(see Lemma 2.1). Since some of the groups may be empty, this is compatible with a
wide array of equilibrium configurations (see Propositions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.6).
This seemingly technical observation should be contrasted with the equilibrium pre-
dictions of standard dual provision scenarios (Epple and Romano, 1996a). With pure
consumption concerns, group 4 does not exist: nobody in the private system would ever
want to pay for more public provision. If, as assumed in Epple and Romano (1996a),
groups 1 to 3 are ordered in the form of ascending income brackets a majority vot-
ing equilibrium has an “ends-against-the-middle” structure, with a coalition between
“the poor” (group 1) and “the rich” (group 3) against middle-income earners (group 2).
Image concerns – and with them, the potential emergence of group 4 – produce alterna-
tive equilibria (Proposition 2.3). E.g., a novel “ends-against-the-ends” equilibrium type
can arise where the very rich (group 4) coalesce with the lower middle class (group 2)
that also wishes to expand public provision for reasons of reduced stigma on those who
take the publicly provided good. Conversely, the very poor and the upper middle class
(groups 1 and 3) vouch for a retrenchment of public provision.
Image concerns can help to understand several puzzling observations in dual provision
schemes for private goods. First, if individuals only care for consumption, a private
good is publicly provided only if the majority of individuals actually takes up the public
option (Epple and Romano, 1996a; Lindbeck et al., 1999). However, in several countries
goods and services like housing, nutritional assistance and sometimes transport are
government-provided although a large majority purchases them in the market (Currie,
2006). With image concerns, such a situation can arise as an equilibrium: the desire
for distinction generates a positive benefit of public provision among its non-users (see
Proposition 2.4). Second, if only consumption utilities matter, individuals who exit the
public system will always choose a higher consumption level than the one supplied by
the government. This prediction is in conflict, e.g., with the observation that private
schools or private transport sometimes offer a lower quality of education or commuting
than their public counterparts (see, e.g., Figlio and Stone, 1999). Similarly, eligible
households who do not take up in-kind programs such as Food Stamps or Medicare
in the U.S. forego substantial economic benefits while constraining themselves to lower
qualities of food or medical care than offered in public programs (Currie and Gahvari,
2008). Such behavior might be driven by image concerns: seeking to gain in distinction
or avoid stigma, individuals may substitute consumption for improved social status
9
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(see Proposition 2.5). Third, if only material concerns mattered, the rich would always
oppose redistribution, both in cash or via tax-financed in-kind programs. With image
concerns, dual provision schemes may appear attractive for the better-off: opting out
provides a vehicle to display status and reap gains in image utility.
Our paper complements a growing literature on image and status concerns in consumer
demand (e.g., Ireland, 1994; Pesendorfer, 1995; Bagwell and Bernheim, 1996; Glazer
and Konrad, 1996; Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Moav
and Neeman, 2012) and suppliers’ reactions to consumers’ desires for distinction (Rayo,
2013; Friedrichsen, 2015; Vikander, 2015). These papers deal with the provision of
goods in markets; to our knowledge, image concerns have not yet been analyzed in
a dual provision, political economy model.2 The literature on the political economy
of status concerns is scarce. Corneo and Grüner (2000) study majority voting over
redistribution when individuals want to signal status. By equalizing the distribution of
disposable incomes, redistribution makes consumption lose its signaling capacity, thus
reducing the political support for redistribution. In our framework, more redistribution
(via public provision) increases the scope for distinction among the rich: public provision
keeps the poor in the public system, thus enhancing the classiness of private alternatives.
Levy and Razin (2015) argue that an expansion of the public sector and the attending
reduction in income inequality softens the pressure (for the rich) to engage in costly
signaling, e.g., through private schooling. Our approach differs in that in-kind redis-
tribution is a vehicle for signaling, rather than a remedy against it: taxpayers forego
public provision exactly because this gives them higher distinctiveness. On the flip
side, categorizing consumers in the public system into a low-status group is related to
the stigma from participation in welfare schemes, discussed in Lindbeck et al. (1999).
Reduction in stigma then would strengthen the interest of individuals inside the public
system to expand the system and broaden its membership. In our approach, the strive
for distinction among those outside the public system reinforces the political clout for
public provision (see Proposition 2.1).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the model. Section 2.3
analyses the properties of endogenous image utilities. Section 2.4 discusses technical
aspects of majority voting equilibria. Their political and economic features are described
in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 generalizes our findings, and Section 2.7 concludes. All proofs
2Status motives are, however, discussed in other areas of public policy, including commodity tax-
ation, regulation and income taxation. See, e.g., Truyts (2012) and the references therein.
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are relegated to Appendix 2.A.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Framework
General: The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals with measure
one. Individuals differ in their exogenous gross incomes y. Incomes in the population
are distributed according to a continuous cumulative distribution function F (·) with
support on Y = [y, ȳ] ⊂ (0,∞). By ymed = F−1(1/2) and Y =
∫
Y ydF (y) we denote,
respectively, median and average income in the economy. Subsets of the population
will be abbreviated by capital letter H, possibly adorned by sub- or superscripts; the
attending measure will be indicated by lower-case h. I.e., for H ⊆ Y we have h =∫
y∈H dF (y).
Goods and their provision: There are two private goods, denoted by x and c.
Good c, which serves as the numéraire, is a standard consumption good, exclusively
provided by markets. Good x, which is also a rival good, is costlessly provided by
the government at an equal per-capita level x̄ to all individuals. As an alternative to
consuming x̄, individuals can opt out of public provision and buy their desired level on
the market. Public and private sector consumption are mutually exclusive: individuals
cannot supplement or diminish the publicly provided quantity via additional purchases
or sales on the private market.
To finance public provision, the government levies a proportional income tax at rate
t. Everybody has to pay the tax, irrespective of whether he consumes x̄ or opts out.
The production technology of good x is linear and identical in the public and the
private sector: one unit of the numéraire can be transformed into one unit of x. We
correspondingly normalize the market price of good x to one.
Preferences: All individuals have identical preferences. They derive utility from the
consumption of goods x and c, represented by a smooth, strictly increasing and strictly
quasi-concave utility function u(x, c). We assume that both goods are essential.3
In addition to consumption utility, the decision to consume good x in the public system
or to buy it on the market imparts to individuals a certain social reputation or (self-)
3Formally, u(0, c1) < u(x, c2) for all x, c1, c2 > 0 and u(x1, 0) < u(x2, c) for all c, x1, x2 > 0.
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image. Both choices generate non-pecuniary “image rents”, depending on their social
perceptions. Let Pa denote the image value of consumption choice a, where we define
variable a to take value 0 for an individual who consumes the publicly provided x̄ and
1 if she buys good x on the market. In summary, preferences are given by
U(x, c, a) = u(x, c) + β · Pa, (2.1)
where scalar β ≥ 0 measures the weight of image concerns. The additive separability
between u(x, c) and Pa in (2.1) allows for a clear distinction between consumption and
image utility. It implies that the two utility components do not directly interfere with
one another.
The values P0 and P1 represent the feelings like prestige, distinction, or stigma asso-
ciated with consumption choices for x. They are assumed to arise as the individual
is, or perceives himself to be, socially equated with a typical consumer who makes the
same choices as he does. Image values Pa of consumption choices are endogenous in
the economy, varying with the partition of individuals into consumers of the publicly
provided level x̄ and buyers on markets. Specifically, we assume that both P0 and P1
increase in the average incomes in the population subgroup they represent:
Pa = E(y|a). (2.2)
Here, E(·|a) is the expectations operator, conditional on the choice a ∈ {0, 1}. The
linearity of U in E(y|a) is chosen for simplicity, reflecting a constant marginal relevance
of image concerns.
Interpretation: Preferences (2.1) and (2.2) capture various social or individual per-
ceptions of choosing between public provision and market purchases. One interpreta-
tion, akin to Corneo and Jeanne (1997) and Bénabou and Tirole (2011), is income or
status signaling: choices between publicly provided and private options – such as send-
ing one’s child to a private rather than to a public school or kindergarten or commuting
by private car rather than by public transport – often involve a sorting according to
incomes or wealth. Consumption decisions that are observable for social peers, thus,
might easily communicate otherwise private information about one’s income or wealth
(Charles et al., 2009; Heffetz, 2011). This may be beneficial if, e.g., higher incomes
are associated with a higher social rank. It may also generate stigma if, e.g., public
12
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schemes for transportation, housing, or health insurance turn out to be the “poor man’s
schemes” and are associated with failure, idleness, or other stereotypes of low-income
earners (Simanis, 1970).
Preferences (2.1) and (2.2) may also lend to an interpretation in terms of social norms.
A public provision scheme redistributes from users to non-users of publicly provided
goods (since taxes must be paid by everybody). Then, P0 − P1 can be interpreted as
the image value of being a net contributor rather than a beneficiary from the public
budget. If positive, P0 − P1 reflects so-called welfare stigma: living off welfare benefits
is seen, from one’s own or from society’s view, as normatively inferior to contributing to
the common good. Via (2.2), P0−P1 will turn out to decrease in the number of public
sector users, i.e., in the take-up rate of public provision.4 Such endogenous welfare
stigma – the psychological costs of welfare take-up decrease the more common such
behaviour is – has been discussed frequently in social policy (Currie, 2003; Lindbeck et
al., 1999).
Sequence of events: The model proceeds in three stages with the following chronol-
ogy: in the first stage, a policy (t, x̄) with an income tax rate t and an expenditure
level x̄ is selected by majority voting (political equilibrium). In the second stage, each
individual decides whether to consume good x in the public system or to purchase it on
the market, taking (t, x̄) as given (decision over a). In the third stage, given a and (t, x̄),
individuals spend their after-tax incomes to maximize utility (individual consumption
choices). We solve the model by backward induction.
2.2.2 Consumption and system choice
Stage 3: Given (t, x̄), an individual with gross income y who opts out of public
provision (a = 1) purchases the (unique) bundle (x, c) > (0, 0) that maximizes u(x, c)
subject to the budget constraint c + x = y(1 − t). Let x∗ = x∗(y(1 − t)) and c∗ =
c∗(y(1− t)) = y(1− t)− x∗(·) be the Marshallian demand functions for goods x and c.
By the separability of (2.1), x∗ and c∗ are independent of image utility. The indirect
utility from consumption is given by
v(y(1− t)) := u(x∗, y(1− t)− x∗).
4Lindbeck et al. (1999) directly write the number of welfare users in the utility function of welfare
users. Our modeling can be interpreted as a micro-foundation of this approach.
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If the individual consumes the publicly provided amount x̄ (i.e., if a = 0), she spends her
entire net income y(1−t) on good c. Consumption utility then amounts to u(x̄, y(1−t)).
Stage 2: Anticipating the decisions in Stage 3, an individual chooses a = 1 over
a = 0 whenever the difference in image utilities between the consumption options is
large enough to compensate for differences in consumption utility, i.e., if:
β · (P1 − P0) ≥ u(x̄, y(1− t))− v(y(1− t)). (2.3)
For given image values P1 and P0 and policy (t, x̄), condition (2.3) partitions the pop-
ulation into the set of individuals who consume in the private system (a = 1) and of
those who choose the publicly provided level (a = 0). We denote these groups by
H̃out(P1 − P0, t, x̄) := {y ∈ Y| Condition (2.3) holds } ,
H̃ in(P1 − P0, t, x̄) := Y \ H̃out(P1 − P0, t, x̄).
Consistent expectations. We require that expectations (and hence image values)









Denote the sets of individuals in and outside of the public system under consistent ex-
pectations by H̃ in(t, x̄) and H̃out(t, x̄). We assume that their measures are continuously
differentiable in t and x̄.
2.2.3 Balanced budget
In stage 1, a policy (t, x̄) is selected by majority vote. We restrict the analysis to feasible
policies, which both balance the government budget and involve consistent expectations.
Formally, a policy (t, x̄) is feasible if
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By the Implicit Function Theorem, (2.5) defines the provision level x̄ as a continuously
differentiable function of the tax rate t, i.e.,
x̄ = x(t). (2.6)
Obviously, x(0) = 0. Without much loss in generality, we assume that all positive tax
rates t > 0 that we consider go along with positive public provision levels x(t) > 0. By
(2.6), the policy space is one-dimensional, with the tax rate t as the remaining policy
variable. Henceforth, we denote by
H in(t) := H̃ in(t, x(t)) and Hout(t) := H̃out(t, x(t))
the sets of individuals in and outside the public system. At feasible policy (t, x(t)), the
image values of consuming in and outside the public system are given by
P in(t) := P0|(2.4),(2.5) = E(y|y ∈ H
in(t)) and
P out(t) := P1|(2.4),(2.5) = E(y|y ∈ H
out(t)).
2.3 Political preferences and image concerns
2.3.1 Preferences
We now define indirect individual preferences over policies, which will determine voting
behavior. Given a tax rate t, denote by
V in(t, y) := u(x(t), y(1− t)) + βP in(t, x(t)),
V out(t, y) := v(y(1− t)) + βP out(t, x(t))) and (2.7)
V (t, y) := max{V out(t, y), V in(t, y)}
the indirect utility levels of an individual with income y in the public system (V in), out
of the public system (V out), and when choosing the better of the two (V ). Observe that
V in, V out, and V incorporate utility-maximizing behavior of all other individuals, the
partition of the population into H in and Hout, and the government budget constraint.
Functions V out, V in, and V are continuous and differentiable in (t, y) with the exception
that V (·, y) has a (zero-measure) non-differentiability when V in(t, y) = V out(t, y).
Utilities V out and V in in (2.7) depend on the policy variable t in two ways. First,
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taxation affects consumption utilities u(x(t), y(1 − t)) and v(y(1 − t)). This effect
is present in the absence of image concerns as well. Second, changes in t alter the
composition of public and private sector users and, thus, the image utilities P in and
P out of individuals in and outside of the public system. These social feedback effects
translate into additional motives to favor or oppose public provision, thereby shaping
the coalition structure in voting equilibria (see below).
2.3.2 Assumptions on preferences
In the following, we will make a series of assumptions that ensure two standard features
of models of dual provision (see, e.g., Epple and Romano, 1996a; Luelfesmann and
Myers, 2011). Specifically, we require that (i) image concerns do not offset (monotone)
sorting across incomes and (ii) that higher tax rates ceteris paribus make the public
system more attractive.5 Our first assumption requires that image concerns are not
overriding consumption concerns at extreme tax rates:
Assumption 2.1 For every y ∈ Y, V out(0, y)− V in(0, y) > 0 and
V out(1, y)− V in(1, y) < 0.
I.e., for very low tax rates and public provision levels, the public system is unattractive
such that everybody buys good x in the market, and for sufficiently high tax rate,
everybody will consume x in the public system and spend the entire net income on good
c. In Epple and Romano (1996a) or Luelfesmann and Myers (2011), Assumption 2.1 is
ensured by the strict quasi-concavity of u and the essential-good property of c and x.
Our second assumption says that opting out of the public system becomes more
unattractive (or less attractive) the larger the tax rate and, hence, the public provi-
sion level:
Assumption 2.2 For all t and y, ∂[V out(t, y)− V in(t, y)]/∂t < 0.
Together with Assumption 2.1, Assumption 2.2 implies that for every income level y ∈ Y
there exists a unique tax rate t̂ such that V in(t, y) ≥ V out(t, y) for all t ≥ t̂(y). I.e.,
an individual with income y stays in [opts out of] the public system whenever t ≥ t̂(y)
[t < t̂(y)].
5All assumptions are phrased in terms of V in(t, y) and V out(t, y), and thus, are combined require-
ments on direct preferences (u), image concerns (βPa), the distribution function (F (y)), and their
interplay through (2.4) and (2.6).
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The third assumption ensures that, if a person is in [out of] the public system, then
so are all poorer [richer] persons: for any t, if V in(t, y′) = V out(t, y′) at some income
y′, then V in(t, y) ≥ V out(t, y) for all lower incomes y and V out(t, y) ≥ V in(t, y) for all
higher incomes y.
Assumption 2.3 For any t, V out(t, y)− V in(t, y) strictly increases in y.
2.3.3 Implications for image concerns
Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 shape image utilities in the aggregate. First, by Assumptions 2.2
and 2.3 the tax rate of indifference increases in income: for all y,
t̂′(y) > 0. (2.8)
Intuitively, when individuals get richer, a higher tax rate (likewise, a higher public
provision level) is needed to keep them consuming x in the public system. From (2.8),
t̂(y) can be inverted; we denote its inverse by ŷ(t) with ŷ′(t) > 0. For a given tax rate t,
there exists an income threshold ŷ(t) such that individuals with incomes below [above]
ŷ stay in [out of] the public system; this threshold is higher for higher tax rates.
As a consequence, the sets of individuals in and out of the public system are, at every
feasible policy t, the income brackets below and above ŷ(t):
H in(t) = [y, ŷ(t)] and Hout(t) = (ŷ(t), ȳ]. (2.9)
Consequently, the image values ascribed to consuming good x in and out of the public
system are the average incomes below and above the income threshold ŷ:
P in(t) = E(y|y ≤ ŷ(t)) and P out(t) = E(y|y ≥ ŷ(t)). (2.10)
Image utilities have the following properties:








Individuals who purchase good x in the market enjoy higher image utility than users
in the public system: by income sorting, individuals in Hout(t) are richer. Moreover,
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image utilities P in and P out both increase in the tax rate. Higher tax rates attract
richer individuals into the public system, raising average incomes both in and out of
the public system. Consuming good x in the public system loses stigma, buying it on
markets becomes even more select.
The monotonicity of image utilities in (2.11) has important implications for political
preferences V out and V in. For individuals out of the public system, consumption utility
v(y(1 − t)) strictly decreases in the tax rate. In the absence of image concerns, in-
dividuals in the private system, thus, will always be in favor of cutting back tax and
expenditure levels: for β = 0, ∂V out/∂t < 0. By contrast, image utilities entail a benefit
from higher taxes (dP out/dt > 0). If these image effects are strong enough, they can
override the reduction in consumption utility and turn ∂V out(t)/∂t positive. Hence,
their image concerns can also make non-users support public provision or its expansion.
For those who consume x̄ in the public system, a higher tax rate involves a trade-off in
consumption utility u(x(t), y(1−t)): it means a higher provision level x(t) but comes at
the cost of reducing the consumption level of the other good, c = y(1−t). Depending on
which effect dominates (which may vary with income and the prevailing tax rate), their
materialistic concerns can lead consumers in the public system to favor expanding or
cutting back public provision. Image concerns P in(t) add a marginal benefit from higher
tax rates, ceteris paribus leading to stronger support for (or lower reluctance against)
more public provision amongst users. However, if tax rates get large, the deterioration
in consumption utility due to the low level of good c will override the benefits from
higher tax rates.
2.4 Majority voting equilibria
2.4.1 Definition and description
As usual, a majority voting equilibrium (MVE) is defined as a feasible tax rate that
beats every other feasible tax rate in pairwise majority comparison:
Definition 2.1 A tax rate t∗ is a majority voting equilibrium (MVE) if
(i) the attending expenditure level balances the government budget: x̄∗ = x(t∗), and
(ii) at least half of the population prefers, with respect to V (t, y), policy t∗ to any other
(t, x̄) with x̄ = x(t).
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A MVE is called interior if and only if t∗ > 0 and, consequently, x(t∗) > 0. A MVE
has dual provision if both Hout(t∗) 6= ∅ and H in(t∗) 6= ∅.6
We now provide a technical result that will be instrumental for our characterization of
MVE below. Denote by
tin(y) := arg max
t≥t̂(y)
V in(t, y),
tout(y) := arg max
t≤t̂(y)
V out(t, y) and
t(y) := arg max
t
V (t, y)
the most preferred tax rates for a person with income y, provided, respectively, she con-
sumes the publicly provided option, opts out of public provision, or chooses optimally.
Given t, define the following four (not necessarily non-empty) subsets of individuals:
H in− (t) = H
in(t) ∩ {y|tin(y) < t},
H in+ (t) = H
in(t) ∩ {y|tin(y) ≥ t},
Hout− (t) = H
out(t) ∩ {y|tout(y) < t},
Hout+ (t) = H
out(t) ∩ {y|tout(y) ≥ t}.
The first two sets split the group of individuals in the public system into those who
would favor a (marginal) reduction of the tax rate (H in− (t)) and those who would like
to see the tax rate to be increased (H in+ (t)). Sets H
out
− (t) and H
out
+ (t) do the same for
the group of individuals who opt of public provision at t. The sets H in− (t) to H
out
+ (t)
correspond to the groups 1 to 4 informally described in the Introduction.
Lemma 2.1 Suppose Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 hold. In an interior MVE with dual
provision the following holds true:
hin− (t





∗) + hout+ (t
∗).
Lemma 2.1 states that there are two opposing coalitions in an interior MVE: those who
advocate slightly higher tax rates, Hout+ (t) ∪ H in+ (t), and those who advocate slightly
lower tax rates, Hout− (t)∪H in− (t). Both coalitions encompass half of the population and,
thus, exactly offset one another.
6MVE without dual provision are uninteresting: if none is in the public system at a MVE, t∗
is trivially zero. If everybody is in the public system, the median income earner is decisive, i.e.,
t∗ = arg maxV (t, ymed).
19
2.4. MAJORITY VOTING EQUILIBRIA
Lemma 2.1 does not imply though that all four groups H in− (t) to H
out
+ (t) are non-empty.
Depending on whether any of them and, if so, which are empty, various interesting
coalitional structures arise.
2.4.2 Preference profiles
The properties of a MVE generically depend on the distribution of favorite policies or,
what is the same, political preferences V over voters’ types (i.e., incomes). In dual
provision systems, political preferences need not be single-peaked over the policy space
t ∈ [0, 1] (see, e.g., Stiglitz, 1974; Epple and Romano, 1996a; Barbera and Moreno,
2011; Luelfesmann and Myers, 2011). Hence, the median-voter theorem typically does
not apply. In the following, we will endow the collection of preferences {V (·, y)}y∈Y with
(more) structure. We choose assumptions such as to nest the standard dual provision
scenario by Epple and Romano (1996a) as the special case when image concerns are
absent (β = 0).
We first exclude the uninteresting case that the richest persons choose to consume in
the public system at the median income earner’s favorite policy:
Assumption 2.4 Hout(tin(ymed)) 6= ∅.
Assumption 2.4 appears as (A.6) in Epple and Romano (1996a). If it does not hold,
the median income earner is the decisive voter in an interior MVE.
We next assume that, for all y, the most-preferred tax rates tout(y) and tin(y) are unique
and that, within a consumption mode, no individual is ever indifferent between two tax
rates on the same side of his utility peak:
Assumption 2.5 For every y ∈ Y, V in(t, y) and V out(t, y) are single-peaked in t.
Single-peakedness of V in is also assumed in Luelfesmann and Myers (2011). Since
consumption for individuals outside the public system strictly decreases in t, single-
peakedness of V out is trivially satisfied in Epple and Romano (1996a) and Luelfesmann
and Myers (2011). It needs, however, to be explicitly assumed in the presence of image
concerns. Single-peakedness of both V out and V in does not imply single-peakedness of
their upper envelope V (see Barbera and Moreno, 2011). Naturally, however, t(y) ∈
{tout(y), tin(y)}. By construction, tout(y) ≤ t̂(y) ≤ tin(y).
The final two assumptions govern the distribution of favorite tax rates tout(y) and
tin(y) across incomes. Starting with Epple and Romano (1996a), dual provision models
20
CHAPTER 2. PUBLIC PROVISION WITH IMAGE CONCERNS
typically assume that favorite tax rates vary (weakly) monotonically in incomes. For
consumers in the public system, two scenarios are discussed: preferred tax rates tin(y)
increase or decrease in income. As only the former scenario generates interesting results
in the absence of image concerns, we choose to study it in the first place (the latter
scenario is covered by the general analysis of Proposition 2.6 below). Hence, we impose7
Assumption 2.6 For all y > y′,
∂V in(t, y′)
∂t




Assumption 2.6 and the maximum property of tin(y) entail that favorite tax rates are
weakly ordered in incomes: tin(y) ≥ [≤] tin(y′) for all y > [<] y′. These inequalities are
strict whenever tin(y′) is an interior maximum characterized by ∂V in(t, y′)/∂t = 0. I.e.,
richer individuals in the public system prefer higher tax rates. Keeping with the logic
of Assumption 2.6 also for those in the private system, we suggest
Assumption 2.7 For all y > y′,
∂V out(t, y′)
∂t




Assumption 2.7 implies that tout (weakly) increases with income. It is always satisfied in
the absence of image concerns (where ∂V out/∂t < 0 and tout = 0 for all y). Economically,
Assumption 2.7 conveys that the gain in image utility or social distinction from making
the private system more elitist is increasing in income. In an instrumental interpretation
of image concerns, Assumption 2.7 conveys that the utility gain from mixing with
the rich is complementary to income – which is a frequent assumption in matching
models (see, e.g., Levy and Razin, 2015). The monotonicity in Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7
only refers to preferences within each consumption system; no assumption is made on
marginal utility across systems.
By Assumptions 2.1 to 2.7, subsets H in− through H
out
+ are disjoint intervals that partition
Y into ascending income brackets. In Section 6 we show that the richness of coalitional
structures in our model does not hinge upon Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7.
7Epple and Romano (1996a) couch their analysis in terms of marginal willingnesses to pay. As-
sumption 2.6 then corresponds to their so-called SRI case. As in Luelfesmann and Myers (2011) and
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998), we equivalently phrase assumptions in terms of indirect utilities.
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2.5 Political and economic features of MVE
2.5.1 Equilibrium configurations
To appreciate Proposition 2.3 below, we briefly consider the case without image con-
cerns: β = 0. There, tout(y) = 0 for all y and Hout+ (t) is empty.
Proposition 2.2 (Epple and Romano, 1996a, Prop. 3) Suppose that β = 0 and
that Assumptions 2.1 to 2.7 hold. An interior MVE with dual provision is of the “ends-
against-the-middle” type, i.e.,
• there exist incomes y1, y2 with y1 < ymed ≤ y2 such that t∗ = tin(y1) = t̂(y2) <
tin(ymed);
• hout+ (t∗) = 0 and hin− (t∗) + hout− (t∗) = hin+ (t∗) = 1/2.
The ends-against-the-middle MVE in Proposition 2.2 derives its name from its coali-
tional structure (see Epple and Romano, 1996a, for a full discussion). At t∗, the upper
and lower “ends” of the income distribution – given by the income brackets [y, y1) in the
public system and (y2, ȳ] out of the public system (with y1 < y2) – would favor a lower
tax rate than t∗ while an equally large group of individuals with intermediate incomes
(the “middle”) would like to see the tax rate increased. Both the (combined) ends and
the middle constitute half of the population. Consequently, the median income earner
belongs to the middle group and consumes in the public system but the equilibrium tax
rate and provision level are lower than he would ideally have them.8
The next result reports that with image concerns the coalitional structures that can
prevail in a MVE are richer:
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that β > 0 and that Assumptions 2.1 to 2.7 hold. If an
interior MVE t∗ > 0 is such that the median income earner consumes in the public
system (i.e., if ymed ∈ H in(t∗)), then the MVE is of either of the following types:
(A) “Ends-against-the-middle”.
(B) “Ends-against-the-ends”:




− = 1/2 and y2 = ymed. At the expense of
some notational clutter (formally, the definition of y1 in (2.14) would have to be adjusted), this could
still be modelled as a degenerate ends-against-the-middle equilibrium. We will not pursue this here;
also see case (D.1) in Proposition 2.4.
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• there exist incomes y1 < y2 < y3 such t∗ = tin(y1) = t̂(y2) = tout(y3) <
tin(ymed);
• all four of hin− (t∗), hout− (t∗), hin+ (t∗), hout+ (t∗) are positive.
(C) “Median income earner”:
• t∗ = tin(ymed);
• hout− (t∗) = 0 and hin− (t∗) = hin+ (t∗) + hout+ (t∗) = 1/2.
Item (A) of Proposition 2.3 states that ends-against-the-middle MVE can arise also in
the presence of image concerns. Items (B) and (C) show that image concerns consid-
erably widen the variety of possible MVE configurations. A novel equilibrium type is
the ends-against-the-ends MVE (B). Here, all four types of political preference, each
held within a separate income bracket, are relevant. Individuals in the bottom end of
the income distribution (H in− = [y, y1]) consume the publicly provided option but would
prefer less of it. They coalesce with the “upper middle” class (Hout− = [y2, y3)) who con-
sumes x in the private system and would like to see public provision curtailed. These
two groups of opponents to public sector expansion are politically offset by two groups
of proponents: the “lower middle” class (H in+ = [y1, y2)) that consumes the publicly
provided option and the “rich” (Hout+ = [y3, ȳ]) who are out of the public system but
would still favor its expansion since that would boost their image utility from belonging
to the more select group of outsiders. As in the end-against-the-middle case, the MVE
tax is strictly lower than the median-income earner’s favorite tax rate: t∗ < tin(ymed).
Item (C) shows that also median income earner -type MVE can arise: t∗ = tin(ymed).
There, everybody outside the public system prefers to have a higher tax rate (i.e., Hout−
is empty) and, in that, coalesces with the higher-income earners in the public system.
Only the poor in the public system, H in− = [y, y1), object to tax rises. Since political
preferences are monotonically aligned with incomes, the MVE is the median income
earner’s preferred tax rate.
Equilibrium types (B) and (C) involve individuals who buy good x on their own but still
like to see public provision expanded (group Hout+ is non-empty). In the absence of image
concerns, such a preference cannot prevail out of the public system, and proponents for
public system expansion can only come from among public system users. Image concerns
provide a motive for non-users to endorse higher public provision: the benefit from the
attending increase in social status exceeds the deterioration in consumption utility. By
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Assumption 2.7, this motive is stronger for richer individuals. If it is strong enough
only for some of the non-users of public provision (viz., the richest group), then the
MVE will be of the ends-against-the-ends type (B); for some (not-so-rich) consumers
outside the public system image gains do not override their materialistic preference for
lower tax rates (Hout− 6= ∅). If everybody outside the public system wants higher taxes
(i.e., if image concerns are sufficiently strong), the median income earner MVE (C) will
prevail. Finally, if image concerns are weak, we are back in the ends-against-the-middle
MVE of Proposition 2.2 (case (A)).
Proposition 2.3 characterizes the possible types of interior MVE. It does not provide any
conditions for the emergence of a certain type (or for MVE existence). Such conditions
require, in a complex way, restrictions on consumption utilities, the income distribution,
and the strength of image concerns. Appendix 2.A.5 demonstrates by a worked example
with CES consumption utility and a Weibull-type distribution of incomes that all MVE
types of Proposition 2.3 can indeed arise (in that example, by letting the strength, β,
of image concerns vary alone). The example also illustrates that one cannot expect any
monotonic relation between β and the tax rate or provision level in a MVE.
2.5.2 Public provision for a minority
In the absence of image concerns (β = 0), those who opt out of the public system always
prefer a zero tax rate and provision level to any other policy. Hence, positive public
provision can only arise as a MVE if a majority of individuals actually uses the public
supply. By Assumption 2.3, this requires the median income earner to be in the public
system: if β = 0 and t∗ > 0, then ymed ∈ H in(t∗) (Epple and Romano, 1996a, Prop. 2).
This feature is certainly met for publicly provided goods such as schools or public health
services. In the cases of housing or (in some countries or cities) transportation, goods
are actually publicly provided while the majority chooses private alternatives. Image
concerns can help to explain such puzzles: even individuals who buy good x on markets
might benefit from the existence of a public sector as it enhances their image utility
from opting out. If this effect is strong enough, the decisive voter is willing to provide a
positive level of x̄ even if he himself relies on the private market. Majority voting then
leads to the provision of a good that the majority does not consume:
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 to 2.7 hold. If β > 0, the median
income earner can be out of the public system in an interior MVE: it is possible that
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t∗ > 0 and ymed /∈ H in(t∗).
Proposition 2.4 is verified in Appendix 2.A.6. There we provide an example with CES
consumption utilities and a uniform income distribution that features the majority in
the population supporting public provision while only a minority actually uses it.
One can show that the potential coalitional structures in a MVE where the median in-
come earner opts out of public provision are the same as those listed in Proposition 2.3.9
An ends-against-the-ends equilibrium has exactly the same coalitional structure as be-
fore: the upper [lower] ends in the public and private system forge a political alliance
for [against] a higher tax rate. The ends-against-the-middle equilibrium, however, re-
markably differs: when the majority is outside the public system, the rich and the poor
“ends” still form a political coalition but they now would vote for an expansion of public
provision (the middle class, buying in the market, favors tax cuts). In that sense, image
concerns can completely upset political preferences, relative to the standard framework.
2.5.3 Public vs. private provision levels
In the absence of image concerns, everybody who opts out of public provision in a MVE
purchases a higher level (or quality) of good x than the level x̄ provided in the public
system.10 This prediction is, however, not always in line with empirical evidence. For
instance, private schools do not always offer better quality than their public counterparts
(Figlio and Stone, 1999). Likewise, in many cities those who commute by car accept
significantly longer travel times or higher stress levels through congestion, although
convenient and quick public transport systems may exist. Conversely, many eligible
households do not take up in-kind transfer programs like Food Stamps or Medicare in
the U.S., although they can privately afford only a lower level of food or medical care
than offered in the public program (Currie and Gahvari, 2008).
Image concerns might explain why individuals choose a lower level of good x than x̄.11
In exchange for the gains in image utility from opting out of the public system some
individuals might be willing to accept lower consumption levels of both goods when
buying them on the market (for private car use, see Steg, 2005, or Litman, 2009). Con-
9The proof of this assertion follows, mutatis mutandis, the same logic as the proof of Proposition 2.3
and is omitted.
10For β = 0, individuals who opt out of the public system are characterized by u(x∗(y(1−t)), c∗(y(1−
t))) > u(x̄, y(1− t)). As c∗ = y(1− t)− x∗ < y(1− t), this can only hold if x∗(y(1− t)) > x̄.
11For education, alternative explanations have been put forward by, e.g., Figlio and Stone (1999),
Martinez-Mora (2006) or Brunello and Rocco (2008).
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versely, the stigmatization of public in-kind provision (relative to private consumption)
can make people avoid program take-up and sacrifice better consumption (Moffitt, 1983;
Besley and Coate, 1992).
Exiting public provision happens when
β
[
P out(t)− P in(t)
]
> u(x(t), y(1− t))− u(x∗, c∗). (2.12)
For β > 0, the gain in image utility from opting out is strictly positive (see Proposi-
tion 2.1). Hence, image concerns will induce some individuals to opt out of public provi-
sion even if that diminishes their consumption utility, i.e., if u(x∗, c∗) < u(x(t), y(1−t)).
Regardless of image concerns, opting out of public provision always goes along with a
reduced consumption of good c (since c∗ < y(1− t)). In the presence of image concerns
(and only then), also the consumption of good x may be lower for those who opt out
of public provision:
Proposition 2.5 In an interior MVE t∗ with image concerns, it is possible that
x∗(y(1− t∗)) < x(t∗) for some, and possibly even for all, y ∈ Hout(t∗).
The example in Appendix 2.A.6 can again serve as proof. There, the consumption
level of x for everybody who opts out of the public mode is lower in a MVE than the
publicly provided level x̄. In less extreme scenarios (not constructed here), the private
consumption of good x will be lower than the public level only for some of those who opt
out of public provision. Due to the normality of good x, this applies to individuals close
to the threshold of opting out (i.e., for whom (2.12) just holds). By Assumptions 2.1
to 2.3, these are the poorest among those who, in their desire to avoid stigma or to
mingle with the rich, opt out of public provision.
2.6 Generalization
Political preferences and, consequently, the coalitional structure in a MVE depend on
the interaction of direct preferences u(x, c), the income distribution F , and the specifics
of image concerns. If political preferences exhibit income monotonicity in the sense of
Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7, the specific equilibrium predictions in Propositions 2.3 (and
2.4) arise.
Independently of income monotonicity, a population that harbours image concerns can,
at any feasible policy, be partitioned with respect to political preferences into the four
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subgroups H in− to H
out
+ introduced in Section 2.4.1 (not all types of political preference
need to materialize in a MVE). As in an interior MVE the groups of opponents and
supporters of further tax increases are of equal size (Lemma 2.1), the coalitional struc-
tures in an interior, dual provision MVE with image concerns can only be of limited
variety, even without Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7:12
Proposition 2.6 Suppose that β > 0 and that Assumptions 2.1 to 2.5 hold. An interior
MVE t∗ with dual provision has either of the following coalitional structures:
(A.1) Hout(t∗) = Hout− (t
∗) and hin > 1/2: the majority of the population is in the public
system; all individuals out of the public system (and some inside) prefer a lower
tax rate than t∗.
(A.2) H in(t∗) = H in+ (t
∗) and hout > 1/2: the majority of the population is out of the
public system; all individuals in the public system (and some outside) prefer a
higher tax rate than t∗.
(B) None of H in− (t
∗) to Hout+ (t
∗) is empty: both among those in the public system and
among those outside there are opponents and supporters of an increase in the tax
rate beyond t∗.
(C.1) Hout(t∗) = Hout+ (t
∗) and hin > 1/2: the majority of the population is in the public
system; all individuals outside of the public system (and some inside) prefer a
higher tax rate than t∗.
(C.2) H in(t∗) = H in− (t
∗) and hout > 1/2: the majority of the population is outside the
public system; all individuals in the public system (and some outside) prefer a
lower tax rate than t∗.
Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7 turn the subgroups H in− to H
out
+ into ascending income brack-
ets. The equilibrium types end-against-the-middle, ends-against-the-ends, and median
income earner characterized in Proposition 2.3 under the proviso that ymed ∈ H in(t∗)
then correspond to (A.1), (B), and (C.1) in Proposition 2.6. Similarly, the MVE config-
urations mentioned below Proposition 2.4 for ymed /∈ H in(t∗) are represented by (A.2),
(B), and (C.2) in Proposition 2.6.
12Proposition 2.6 does not list two uninteresting knife-edge cases; see the proof.
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As a first application of Proposition 2.6, consider a scenario where the inequalities
in Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7 are reversed. Economically, this means that poorer con-
sumers of the publicly provided good are less reluctant to finance an expansion than
richer consumers; among those who opt out of public provision, the willingness to bear
tax increases that entice others back into the public system is lower for the very rich
than for the moderately rich. Without image concerns, the MVE is always of the me-
dian income earner-type (Epple and Romano, 1996a, SDI-case). In the presence of
image concerns, however, a similarly rich assortment of possible MVE configurations
as in Proposition 2.3 emerges.13 In particular, both ends-against-the-middle and ends-
against-the-ends equilibria can arise.
Proposition 2.6 is also applicable without uniform monotonicity assumptions on pre-
ferred tax rates. The precise structure of a MVE then depends on the distribution
of the signs of ∂V in(t, y)/∂t and ∂V out(t, y)/∂t over Y , allowing for an even finer seg-
mentation of the population and manifold coalitional structures. In summary, image
concerns substantially enlarge the set of political equilibrium patterns.
Finally, Proposition 2.6 also shows that the feature that, with image concerns, pub-
lic provision might arise in a MVE although a majority does not take up the public
program, is compatible with several types of coalitional structures.14
2.7 Conclusion
Governments provide goods to their citizens that are at least partly private in nature:
education, housing, transport, health services etc. In democratic regimes, such pro-
vision must find support among a majority of citizens15 whose political preferences
for or against (a larger volume of) public provision are shaped by individualistic cost-
benefit deliberations as well as by social motives. Our analysis demonstrates that social
motives, here exemplified by endogenous image concerns, can substantially affect the
political and economic properties of voting equilibria.
Our paper contributes to a better understanding of redistributive policies (or the “wel-
fare state”) in various ways. First, a dual provision scheme potentially endows society
13Formally, reverting the inequalities in Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7 implies that both tin(y) and tout(y)
decrease in y (on their domains), inverting the income stratification in the subgroups of Hin and Hout.
14Equilibria of type (B) in Proposition 2.6 can go along with both hin > 1/2 or hin < 1/2.
15From a social planner perspective, the public provision of private goods can also be motivated by
externality or market failure arguments (see, e.g., Levy 2005).
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with a screening mechanism: if the partitioning of the population into non-users and
users of publicly provided goods runs parallel to a stratification into high- and low-
status groups, image-concerned non-users may be willing to subsidize public provision
although they do not materially benefit from it. Image concerns, thus, complement
social motives such as altruism (Coate, 1995), concerns for equal opportunities (Gas-
parini and Pinto, 2006) or paternalistic preferences that also help to explain why, e.g.,
certain private goods are publicly provided though the majority does not take them up.
Unlike image concerns, these types of social preferences cannot, however, accommodate
for private consumption being at a lower level than public provision.
Second, every redistributive mechanism, whether in cash or in-kind, partitions the pop-
ulation into two social groups – beneficiaries and net contributors – and can, in principle,
generate informative signals about an underlying status-bearing personal characteristic
such as income, a strong work ethic etc. Our results, thus, generally apply for both
cash and in-kind transfers. However, taking up or declining a publicly provided good
(such as schools, housing, transport) is more openly visible than receiving (or even not-
receiving) a monetary payment. In-kind transfers are more discriminatory than cash
transfers (Besley and Coate, 1992), and image concerns will work to a stronger effect
with in-kind programs. In fact, due to image concerns in-kind programs might survive
in a political process where cash transfers fail. This observation may contribute to the
ongoing debate why there is so much in-kind redistribution although cash transfers are
available and economically superior (see, e.g., Currie and Gahvari, 2008).
Generally, in the presence of image concerns richer individuals are likely to favor, for a
given level of redistribution, a discriminatory in-kind system whereas poorer individuals
will support the more anonymous cash-transfer system. To study which system (or





2.A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The fact that P out > P in can directly be seen from (2.10): individuals in the private


















· (E(y|y ≥ ŷ)− ŷ) · dŷ
dt
> 0,






· (ŷ − E(y|y ≤ ŷ)) · dŷ
dt
> 0.
This proves (2.11). 
2.A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Note that H in− (t) through H
out
+ (t) partition Y by construction. Hence, hin− +hout− +hin+ +
hout+ = 1 for all t, where all measures are continuous. By the dual provision property,
Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, we have t > t̂(y). Any t > t̂(y) with hout− (t) + h
in
− (t) > 1/2 >
hout+ (t) + h
in
+ (t) can be defeated in majority vote against a suitably chosen, slightly
lower tax rate; any t > t̂(y) with hout− (t) + h
in
− (t) < 1/2 < h
out
+ (t) + h
in
+ (t) would lose
against a slightly higher tax rate. Hence, only tax rates such that hout− (t) + h
in
− (t) =
hout+ (t) + h
in
+ (t) = 1/2 can be MVE. 
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Suppose that β = 0 and consider an interior MVE t∗ > 0 with dual provision. Since, in
the absence of image concerns, hout+ (t) = 0 for all feasible t, Lemma 2.1 directly implies
that the coalitional structure at t∗ must be such that hin− (t
∗) + hout− (t
∗) = hin+ (t
∗) = 1/2.
Moreover, ymed ∈ H in(t∗) and, thus, hin(t∗) ≥ 1/2 ≥ hout− (t∗) > 0, the latter due to dual
provision. Moreover, a threshold ŷ(t∗) exists such that ŷ(t∗) ≥ ymed. It can be shown
that for a MVE16
tin(y) ≤ t∗ < tin(ymed) (2.13)
16See Appendix 2.A.8 or Proposition 2 and Corollary 2 in Epple and Romano (1996a).
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must hold. Since we require the majority to stay in the public system, all tax rates
t ≤ t̂(ymed) can be ruled out as a MVE. Hence, a MVE t∗ must come from the interval
[max{t̂(ymed), tin(y)}, tin(ymed)). It, thus, satisfies
∂V in(t∗, y)
∂t




By the continuity of the distribution F (y) and Assumption 2.6 there exists
y1 = max
{
y ∈ [y, ymed)
∣∣∣∣∂V in(t∗, y)∂t ≤ 0
}
. (2.14)
Moreover, set y2 = ŷ(t
∗). By Assumption 2.6 we then get that H in− (t
∗) = [y, y1),
H in+ (t
∗) = [y1, y2), and H
out
− = [y2, ȳ].
17 
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2.3
By similar lines of reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 2.2, it can be excluded that a
MVE has t∗ > tin(ymed): in these cases h
in
− would be strictly larger than 1/2, contradict-
ing Lemma 2.1. Since we require the majority to stay in the public system, all tax rates
t < t̂(ymed) can be ruled out as a MVE. Should they exist, tax rates in [t̂(ymed), t
in(y))
can also be disregarded as MVE: they would have hin+ > 1/2 by Assumption 2.6. Hence,
an interior MVE t∗ with ymed ∈ H in(t∗) must lie in [max{t̂(ymed), tin(y)}, tin(ymed)].
The dual provision property requires that Hout(t∗) is non-empty. Thus, at most one of
hout+ (t
∗) and hout− (t
∗) can be zero. This gives rise to three cases:
(A) Assume that only hout+ (t
∗) is zero. From Lemma 2.1, hin+ (t
∗) = 1/2 and hin− (t
∗) ≥ 0.
By Assumptions 2.6 and 2.7, subsets H in− (t
∗), H in+ (t
∗) and Hout− (t
∗) partition Y
into ascending income brackets, where the latter two subsets are separated by
ŷ(t∗) =: y2. Define y1 as in (2.14). Recall that t
in(y) ≤ tin(y1) < tin(ymed).
Then a MVE has t∗ = tin(y1) and H
in
− (t
∗) = [y, y1), H
in
+ (t
∗) = [y1, y2), and
Hout− (t
∗) = [y2, ȳ], as in Proposition 2.2.
18
(B) Assume that both hout− (t
∗) and hout+ (t
∗) are non-zero. Dual provision and the fact
17For completeness, consider the case that Assumption 2.4 does not hold. Then tin(ymed) is the only
candidate for an interior MVE by the median-voter theorem: If t > tin(ymed), then V
in(tin(ymed), y) >
V in(t, y) for all y ≤ ymed and for some y > ymed, a set with a measure larger than 1/2. If t < tin(ymed),
then V in(tin(ymed), y) > V
in(t, y) for all y ≥ ymed and for some y < ymed, again a set of measure
larger than 1/2.
18A limiting case, already reported in footnote 8, with hin− (t
∗) = 0 and hin+ (t





that t∗ ≥ t̂(ymed) imply that both hin− (t∗) and hin+ (t∗) are strictly greater than zero,
too.19 Non-emptiness of all four subgroups H in− (t
∗), H in+ (t
∗), Hout− (t
∗) and Hout+ (t
∗)
and income sorting from H in− (t
∗) to Hout+ (t
∗) implies that t∗ = tin(y1) = t̂(y2) =
tout(y3) for three distinct y1 < y2 < y3. Depending on whether h
in is equal to
or strictly greater than 1/2, ŷ(t∗) = ymed or ŷ(t
∗) > ymed and t
∗ = t̂(ymed) or
t∗ > t̂(ymed). Moreover, since h
in
− (t
∗) < 1/2, t∗ < tin(ymed).
(C) Assume that only hout− (t
∗) is zero. By Lemma 2.1, hin− (t
∗) = 1/2 (and hin+ ≥ 0).
Due to income sorting, t∗ = t(ymed). If h
in
+ > 0, t
out(ymed) < t
∗ = tin(ymed) and
ymed < ŷ. If h
in
+ = 0, t
∗ = tin(ymed) = t
out(ymed) = t̂(ymed) and y
∗ = ymed = ŷ.
This gives rise to configurations (A) through (C), as claimed. 
2.A.5 Example for Proposition 2.3
The simulations underlying this and all following other examples were done with the
help of Mathematica. Source codes are available on request.
Assume that consumption preferences are represented by CES utility function




αx1−γ + (1− α) c1−γ
)
, (2.15)




0 y ≤ y
1− e−(y/σ)µ y < y ≤ ya
1 + e−(ya/σ)
µ (y−ȳ)
(ȳ−ya) ya < y ≤ ȳ
1 otherwise.
This piecewise distribution is Weibull on [y, ya) and uniform on [ya, ȳ] (the piecewise
specification ensures that the support of F is bounded). Setting y = 0, ya = 15,
µ = 0.35 and σ = 0.37, this distribution is positively skewed with median ymed = 0.13
and mean Y = 5.96. It can be verified that Assumptions 2.1 to 2.7 are satisfied.
19With dual provision, hin− (t
∗) and hin+ (t
∗) cannot be zero at the same time. If hin− (t
∗) 6= 0 and
hin+ (t
∗) = 0, then hout+ (t
∗) = 1/2 from Lemma 2.1. Since hout− (t
∗) 6= 0 by assumption, Hout would
comprises more than 50 % of the population, including (from Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3), the median
income earner. If hin− (t
∗) = 0 and hin+ (t
∗) 6= 0, then hout− (t∗) = 1/2, which, together with hout+ (t∗) > 0,
contradicts t∗ ≥ t̂(ymed) as well.
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Table 2.1 reports the features of the MVE if we sequentially increase the strength of
image concerns, represented by β. In particular, the MVE type changes from ends-
against-the-middle to ends-against-the-ends to median income earner. The equilibrium
β t∗ x(t∗) ŷ MVE type
0.000018 0.008 0.05 2.56 ends-against-the-middle
0.0002 0.010 0.07 2.68 ends-against-the-ends
0.001 0.012 0.08 1.90 median income earner
Tab. 2.1: MVE in Example 1
structures are visualized in Figure 2.1. The vertical axis in each panel depicts the sign
of ∂V (t∗, y)/∂t for y ∈ Y and, thus, indicates whether the individual would prefer a
higher (represented by value +1) or a lower tax rate (−1) than t∗. The union of the
plus-groups and the union of the minus-groups form the political coalitions, H in+ ∪Hout+
and H in− ∪ Hout− . Income level ŷ separates users outside and inside the public system.
At the jumps, political preferences change. E.g., in Panel (A), individuals with incomes
smaller than ys = 0.04 or above ŷ = 2.56 prefer a lower tax rate while individuals
with incomes between ys and ŷ (including ymed) favor tax rates larger than t
∗. This
constitutes an end-against-the-middle configuration. Panels (B) and (C) depict ends-
against-the-ends and median income earner configurations. In all panels, the plus- and
the minus-groups each have measure 1/2 with respect to F . In Appendix 2.A.9 we
verify that the t∗ reported in Table 2.1 indeed constitute MVE: they garner at least a
50%-majority in all binary comparisons against alternative feasible tax rates (including
t = 0).
2.A.6 Example for Propositions 2.4 and 2.5
In this example we use CES consumption preferences (2.15) with parameters α = 0.1
and γ = 1.02. Image utility has strength β = 0.01. Incomes are uniformly distributed
on [y, ȳ] = [0, 100] such that ymed = Y = 50. The interior MVE is of the ends-against-
the-middle type (see panel (i) in Figure 2.2). As panel (ii) demonstrates, it has two
interesting features:
• The median income earner and, with him, a majority of individuals opt out of
public supply at t∗ (cf. Proposition 2.4).
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(C): Median income earner (β = 0.001)
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• Everybody outside the public system (including the median income earner) pur-
chases less of good x than x̄ = x(t∗) (cf. Proposition 2.5).

















2.A.7 Proof of Proposition 2.6
By Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3, the sets H in(t) and Hout(t) are, for any feasible tax rate t,
non-empty intervals of Y , separated by ŷ. Moreover, subsets H in− (t) to Hout+ (t) (some
of which can be empty) partition Y . Since hin− (t∗) + hout− (t∗) = hin+ (t∗) + hout+ (t∗) = 1/2
holds in any interior MVE (Lemma 2.1), at most two of H in− to H
out
+ can be empty.
Additionally, the dual provision property precludes that cases H in− = H
in
+ = ∅ and
Hout− = H
out
+ = ∅ can arise. Hence, the following seven cases are an exhaustive enumer-
ation of what can happen in a MVE t∗:
(A.1) Hout+ (t
∗) = ∅ (while all other subsets are non-empty): Then hin+ = 1/2. Moreover,
hout− > 0, h
in
− > 0, and both sum up to 1/2. Moreover, h
in > 1/2, implying
ymed ∈ H in.
(A.2) H in− (t
∗) = ∅: Then hout− = 1/2. Moreover, hout+ > 0, hin+ > 0, and both sum up to
1/2. Moreover, hout > 1/2, implying ymed ∈ Hout.
(B) None of H in− to H
out
+ is empty at t
∗: Then t∗ = tin(y′) = tout(y′′) for two distinct
y′′ > y′ with y′ ∈ H in and y′′ ∈ Hout (two decisive voters). In the groups both of
those in the public system and of those outside, there are individuals with who




∗) = ∅: Then hin− = 1/2. Moreover, hout+ > 0, hin+ > 0, and both sum up to
1/2. Consequently, hin > 1/2, implying ymed ∈ Hin.
(C.2) H in+ (t
∗) = ∅: Then hout+ = 1/2, hout− > 0, hin− > 0, and hout > 1/2, implying
ymed ∈ Hout.
(D.1) H in+ = H
out
− = ∅: Then hin− = hout+ = 1/2. Hence, t−1(t∗) = ymed. All individuals
with below-median incomes are in the public system and would prefer a higher
tax rate; all others are out and would prefer a lower tax rate.
(D.2) H in− = H
out
+ = ∅: Then hin+ = hout− = 1/2. Again, t−1(t∗) = ymed. All individuals
with below-median incomes are out of the public system and would prefer a lower
tax rate; all others are in and would prefer a higher tax rate.
Equilibria (D.1) and (D.2) are uninteresting knife-edge cases, omitted from the propo-
sition. 
2.A.8 Proof of (2.13)
Clearly, any t ≤ t̂(y) can be excluded as an interior MVE since it would be unanimously
out-voted by any smaller t. More strictly, all t0 ∈ (t̂(y), tin(y)) can also be excluded as an
interior MVE. At any such t0, H
in(t0) = [y, y0] with y0 = ŷ(t0) > y from Assumption 2.2.
• If y0 > ymed, all individuals with y ∈ [y, y0] would prefer a slightly higher t to t0;
this is due to the fact that t0 < t
in(y) < tin(y) for all y ∈ (y, y0] by Assumption 2.6.
Since y0 > ymed, we have h
in(t0) > 1/2, and t0 cannot be a MVE.
• If y0 < ymed, then hout(t0) > 1/2 such that t0 would lose a majority vote against
any smaller t. Hence, t0 again cannot be a MVE.
Finally consider tin(ymed). By Assumption 2.6, t
in(ymed) > t
in(y). Assump-
tion 2.4 together with Assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 implies that there exists y′ such that
V out(tin(ymed), y) > V
in(tin(ymed), y) for all y > y
′. As a consequence, tin(ymed) cannot
be a MVE. It loses in majority comparison against all t′ smaller than, but suitably close
to, tin(ymed): everybody in H
out(t′) (which is non-empty since Hout(tin(ymed)) 6= ∅ and
t′ is close to tin(ymed)) and everybody in {y|V in(t′, y) > V in(tin(ymed), y)} prefer t′ to
tin(ymed). Since the measure of the latter set alone approaches 1/2 for t
′ suitably close
to tin(ymed), the two sets together have measure strictly larger than 1/2.
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Since a policy t > tin(ymed) cannot be a MVE either (it would lose a majority vote
against tin(ymed)), an interior MVE must satisfy (2.13). 
2.A.9 Verification of MVE for Example 2.A.5
To confirm that the tax rates t∗ reported in the example of Appendix 2.A.5 are indeed
MVE, we let each of them run in pairwise majority comparison against all alternative
feasible tax rates (including t = 0). Panels (A) to (C) in Figure 2.3 plot the shares
of individuals preferring t∗ in pairwise comparison; for graphical reasons we only plot
tax rates in a range from 0 to 0.15. As can be seen, the t∗ always garner more than
50 percent of the popular vote and are, thus, indeed MVE. In the example, equilibria
gradually change from type (A) via (B) to (C) when the intensity of image concerns
increases. This monotonicity is not general, though. For instance, for β ≥ 0.015, the
equilibrium again has the ends-against-the-ends structure (B). Likewise, the equilibrium
values of tax rate t∗ and public provision level x̄(t∗) vary non-monotonically with β.
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Fig. 2.3: Vote shares for t∗








(A): β = 0.000018








(B): β = 0.0002








(C): β = 0.001
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Chapter 3
Relative Consumption and the Public Provision of Private Goods1
3.1 Introduction
In most countries, a significant share of the public budget is devoted to the provision
of goods that are essentially private in nature – such as health care, education, child
care, housing, and nutrition. The volume of public in-kind spending ranges from 5 to 20
percent of GDP in members of the OECD, and is still growing in many countries, both
developed and developing (Bearse et al., 2000; Currie and Gahvari, 2008). Traditional
economic theory offers no rationale for publicly providing specific private goods: as
government-provided goods are typically also available on markets, replacing public
provision with cash payments of equal value should (weakly) increase welfare, since
then, people can choose consumption bundles that best suit their preferences.
In the past decades, several normative explanations for public provision have been put
forward, including paternalism (Sandmo, 1983; Besley, 1988), motives of redistribution
under informational constraints (Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Blackorby and Donald-
son, 1988; Besley and Coate, 1991), positive (production) externalities (Barr, 2012),
and notions of equality of opportunity (Gasparini and Pinto, 2006). In this paper, we
provide an alternative explanation: the public provision of private goods may serve as
an instrument to correct inefficient consumer choices when people have concerns for
relative consumption.
1An earlier version of the chapter is available as Number 510 of Hannover Economic Papers (HEP).
Earlier versions were presented at 18th Spring Meeting of Young Economists (Aarhus, Denmark), the
14th Meeting of the Association for Public Economic Theory (Lisbon, Portugal), the 69th Congress
of the International Institute of Public Finance (Taormina, Italy), the 28th Congress of the Euro-
pean Economic Association (Gothenburg, Sweden) and at the 2014 Annual Conference of the Royal
Economic Society (Manchester, Great Britain).
3.1. INTRODUCTION
While standard economic theory assumes that individuals only derive utility from goods
and services per se, there is growing evidence in line with the idea that consumers’
choices and satisfaction are also affected by the comparisons they make: individuals
relate their own consumption to that of others and feel pleasure [discomfort] when they
possess more [less] than their social peers.2 For instance, people may enjoy their new
car, but it feels even nicer when the car is bigger than that of one’s friends, colleagues, or
neighbors. Conversely, the Smiths may be no longer satisfied with their latest purchases
if they see the Joneses enjoying a more lavish lifestyle – and engage in further spending
races to try catching up (Dupor and Liu, 2003; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004).
As argued by Hirsch (1976) and Frank (1985b), and supported by findings in the em-
pirical literature on conspicuous consumption (see, e.g., Charles et al. 2009), relative
consumption concerns are not equally important for all goods.3 There are “positional”
goods, whose value depends relatively strongly on how they compare with things con-
sumed by others, and “non-positional” goods for which only one’s own, absolute con-
sumption matters.4
When people care for relative consumption, preferences are interdependent. If one indi-
vidual consumes more of a positional good, others’ relative consumption and well-being
ceteris paribus decline. As people neglect that their positional spending imposes a harm
on others, unregulated consumption choices are inefficient; people spend “too much” on
positional goods while spending “too little” on other, non-positional items. Then, re-
stricting consumer choices via public provision can be desirable: by providing a certain
level of a non-positional good and financing it through incomes taxes, governments can
alter how individuals spend their incomes and induce them to consume less of positional
goods and more of non-positional goods.
We formalize this argument in a model with two private goods and two types of individ-
2The idea of relative consumption concerns traces (at least) back to Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry
(1949). For recent evidence on the importance of relative consumption concerns, see, for example, Frey
and Stutzer (2002), Bowles and Park (2005), Luttmer (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson
et al. (2007), Clark et al. (2008), Charles et al. (2009), Clark and Senik (2010), Heffetz (2011), Frank
and Heffetz (2011), Friehe and Mechtel (2014) and Roth (2014).
3See also Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Heffetz (2011) and Roth (2014).
4People might care about consumption positions for several reasons (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004;
Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2012). For example, to the extent that a favorable consumption position con-
veys a superior position in some underlying status scale (e.g., wealth or income), a preference for
relative consumption may reflect a desire for high social status (Arrow and Dasgupta, 2009). Likewise,
concerns for relative consumption may also originate from feelings of jealousy, envy or relative depriva-
tion (Dupor and Liu, 2003). We do not presuppose one or another candidate motive. What is crucial
to our analysis is the hypothesis that an individual suffers utility losses when others’ consumption
levels rise.
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uals who differ in exogenous gross incomes (“rich” and “poor”). One good is positional,
the other non-positional. In addition to the absolute consumption of both goods, in-
dividuals care about how their consumption of the positional good compares to an
endogenous reference level – of which they dislike being behind and enjoy being ahead.
Reference levels may differ across income groups and are modeled as a general, weakly
increasing function of both groups’ average positional spending. This formulation al-
lows us to distinguish between different types of social comparisons discussed in the
literature on social psychology and economics (Falk and Knell, 2004) – including up-
ward, downward, or within-group comparisons.5 We start our analysis with the public
provision of non-positional goods, which is typically attributed to health care, old-age
provision, nutrition, and basic education (Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Charles et al.
2009; Heffetz, 2011). In particular, the government may provide a uniform amount
of the non-positional good that is offered to all individuals free of charge and can be
topped up by additional purchases on a market. To finance public provision, (lump-
sum) income taxes can be levied.
We find that public provision can always achieve Pareto improvements over a laissez-
faire without government intervention if at least one income group compares its posi-
tional good consumption with that of the poor – a condition satisfied by many specifi-
cations of reference functions such as average, within-group, or downward comparisons.
To get an intuition, assume that the government sets the public provision level slightly
above the amount consumed by the poor in the laissez-faire and raises income taxes by
an equal-valued amount. This policy change does not alter the material utilities of both
income types: as the rich had purchased a larger amount of the non-positional good
anyway, their consumption choice is not affected; they take the publicly provided level
and top it up through additional purchases. The poor are forced to marginally reduce
their spending on the positional and to increase the consumption of the non-positional
good, which – by the Envelope-Theorem – produces only negligible second-order effects.
However, if at least one income type socially compares with the poor, the enforced re-
duction in positional spending of the poor decreases (some) individuals’ reference levels,
and thus, has positive first-order welfare effects.
We extend our simple model to several directions. In our basic set-up, social com-
parisons only have an effect on utility but not on consumption behavior. However, an
5While earlier contributions focus on comparisons with the economy-wide average positional con-
sumption (see, e.g., Dupor and Liu, 2003), a growing body of work studies the policy implications of
different comparison motives (see, for example, Micheletto, 2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013).
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individual’s relative position may also affect her marginal propensity to consume. While
the presence of such peer effects in consumption considerably complicates the analysis
and can give rise to multiple equilibria, we derive a tractable sufficient condition for
public provision to be always Pareto-improving. This condition not only requires that
individuals compare themselves with the poor, but also that people consume more of the
positional good if others’ consumption levels rise, a property that is labeled “keeping-up
with the Joneses” and considered the relevant case in the recent empirical literature on
conspicuous consumption (see, e.g., Kuhn et al., 2011; Roth, 2014).
To underscore the efficiency-enhancing potential of public provision, we also study the
case where a uniform tax on the positional good – a standard policy recommendation
to address inefficiencies from status consumption – is available (Ireland, 1994; Hop-
kins and Kornienko, 2004; Micheletto, 2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013). We
provide simple necessary and sufficient conditions such that public provision can be
Pareto-improving even if the tax is optimally chosen. Basically, there is room for public
provision in all cases where the “marginal social harms” of positional good consumption
differ across social groups. Moreover, we show that a combination of public provision
and a consumption tax can achieve Pareto efficient allocations – which is, in general, im-
possible if only a single instrument is available. However, under specific circumstances,
public provision might implement efficient allocations alone, and therefore even domi-
nate the taxation of the positional good.
As certain publicly provided goods like higher education are sometimes considered as
positional (Frank, 1985a), we finally discuss the role of the public provision of positional
goods. Pareto improvements are then only possible in a provision system where addi-
tional purchases on top of the publicly provided level are infeasible. Intuitively, public
provision could not distort individuals’ positional good consumption downwards if they
were allowed to buy additional units on markets.
The relevance of our analysis is supported by the growing evidence that concerns for
relative standing play a crucial role in explaining individual consumption patterns and
seem to be particularly important among lower income groups. For instance, using
U.S. household consumption data, Charles et al. (2009) find that minorities (Blacks
and Hispanics) spend more on conspicuous goods (jewelry, clothes) than do comparable
Whites. These expenditure differences are associated with substantial diversions of
resources from inconspicuous or non-positional goods such as education, health care, and
food. Similar patterns hold for developing countries, where the poor devote relatively
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large fractions of their incomes on festivals, weddings, or funerals (Banerjee and Duflo,
2007; Case et al., 2008). Such behavior is often interpreted as satisfying needs to signal a
high relative standing (Moav and Neemann, 2010, 2012), and, in most cases, financed by
borrowing against the future (e.g., reduced old-age provision) or by diverting resources
away from basic education or health prevention like mosquito nets, preventive drugs, or
basic vaccination (Brown et al., 2011; Khamis et al., 2012; Moav and Neemann, 2012).
Public provision is an effective instrument to correct such status-driven distortions in
consumer choices: as long as demands for the non-positional and under-consumed goods
are increasing in income, governments can separately target the poor while leaving richer
individuals unaffected – an objective that a uniform consumption tax cannot achieve.
We contribute to the theoretical literature on the public provision of private goods
or in-kind transfers (see Currie and Gahvari, 2008, for a survey). In contrast to the
majority of existing explanations, we abstain from redistributive or paternalistic motives
and provide a pure efficiency rationale. This is not to say that relative consumption
concerns are the only (normative) justification for public provision; rather, we consider
our rationale as complementary to the existing ones – and, given the importance of
status concerns and social comparisons for consumption choices and individual well-
being, as an empirically relevant additional explanation.
Our paper is also related to the literature studying the policy implications of concerns
for relative standing. Earlier contributions mainly focus on price instruments – either
in the form of consumption taxes and subsidies (Corneo and Jeanne, 1997; Hopkins
and Kornienko, 2004; Micheletto, 2008; Truyts, 2012; Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013)
or income taxation (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Blomquist, 1993; Ireland, 1998,
2001; Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman, 2008, 2010). We complement existing studies
by highlighting the usefulness of quantity instruments to cope with the inefficiencies
arising from relative consumption concerns – a role that has been largely ignored in
previous work. An important exception is Ireland (1994). Using a signaling framework,
he develops the idea that public provision or in-kind spending is an instrument to reduce
people’s consumption of conspicuous goods. However, he does not perform any welfare
analysis. We extend his study and show that public provision can indeed induce Pareto
improvements. In addition, while Ireland (1994) only uses quasi-linear examples, our
results apply for more general preference specifications. Finally, we provide a joint
analysis of consumption taxes and public provision.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical framework
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and presents the economic problem. Section 3.3 illustrates the efficiency-enhancing
potential of public provision. Peer effects in consumption are considered in Section 3.4.
Section 3.5 studies the case where consumption taxes are available. Section 3.6 analyzes
whether Pareto efficient allocations can be attained. Section 3.7 considers the public




General: Consider an economy populated by a large number of individuals. Individ-
uals can be of two types i = 1, 2 who differ in their endowments or gross incomes yi,
where y1 < y2. We henceforth label individuals of type 1 as “the poor” and of type 2
as “the rich”. For simplicity, the number of each type is normalized to one. There are
two private goods, denoted c and x. Both goods are produced by perfectly competitive
industries using a linear production technology and individuals’ endowments yi as the
only inputs. As a consequence, producer prices are fixed; we normalize them to one.
Given this simple structure, any demanded quantities for goods c and x are produced,
and we can neglect the production side in what follows.
Preferences: Individuals derive utility from the absolute consumption of c and x. In
addition, they care about relative consumption ∆, i.e., about how their own consump-
tion levels compare to that of others. As suggested by recent empirical evidence, the im-
portance of consumption comparisons may differ across goods (Solnick and Hemenway,
2005; Charles et al. 2009; Heffetz, 2011). We assume that good c is positional, meaning
that both absolute and relative consumption levels matter. Good x is non-positional,
and individuals only care about it’s absolute consumption. Formally, preferences are
represented by a utility function U : R3 → R, with
U (c, x,∆) = u (c, x) + ∆. (3.1)
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In (3.1), u(c, x) is absolute consumption utility, where u : R2+ → R is strictly increasing
in both arguments, twice continuously differentiable, and strongly quasi-concave.6 De-
note individual consumption levels of both goods by ci and xi. We define individual i’s
relative consumption ∆i as the difference between her own consumption of good c and
some reference level ri:7
∆i := ci − ri. (3.2)
An individual’s reference level is (weakly) increasing in both the average positional good
consumption of her own and that of the respective other income group. As individuals
with the same gross income are identical, in equilibrium, ci will coincide with average
consumption of group i. Thus, with a slight abuse of notation, we define ri as a non-
decreasing, twice continuously differentiable function hi : R2+ → Ki ⊂ R1, with
ri := hi(ci, cj),
∂hi
∂ci
≥ 0 and ∂h
i
∂cj
≥ 0 for i 6= j. (3.3)
We restrict the range of hi to Ki := {ri | 0 ≤ ri ≤ y1 + y2}, which means that reference
levels cannot be larger than the economy’s aggregate resource endowment and ensures
the existence of an equilibrium (see Section 3.4). In addition, for at least one income
type, either of the derivatives ∂hi/∂ci or ∂hi/∂cj must be strictly greater than zero for
all (ci, cj) – otherwise, all reference levels would be exogenous and a market inefficiency
would not occur (see below).
Substituting (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.1), an individual’s utility is
U i∗(c
i, xi, cj) := u(ci, xi) + ci − hi(ci, cj) for i 6= j, (3.4)
where U i∗ : R3+ → R. We assume that U i∗ is strongly quasi-concave and that relative
consumption concerns are not “too strong” in the sense that U i∗ strictly increases in
ci.8 According to (3.4), individuals’ utilities may – through the reference functions hi
– decrease in the consumption levels of others.
6Strong quasi-concavity is less general than strict quasi-concavity (see, e.g., Barten and Böhm,
1982; Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2010). It ensures that the bordered Hessian matrix of U is negative
definite and allows us to analyze comparative statics of individual demands.
7We use this specific form of preferences to illustrate our main points as simple as possible. In
Section 3.4, we study more general preferences.
8An equivalent assumption is made in Dupor and Liu (2003) and Dufwenberg et al. (2011).
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Social comparisons: The general formulation of hi includes comparisons with the
average consumption of the entire economy c̄ := (c1 + c2) /2 as a special case. A key
feature of our formulation is, however, to allow different individuals to have different
reference levels, which captures ideas from social psychology that the notion of what
constitutes a“referent other”may considerably vary across individuals and social groups
(Suls and Wills, 1991). According to the similarity hypothesis, for example, social
comparisons are local: individuals are more concerned about the consumption levels of
their immediate associates than of people who are socially distant (see, e.g., Festinger,
1954; Runciman, 1966; Frank, 1984). In this case, an individual feels envious when
another person has a bigger car – but more so, if the other person is one’s neighbor,
colleague, friend, or family member. In our framework with two social groups, we can
represent such local comparisons by letting individuals’ reference levels be exclusively
sensitive to the consumption of members of their own income group, i.e., ∂h1/∂c1 > 0,
∂h2/∂c2 > 0, and ∂h1/∂c2 = ∂h2/∂c1 = 0 (pure within-group comparisons).
In contrast to comparisons within similar groups, Duesenberry (1949) suggests that
people are upward looking and mainly care about the consumption of individuals who
are ranked socially higher. Taken to the extreme, pure upward comparisons would entail
∂h1/∂c2 > 0, ∂h1/∂c1 = ∂h2/∂c2 = ∂h2/∂c1 = 0.
The opposite polar case is when individuals relate only to those below them in the
income ranking. As is advocated by self-enhancement theory, individuals compare with
others in order to make themselves feel better, and therefore tend to compare downward
as a means to increase self-esteem (Wood and Taylor, 1991). In the case of pure down-
ward comparisons, we would have ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 and ∂h2/∂c2 = ∂h1/∂c1 = ∂h1/∂c2 = 0.9
Such a reference specification also entails elements of Veblen’s (1899) snobbism, where
the rich’s primary social motive is to behaviorally separate from the poor. While we do
not take any position on these views, our modeling enables us to explicitly distinguish
between different kinds of social comparisons.
9Strictly speaking, this reasoning considers reference levels as an active choice variable. Endoge-
nizing reference levels (as well as the dimensions over which individuals compare) is beyond the scope
of this paper and left for future research.
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3.2.2 Behavior and equilibrium
When making consumption choices, each individual treats her reference level as exoge-
nous.10 Utility for a given reference level is represented by the function Ũ : R3+ → R,
with
Ũ(ci, xi, ri) := u(ci, xi) + ci − ri. (3.5)
We require Ũ to be strongly quasi-concave in xi and ci, i.e., given a reference level,
preferences over the positional and non-positional good are strictly convex. In addition,
let Ũ (ci, xi, ri) > Ũ (0, x̂i, ri) and Ũ (ci, xi, ri) > Ũ (ĉi, 0, ri) for all ri, ci > 0, xi > 0,
ĉi ≥ 0 and x̂i ≥ 0, which ensures strictly positive demands for both goods for positive
incomes.
Denote the set of consumption bundles available to individual i byBi ⊂ R2+. In all policy




Ũ(ci, xi, ri) s.t. (ci, xi) ∈ Bi. (3.6)
Since Ũ is strongly quasi-concave, problem (3.6) has a unique solution, defining type
i’s demands for goods c and x. By additive separability of Ũ , demands do not depend
on the reference level ri; consumption comparisons only affect utility, but have no
behavioral effects. In the following, we will repeatedly use individuals’ “ordinary” or
“unconstrained” demand functions cd (I) and xd (I) that solve problem (3.6) for the
budget set Bu := {(c, x) : c+ x ≤ I}, where I denotes an exogenous disposable income.
We assume that both goods are normal, i.e., ∂cd(I)/∂I > 0 and ∂xd(I)/∂I > 0.
We define an equilibrium as follows:
Definition 3.1 An allocation C := (c1, x1, c2, x2) and a corresponding pair of reference
levels (r1, r2) constitute an equilibrium if
(i) for every i, (ci, xi) solves (3.6) contingent on Bi,
10This assumption is standard in the literature on relative consumption concerns and analogue to
price-taking behavior of atomistic individuals. Intuitively, as the number of individuals is large, they
regard their own contribution to the reference level as negligible. Since reference levels are a function of
the consumption of others, we could equivalently say that individuals take others’ consumption levels
as given.
11The general formulation of Bi simplifies the exposition as it allows us to express the definition of






i + xi − yi) = 0,
(iii) for every i 6= j, ri = hi (ci, cj).
According to items (i) and (ii), an equilibrium allocation must maximize individuals’
utility given their budgets and satisfy the economy’s resource constraint. Item (iii)
requires that reference levels are consistent with actual behavior (or, alternatively, that
individuals foresee others’ behavior correctly). With preferences as in (3.1) and (3.2),
a unique equilibrium always exists.12 When preferences are more general and reference
levels do affect behavior, multiple equilibria can emerge. We will study this case in
Section 3.4.
3.2.3 Inefficiency of the laissez-faire









in a laissez-faire without government intervention is inefficient. To see this, first consider
the set of Pareto efficient allocations P . As shown in Appendix 3.A.1, any efficient


























≥ 0 for i 6= j.13 (3.8)
We restrict P to allocations where both income types receive positive amounts of both







14 In (3.7), the left-hand side is the economy’s aggregate
marginal willingness to pay for an increase in ci measured in units of the non-positional
good. The term MRS (ci, xi) represents individual i’s “private” marginal rate of sub-
stitution between goods c and x for a constant reference level. The second term, Γi,
reflects that an individual’s consumption of the positional good may negatively affect
others’ well-being through the reference functions hi, and measures the willingness to
pay of others to decrease ci. In the following, we will refer to Γi as the marginal “social
12It can be shown that item (ii) is satisfied for all policies that balance the government budget.
13In the following, we abbreviate uic := ∂u(c
i, xi)/∂c and uix := ∂u(c
i, xi)/∂x.
14We make the second assumption so that our distinction of the two types by their gross incomes
remains meaningful. However, the assumption only serves to simplify the exposition and is not essential
for any of our results.
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harm” of type i’s positional good consumption. The right hand side of (3.7) gives the
marginal social cost of ci, which is constant and equal to one since we assumed a linear
production technology.
In the laissez-faire, individual budget sets are BiLF := {(ci, xi) : ci + xi ≤ yi}. For an
individual of type i, the solution to the maximization problem (3.6) is therefore given
by ciLF := cd (y
i) and xiLF := xd (y
i). Using the first-order conditions for problem (3.6),
it can be shown that the laissez-faire allocation satisfies
MRS(ci, xi) = 1 for i = 1, 2. (3.9)
As we assume endogenous reference levels, Γi is greater than zero for at least one type.
As a consequence, condition (3.9) does not coincide with (3.7), and CLF is inefficient.
Intuitively, the marginal social harms are not reflected in market prices and therefore
neglected in private optimization; there is a divergence between the private and social
evaluations of an individual’s positional spending. Thus, whenever Γi > 0, income type
i’s consumption of the positional good imposes a negative externality on others.
In addition, all individuals for whom Γi > 0 over-consume [under-consume] the po-
sitional [non-positional good] in the laissez-faire: by (3.9), the aggregate willingness
to pay for ci at CLF equals 1 − Γi, and thus falls short of the social cost. Since the
utility function U i∗ is strongly quasi-concave, there always exists a consumption bundle
containing a slightly lower [higher] level of ci [xi] that is Pareto-superior to (ciLF , x
i
LF ).
The inefficiency of the laissez-faire generates scope for government intervention. In the
following, we show that public provision of private goods can correct the external effects
from individuals’ positional good consumption.
3.3 The efficiency role of public provision
Many government-provided goods are rather less important for social comparisons. For
example, health care, basic education, and old-age consumption are relatively little
effective in gaining high social status compared to smart phones, clothes, and cars (see
Alpizar et al., 2005; Solnick and Hemenway, 2005; Charles et al. 2009; Heffetz, 2011).
We now lay out the basic argument for why publicly providing such non-positional
goods can achieve Pareto improvements over the laissez-faire.
The government may provide a uniform level g of the non-positional good, which is
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offered to all individuals free of charge and can be topped up by additional purchases
on a market. However, individuals cannot resell the publicly provided level, i.e., the
sum of public provision and private purchases must exceed or equal g.15 To finance
public provision, (lump-sum) income taxes T i = T (yi) can be levied. Type i’s net
income bi is then equal to yi−T i. It will be convenient to use bi as a government choice
variable, rather than T i itself. We call P = (b1, b2, g) ∈ R3+ a policy, which is a scheme
assigning the uniform provision level and a net income to each individual. Policies must
be feasible and balance the government budget:
G := y1 − b1 + y2 − b2 − 2g = 0. (3.10)
We restrict the set of available policies to those where b2 > b1, so our initial notion of
rich and poor remains meaningful. We further require bi > 0 for i = 1, 2, i.e., income
taxation is not exhaustive.
3.3.1 Individual behavior under public provision
For a given policy, individuals decide how to allocate their net income on market pur-
chases of the two private goods. Formally, each individual solves (3.6) with the budget
set now given by
Big :=
{
(ci, xi) : ci + xi − g ≤ bi, xi ≥ g,
}
.
The unique solution to this problem must satisfy







15Otherwise, public provision would be equivalent to a cash transfer, and thus, redundant in our
framework.
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The demand functions obtained from problem (3.6) with budget Big have a piecewise
form and can be expressed as follows:16
ci(bi, g) =
 cd (bi + g) if g < xd (bi + g) ,bi if g ≥ xd (bi + g) , (3.12)
xi(bi, g) =
 xd (bi + g) if g < xd (bi + g) ,g if g ≥ xd (bi + g) . (3.13)
Demand functions are continuous, but only one-sided differentiable at policies where
g = xd (b
i + g), which will suffice for our proofs below. In (3.12) and (3.13), xd (b
i + g)
gives the amount of the non-positional good an individual with income bi would buy if
it received the value of g in cash. If g < xd (b
i + g), public provision is equivalent to a
cash transfer: the individual takes the publicly provided level and purchases additional
units until xi (bi, g) = xd (b
i + g); compared to a situation with no public provision,
she simply substitutes private purchases with public provision, but still buys additional
units on the market as the overall demand for good x has increased. If g ≥ xd (bi + g),
however, the individual would by less than g when given the publicly provided amount
in cash. As resales are not feasible, she then spends her entire net income on the
positional good. We say that an individual is constrained in her consumption choice or
that private purchases of the non-positional good are “crowded out”. By the normality
of good x, the poor are crowded out at lower levels of public provision than the rich.
Let
V i(bi, bj, g) :=ui(ci(bi, g), xi(bi, g)) + ci(bi, g)− hi(ci(bi, g), cj(bj, g)) (3.14)
be the equilibrium indirect utility of type i. Generally, from the definition of hi, V i also
depends on the net income of the respective other type. Indirect utilities are continuous,
but only one-sided differentiable at points where g = xd (b
i + g).
3.3.2 Conditions for public provision to be Pareto-improving
Our first proposition establishes that, under relatively mild assumptions on the reference
functions hi, public provision of the non-positional good can always achieve Pareto
improvements over the laissez-faire:
16The formal derivation is equivalent to Epple and Romano (1996b) and therefore omitted.
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Proposition 3.1 If ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 for all c1 and c2, there exists a policy
P = (b1, b2, g) with g > 0 that achieves a Pareto improvement over the laissez-faire.
The intuition for Proposition 3.1 is as follows. Consider a policy scheme where any
public provision level is financed by an equal-sized reduction in both types’ net incomes,
bi = yi − g.17 Under this scheme, an individual is crowded out by public provision if
g ≥ xd (bi + g) = xd (yi) = xiLF . By demand functions (3.12) and (3.13), setting the
public provision level equal to g = x1LF then leads to the same allocation – and hence,
indirect utilities – as in the laissez faire; the poor are “just” constrained by public
provision and spend their entire net income on the positional good. As both goods are
normal, public provision is cash-equivalent for the rich.
Now, consider a marginal increase in the provision level slightly above x1LF . This policy
change has no effect on both types’ utilities if reference levels were constant: by the
continuity of individual demand functions, the rich still consume the same consumption
bundle as in the laissez-faire; the poor are forced to consume slightly more of the
non-positional good and less of the positional good – which has a negative effect on
u (ci, xi) + ci − ri. But as individuals consume optimally at g = x1LF , this effect is of
second-order and therefore negligible. However, if ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0, the
forced reduction in c1 has a positive first-order welfare effect as it lowers the reference
level of at least one income group. Since the proposed policy changes are always feasible,
this is sufficient for the existence of a Pareto superior policy.
The condition identified in Proposition 3.1 is satisfied if the poor compare themselves
with members of their own group or the rich are looking downward. Recent empirical
evidence suggests that actual relative consumption preferences indeed entail elements
of within-group or downward comparisons (see, e.g., Falk and Knell, 2004; Corrazini et
al., 2012; Roth, 2014).
However, public provision can be valuable even if the sufficient condition is violated.
To see this, let the provision scheme again be given by bi = yi − g and suppose that
the poor are purely upward-looking and the rich are entirely in-group oriented. Then,
providing the non-positional good in the interval g ∈ (x1LF , x2LF ] can only have negative
efficiency effects; public provision distorts the consumption choice of the poor but has
no effects on people’s reference levels. But if the provision level is set slightly above
x2LF , it forces the rich to reduce their positional consumption – which ceteris paribus
17With this simple provision scheme, public provision effectively acts as a minimum consumption
constraint for the non-positional good.
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has positive welfare effects since ∂h1/∂c2 > 0 and ∂h2/∂c2 > 0. If this effect is strong
enough, a Pareto improvement may occur for some g > x2LF . In the following example,
we demonstrate that this can indeed happen for Cobb-Douglas absolute consumption
utility:
Example 1: Assume that the sub-utility function is u (ci, xi) = cixi. Individuals then
maximize Ũ (ci, xi, ri) = cixi+ci−ri. Further assume (pure) upward comparisons of the
poor and (pure) within-group comparisons of the rich, i.e., h1 (c1, c2) = h2 (c2, c1) = c2.
Set the parameters of the model to y1 = 10, and y2 = 10.4. In this case, the laissez-








LF ) = (5.5, 4.5, 5.75, 4.75). Now, introducing
public provision with g = 5 and T 1 = T 2 = 5 yields (c1, x1, c2, x2) = (5, 5, 5.4, 5) as the
equilibrium consumption allocation. The resulting utility differential is V 1 (5, 5.4, 5)−
V 1 (10, 10.4, 0) = 0.05 > 0 and V 2 (5, 5.4, 5) − V 2 (10, 10.4, 0) = 0.21 > 0, i.e., public
provision makes both types strictly better off. 
Several remarks are in order. First, we considered a simple provision system where
all individuals receive a uniform amount of the non-positional good. Since the poor
are crowded out first by public provision, the government can correct the externality
imposed by their positional spending without causing any negative efficiency effects for
the rich. As Example 1 shows, this does not hold vice versa; when the public provision
level is uniform, reducing the positional spending of the rich necessarily distorts the
consumption choices of the poor. But if we allowed for income-dependent provision
levels, the case for public provision would be strengthened. In fact, the government
could then separately target each individual’s social harm and always achieve Pareto
improvements.
Second, we abstracted from any redistributive motives and our benchmark was the
laissez-faire. However, under the conditions stated in Proposition 3.1, public provision is
valuable for any initial distribution of the economy’s resources on the two income types:
by the same arguments as in Section 3.2.3, individuals under-consume the non-positional
good for any given distribution of net incomes. As a consequence, public provision can
correct this under-consumption even if we allowed for redistribution. Finally, as both
goods are normal, Proposition 3.1 easily generalizes to a model with more than two
income groups.
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3.4 Peer effects in consumption
In our basic model, social comparisons have well-being effects alone: reference levels
enter utility without having any effect on consumption behavior. However, findings
from the empirical literature on conspicuous consumption suggest that an individual’s
relative position also affects her marginal propensity to consume ( Heffetz, 2011; Roth,
2014). In this section, we therefore allow for peer effects in consumption.
3.4.1 Preferences and behavior
Let preferences of individual i be represented by a strictly increasing, twice continuously
differentiable function U : R3 → R, where
U i := U(ci, xi,∆i). (3.15)
Compared to Section 3.2, preferences need no longer be separable in ∆i. In addition,
an individual’s relative consumption is now given by the general function ∆ : R2+ → R,
with







I.e., each individual’s (utility from) relative consumption is increasing in own consump-
tion and decreasing in the reference level. In addition to difference-comparisons used so
far, the general formulation of ∆ also allows for ratio-comparisons ∆(c, r) = c/r that
have been frequently studied in the literature on relative consumption (see, e.g., Clark
and Oswald, 1998). Reference functions hi have the same properties as in Section 3.2.
Substituting (3.16) into (3.15) yields utility for constant reference levels
Ũ(ci, xi, ri) := U(ci, xi,∆(ci, ri)). (3.17)
The utility function Ũ is assumed to satisfy the same assumptions as in Section 3.2.2.
Hence, for a given policy and reference level, there exist unique and strictly positive
demands for both goods. To simplify the exposition, we restrict the analysis to public
provision schemes where any provision level is financed by an equal-sized reduction in
both types’ net incomes and no further taxes (or transfers) are employed. Given g and
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ri, individuals then maximize (3.17) subject to (ci, xi) ∈ B̃g, with
B̃ig :=
{
(ci, xi) : ci + xi ≤ yi, xi ≥ g,
}
.
The demand functions obtained from this problem have the following form:18
ci(g, ri) =
 cid (yi, ri) if g < xid (yi, ri) ,yi − g if g ≥ xid (yi, ri) , (3.18)
xi(g, ri) =
 xid (yi, ri) if g < xid (yi, ri) ,g if g ≥ xid (yi, ri) . (3.19)
The crucial difference to the previous section is that the reference level ri now affects
demands for goods c and x if an individual is not crowded out by public provision
(g < xid (y
i, ri)).19 A change in the positional spending of others thus also impacts on
individuals’ consumption choices. The comparative statics of cid and x
i
d with respect to
ri are generally unclear in sign and depend on how the marginal rate of substitution
between the positional and non-positional good, MRS (ci, xi, ri) := Ũ ic/Ũ
i
x, varies with
ri.20 In this section, we will consider two polar cases: one where MRS(ci, xi, ri) is
increasing and one where it is decreasing in the reference level. In Appendix 3.A.3, we
show that21
∂MRS (ci, xi, ri)
∂ri





Following Dupor and Liu (2003), we say that preferences exhibit “keeping up with the
Joneses” (KUJ) if an individual of type i spends more on the positional good if others’
consumption levels rise (∂cid/∂r
i > 0). In the reverse case, which we label as “running
away from the Joneses” (RAJ), the individual responds to an increase in the reference
level by reducing her positional good consumption (∂cid/∂r
i < 0). We assume that
the rich have higher ordinary demands than the poor, i.e., c1d (y
1, r1) < c2d (y
2, r2) and
x1d (y
1, r1) < x2d (y
2, r2) for all r1 and r2.22
18To simplify the exposition, we suppress the dependence of demand functions on gross incomes yi.
19Whenever an individual is crowded out, the reference level has no effect on consumption, i.e.,
∂ci/∂ri = 0 and ∂xi/∂ri = 0.
20We abbreviate Ũ ic := ∂Ũ(c
i, xi, ri)/∂c and Ũ ix := ∂Ũ(c
i, xi, ri)/∂x.
21From individual budget constraints, we have ∂xid/∂r
i = −∂cid/∂ri.
22As the ordinary demands are normal, this is generally satisfied if both types have the same
reference level. However, as we allow reference levels to vary across types, it may happen that the rich
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3.4.2 Equilibria
Again, an equilibrium is defined as a consumption allocation and pair of reference
levels that satisfy the conditions in Definition 3.1. When preferences are separable in
ri, there exists a unique equilibrium for a given policy. With non-separable preferences
as in (3.15), multiple equilibria can occur. To see this, note that condition (iii) of
Definition 3.1 requires consistency of reference levels and actual behavior, i.e.,
r1 − h1(c1(g, r1), c2(g, r2)) = 0,
r2 − h2(c2(g, r2), c1(g, r1)) = 0.
(3.20)
For every g, system (3.20) is a fixed-point equation in R2. By applying Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem, there exists a pair of reference levels (r̂1, r̂2) that solves (3.20).23
However, as demands for the positional good depend on ri, several pairs of reference
levels may satisfy (3.20). Since each reference level pair corresponds to a unique allo-
cation, multiple equilibrium allocations can emerge. Given a public provision level, we
collect the solutions to (3.20) in the set Eg.
In the following, we make an assumption that ensures equilibria to be locally unique
– in the sense that for every (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ Eg, there is no other reference pair solving
(3.20) sufficiently close to it (see Appendix 3.A.3). The assumption also guarantees
that individuals’ ordinary demands cid and x
i
d are normal in the presence of peer effects.
Specifically, we impose:






























> 0 for i = 1, 2.
Assumption 3.1 allows us to express any solution to (3.20) as an implicit function of
the public provision level, r̂(g) = (r̂1(g), r̂2(g)). For every g, we can therefore write
have a lower demand for one of the two goods. For simplicity, we exclude such cases.
23To see this, rewrite (3.20) as r = (r1, r2)′ = h(r), where h : R2 → R2 is given by h(r) := (h̃1, h̃2)′
with h̃i(r1, r2) := hi(ci(g, ri), cj(g, rj)). Since demand functions are continuous in ri, h is a continuous
function mapping each point (r1, r2) of the convex and compact set K1 ×K2 ∈ R2 into itself, which
ensures the existence of a (r̂1, r̂2) that solves (3.20) for any g.
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individual i’s indirect utility as
V i(g) = ui(ci(g, r̂i(g)), xi(g, r̂i(g)),∆i(ci(g, r̂i(g)), r̂i(g))). (3.21)
Denote the set of equilibria in the laissez-faire (g = 0) by ELF . By the same arguments
as in Section 3.2.3, individuals over-consume the positional and under-consume the
non-positional good in every (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ ELF . Irrespective of whether preferences satisfy
KUJ or RAJ, the source of the inefficiency is not removed by the presence of social peer
effects; individuals still neglect that their own consumption may have negative impacts
on the well-being of others.
3.4.3 Public provision
We now give a sufficient condition under which the public provision of the non-positional
good can achieve Pareto improvements over any (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ ELF . We assume that the
government can select between different laissez-faire equilibria in the sense that, for a
given (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ ELF , reference levels do not “jump” and remain at (r̂1, r̂2) whenever the
public provision level is set equal to g = x1LF . We can state
Proposition 3.2 For every (r̂1, r̂2) ∈ ELF , there exists a Pareto-improving policy with
g > 0 if
(i) preferences exhibit KUJ (∂cid/∂r
i > 0) and
(ii) ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0 for all c1 and c2.
In addition to the presence of within-group comparisons of the poor or downward com-
parisons of the rich, the sufficient condition identified in Proposition 3.2 requires prefer-
ences to satisfy KUJ when there are peer effects in consumption; positional consumption
choices must be strategic complements: if one individual increases her status consump-
tion, other people will follow to spend more on goods that confer a high relative standing.
The logic behind this result is similar to that of Proposition 3.1. When the government
sets the provision level slightly above a given laissez-faire level x1LF , the poor are forced
to slightly reduce their positional spending – which ceteris paribus has positive welfare
effects if ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0. However, the reduced positional consumption
of the poor may induce a behavioral change for the rich who are not constrained at





2, r2). If preferences exhibit RAJ (∂cid/∂r
i < 0), the rich would
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react to the decrease in c1 by increasing their positional spending, which would call for
a rise in individuals’ reference levels. If this counteracting effect is strong enough, a
decrease in c1 might increase reference levels in equilibrium and lower indirect utilities.
Under KUJ, ∂cid/∂r
i > 0, c1 and c2 tend to move in the same direction. Crowding out
positional consumption of the poor would also lower that of the rich and reinforce the
initial positive welfare effect.
Evidence for such positive “social interaction” effects can be found in the recent social
networks literature, which reports conformity or bandwagon effects in various social
contexts, including risky behavior, recreational activities, or labor supply decisions (for
a survey, see Durlauf and Ioannides, 2010). More closely to our framework, Kuhn et al.
(2011) provide evidence for KUJ effects in consumption. In the Dutch Postcode Lottery,
neighbors of lottery winners (who received cash and a new BMW) increase spending on
cars and exterior home renovation. Likewise, using data from a randomized conditional
cash transfer program in Indonesia, Roth (2014) finds that the expenditure share of
visible goods rises for untreated households whose reference group’s visible consumption
is exogenously increased. In that sense, available empirical evidence suggests that public
provision is a valuable instrument even when peer effects are present.
3.5 Taxation of the positional good
The rationale for the public provision of non-positional goods demonstrated so far might
be driven by an arbitrary restriction on available policy instruments. In fact, a standard
policy recommendation to address inefficiencies from status consumption is to levy a tax
on the positional good (Ireland, 1994; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004; Micheletto, 2008;
Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013). To underscore the efficiency-enhancing potential of
public provision, we now study the case where taxation of the positional good is possible.
For simplicity, we will abstract from peer effects in consumption and return to the basic
model of Section 3.2. Specifically, in addition to income taxes and public provision, the
government can levy a uniform per unit tax t on good c. Each individual then faces a
consumer price of p(t) = 1 + t. A policy is described by the vector P = (b1, b2, g, t) and,
again, policies must be feasible and balance the government budget:
G := y1 − b1 + tc1 + y2 − b2 + tc2 − 2g = 0. (3.22)
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To shorten the presentation, we specify individual behavior and demand functions in
Appendix 3.A.4. Denote the indirect utilities of the rich and the poor respectively by
V 2 (b2, b1, g, p(t)) and V 1 (b1, b2, g, p(t)).
To see whether there is a case for public provision when a tax on the positional good
is available, we start from an initial situation where the government can only make use
of consumption and income taxes and sets these instruments optimally. We then study
whether allowing for positive levels of public provision can induce a Pareto improvement
over such an initial situation.
In the absence of public provision (g = 0), a policy P = (b1, b2, 0, t) is defined as
optimal if it maximizes V 1 (b1, b2, 0, p(t)) given that V 2 (b2, b1, 0, p(t)) does not fall below
a minimum level Ū2 and the government budget constraint holds. Solving this problem
for varying minimum utility levels gives the set of optimal policies S. We assume














S to policies where b2 > b1, such that our distinction of the two types in rich and poor
remains meaningful.
In Appendix 3.A.4, we show that for any P0 ∈ S, the optimal tax on the positional
good can be (implicitly) written as a weighted average of both groups’ social harms of
positional consumption:
t0 = [αΓ
1 + (1− α)Γ2] > 0, (3.23)
where the weights α ∈ (0, 1) and (1− α) ∈ (0, 1) are defined in Appendix 3.A.4.24
If optimal policies P0 suffice to implement Pareto efficient allocations, public provision
– as well as any other policy instrument – would be redundant. As a benchmark, our
next proposition identifies when this is the case:
Proposition 3.3 A policy P0 ∈ S induces a Pareto efficient allocation C∗ ∈ P if and
only if Γ1|C=C0 = Γ
2|C=C0.
When both income groups impose identical marginal social harms, a uniform tax on
the positional good – combined with appropriate income taxes – is sufficient to restore
efficiency: as individuals choose both goods according to MRS(ci, xi) = 1 + t, a tax of
t = Γ1 = Γ2 implies MRS(ci, xi)−Γi = 1, which coincides with the efficiency condition
24This formula is familiar from the literature on the optimal taxation of consumption externalities
(see, for example, Diamond, 1973; Balcer, 1980; Micheletto, 2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013).
59
3.5. TAXATION OF THE POSITIONAL GOOD
(3.7). Conversely, if Γ1 6= Γ2, both income groups exert different marginal externalities,
and uniform consumption taxes can never implement efficient allocations.25 In such
cases, public provision as an additional policy instrument can be valuable.
The question is which types of social comparisons imply identical social harms. Using





















It is straightforward to check that condition (3.24) holds if every individual compares
her own consumption with the economy’s average c̄. More generally, there is no role for
public provision if, for both income types, the identity of the individual who purchases
the positional good is irrelevant, i.e., if ∂hi/∂ci = ∂hi/∂cj for all i 6= j. In this case, it
would be immaterial to an individual whether it is her neighbor who buys a new car
or a socially more distant member in society. However, both casual observation and
recent empirical evidence question that actual social comparisons are of this type (see,
e.g., Clark and Senik, 2010). In fact, most of the examples we discussed in Section 3.2
would imply different marginal social harms. This clearly holds for pure upward and
downward comparisons (where one of Γ1 or Γ2 is equal to zero), but is generally also true
for pure within-group comparisons and all intermediate types with ∂hi/∂ci 6= ∂hi/∂cj.26
Hence, in general, there is room for public provision of private goods even if an optimal
uniform tax on the positional good is in place.
The next proposition demonstrates that if the poor impose the larger social harm,
public provision of the non-positional good can be always Pareto-improving compared
to policies P0:
Proposition 3.4 For every P0 ∈ S, if Γ1|C=C0 > Γ
2|C=C0, there exists a policy P with
g > 0 which is Pareto-superior to P0.
25A well-established result in optimal taxation theory states that, if taxes on an externality-
generating good are allowed to vary across consumers such that every individual can be assigned
a personalized price, consumption taxes can implement Pareto efficient allocations (Diamond, 1973;
Sandmo, 1975; Green and Sheshinski, 1976). However, individual-specific consumption taxes are dif-
ficult to implement in practice: this would, for instance, require that every customer can be charged
with a different price at the cash register or that governments can observe the identity of a purchaser
(i.e., who consumes how much of a particular good), which is typically considered administratively or
politically infeasible (Ireland, 1994; Micheletto, 2008; Eckerstorfer and Wendner, 2013). We therefore
only study uniform consumption taxes.
26An externality with ∂hi/∂ci 6= ∂hi/∂cj for at least one i is called non-atmospheric. The impli-
cations of non-atmospheric externalities for the theory of optimal commodity taxation have recently
been studied in, e.g., Micheletto (2008) and Eckerstorfer and Wendner (2013).
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To get an intuition for Proposition 3.4, consider a policy P0 ∈ S and the corresponding
allocation C0. By setting the public provision level slightly above x
1
0 and lowering every
individual’s net income by an equal-valued amount, the government can force the poor
to reduce their positional spending, which has a social benefit given by Γ1. In contrast
to the case without consumption taxes, however, an additional effect emerges: the lower
positional consumption of the poor creates a tax revenue loss equal to t0. If the marginal
benefit from crowding-out the poor outweighs the revenue loss (i.e., if Γ1 > t0), one can
always find a feasible policy that induces a Pareto improvement over P0. Using formula
(3.23) for the optimal tax t0, the requirement Γ
1 > t0 is equivalent to Γ
1 > Γ2 – the
condition stated in Proposition 3.4.





















As opposed to the case where positional good consumption cannot be taxed, condition
(3.25) involves information about the relative strength of ∂hi/∂ci and ∂hi/∂cj. In
particular, public provision is always desirable when the rich have sufficient degrees
of downward orientation or the poor are sufficiently concerned with the consumption
levels of members from their own group (ceteris paribus, ∂h2/∂c1 or ∂h1/∂c1 must be
large enough).27
While we are not aware of any direct evidence providing estimates of individuals’ social
harms, such preferences scenarios appear to be relevant in important social contexts.
For example, evidence from social psychology suggests that people have strong ten-
dencies to refer downward in the sense of comparing their own consumption to that of
those behind in the income hierarchy (see, e.g., Falk and Knell, 2004, and the references
therein). Likewise, the importance of in-group comparisons is one of the basic assump-
tions of social identity theory, which recently found entrance into economics (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2000).
However, public provision of non-positional goods might be desirable even if Γ2 > Γ1.
We demonstrate this in a numerical example in Appendix 3.A.7, where we assume pure
upward comparisons of the poor. As in the case without consumption taxes, public
provision then needs to constrain both the rich and the poor. In sum, for a wide range
of social comparison types, there exists a strong rationale for public provision even if
27Condition (3.25) globally holds in the polar cases of pure downward comparisons of the rich or
pure within-group comparisons of the poor.
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governments can implement optimal uniform taxes on the positional good.28
3.6 Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
As shown in previous sections, public provision can be a valuable instrument to attain
Pareto improvements in the presence of relative consumption concerns. We derived
our results under mild assumptions on the type of the public provision system: the
provision level was uniform and individuals were allowed to purchase additional units
of the non-positional good on the market. In this section, we ask whether such simple
provision schemes can also implement Pareto efficient allocations. Again, we abstract
from peer effects in consumption and study the cases with and without a consumption
tax separately. When governments have access to a tax on the positional good, we only
consider scenarios where Γ1 6= Γ2, as public provision is redundant otherwise. We can
state
Proposition 3.5 For any C∗ ∈ P,
(i) if a tax on the positional good is not available, there exists a policy P = (b1, b2, g)
with g > 0 that implements C∗ if and only if Γ
1 > 0 and Γ2 = 0.
(ii) if a tax on the positional good is available, there exists a policy P = (b1, b2, g, t)
with g > 0 that implements C∗ if and only if Γ
1|C=C∗ > Γ
2|C=C∗. This policy
entails g = x1∗ and t = Γ
2|C=C∗.
In general, if both income groups impose different social harms, the government needs
to target each type’s marginal external effect Γi differently. As a consequence, a sin-
gle uniform policy instrument like public provision typically fails to eliminate all the
inefficiencies from positional good consumption. However, as demonstrated in item (i)
of Proposition 3.5, there are special circumstances where public provision alone can
support efficient allocations. This happens if and only if Γ1 > 0 and Γ2 = 0, i.e., the
poor make pure within-group comparisons or the rich are entirely downward-looking.
In such cases, one needs a policy instrument that can distort the consumption choices of
the poor, but leaves the rich unconstrained. With our simple public provision system,
this is possible: as both goods are normal and individuals are allowed to top up the
28It can be shown that Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 extend to a framework with more than two income
groups: if and only if Γi is identical for all types, public provision is redundant; if Γi (weakly) decreases
as individuals get richer, public provision can always achieve Pareto improvements over policies P0.
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publicly provided level, by setting g = x1∗, the government can force the poor to choose
the intended consumption bundle (c1∗, x
1
∗) without constraining the rich.
While interesting, however, Γ2 = 0 is a strong condition. It fails whenever the poor
are upward looking or the rich are within-group oriented, cases we cannot exclude a
priori.29 If we allow for a consumption tax as an additional instrument, Pareto efficient
allocations can be achieved even if Γ2 > 0. As stated in item (ii) of Proposition 3.5,
this requires Γ1 > Γ2. The intuition for item (ii) is as follows. As the poor are crowded
out by lower levels of public provision than the rich, any policy intended to implement
a given efficient allocation must involve g = x1∗ and t = Γ
2: the public provision system
corrects consumption choices of the poor, while the tax corrects choices of the rich.30
But such a policy is incentive compatible if and only if Γ1 > Γ2. In the reverse case, a
consumption tax equal to Γ2 would be “too large” for the poor; at g = x1∗, they would
buy additional units on the market, and no combination of consumption tax and public
provision could support C∗.
When Γ2 > Γ1, we therefore need stronger assumptions on available provision sys-
tems. One possibility would be to allow for income-dependent public provision levels.
Any efficient allocation could then be implemented by provision levels equal to x1∗ and
x2∗. However, income-specific provision systems might be infeasible due to high admin-
istrative costs or political economy considerations. Alternatively, governments could
maintain the assumption of uniform provision, but prohibit additional purchases of the
government-provided good on the market. Individuals would then face a choice be-
tween accepting the publicly provided level or “opting-out” of the public system and
purchasing the non-positional good entirely on the market at own expenses. Educa-
tional services are often available in such “dual” provision systems, where parents can
send their children to either a public or a private school or kindergarten. With a pro-
vision system of this type, Pareto efficient allocations might be attainable even if the
marginal social harm is stronger among the rich. This requires, however, that the poor
[the rich] indeed stay in [out of] the public system at policies with g = x1∗ and t = Γ
2 –
a condition which does not hold for all efficient allocations C∗ ∈ P .
29E.g., evidence for upward social comparisons can be found in Bowles and Park (2005), Corrazini
et al. (2012) or Drechsel-Grau and Schmid (2014).
30As we only consider efficient allocations where x1∗ < x
2
∗, the rich are unconstrained at g = x
1
∗ and
choose MRS(c2, x2) = 1 + t. It is straightforward to check that a tax equal to Γ2 implies the efficiency
condition (3.7).
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A corollary of item (ii) is that public provision would even outperform consumption
taxes in scenarios where Γ1 > 0 and Γ2 = 0: as a tax always distorts the consumption
choices of both income groups, it cannot target Γ1 separately. We therefore have a situ-
ation where a quantity-based policy strictly dominates a price instrument; to internalize
externalities from positional spending, governments should publicly provide health care
or education, but not tax smart phones, cars, or jewelry.31
3.7 Public provision of the positional good
In previous sections, the publicly provided good was non-positional. In line with em-
pirical evidence, this characteristic can be reasonably attributed to goods like health
care, health insurance, elderly care, or old-age consumption. The case of education is,
however, perhaps less clear-cut. While the majority of studies in the recent literature
on conspicuous consumption classifies education as non-positional (see, e.g., Charles et
al., 2009; Heffetz, 2011; Khamis et al., 2012; Friehe and Mechtel, 2014), Frank (1985a)
argues that it is precisely the positional aspect of education that may justify govern-
ment interventions.32,33 In his argument, education is considered as a signal for some
unobservable desirable trait such as intelligence, ability or motivation. Individuals with
highest educational levels then have the best job opportunities in the labor market.
Out of the fear that their children will fail to receive one of these scarce positions,
parents ceteris paribus have an incentive to increase spending on the resources devoted
their children’s education. But as other parents act in the same way, an “educational
rat race” would be unleashed where every child’s relative position remains unchanged
in equilibrium. By public provision, the government can prevent parents to spend ex-
cessively on educational services – which frees resources that can be used for other
welfare-enhancing items.
In this section we formalize Frank’s argument. We set out the conditions under which
public provision of the positional good can be desirable, with and without a tax on the
31As a caveat, it should be stressed that our results do not generalize to a model with more than
two income groups (and hence, potentially more than two marginal external effects). Intuitively,
governments cannot correct all the different externalities with only two uniform policy instruments.
32In fact, the only exception in this literature is Roth (2014). In a study using Indonesian house-
hold survey data, education is placed second in some visibility ranking scale, and thus, considered a
positional good.
33Generally, what makes a good positional may also depend on social and cultural environment
(Heffetz, 2012).
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positional good.34
3.7.1 Framework
Individuals’ preferences are again as in Section 3.2. Let the uniform provision level
of the positional good be denoted by e. Since individuals over-consume the positional
good in the laissez-faire, public provision must reduce individuals’ consumption of good
c in order to achieve Pareto improvements. However, distorting positional spending
downwards is impossible with a top up provision system: whenever the government
provides a lower level than consumed in the laissez-faire, individuals would top up e to
ciLF . We therefore consider a provision system where individuals must decide whether to
accept the publicly provided level e or to “opt out” of the public system and to purchase
the positional good on a market; parents can send their children either to a public or
private school, but not both. The government further has access to a per unit tax t on
good c and income taxes T i = T (yi).
The chronology of events is as follows. In a first stage, the government specifies a policy
P = (b1, b2, e, t). Given P , in the second stage, individuals decide whether to consume
the positional good in or out of the public system (system choice). In the third stage,
individuals spend their net incomes to maximize utility (consumption choice). We
assume that in stages 2 and 3, individuals treat their reference levels as given.
We solve the model backwards. If an individual has decided to consume the positional
good in the public system, it has e units of good c and – as additional purchases are not
feasible – spends the entire net income on the non-positional good. For a given reference
level, the individual thus obtains utility V iin := u(e, b
i) + e − ri. If the individual opts
out of public provision, it chooses the bundle (ci, xi) to maximize u(ci, xi) + ci − ri
subject to pci + xi = bi. By our assumptions on preferences, there exist demand
functions cd(b
i, p) and xd(b
i, p). Observe that – in contrast to a top up provision system
– e is not an argument of the demand functions. The individual then enjoys utility
V iin := u(cd(b
i, p), xd(b
i, p)) + cd(b
i, p)− ri.
In the second stage, each individual decides whether to take e or to buy good c on the
market. For a given policy, there exists a unique provision level êi = ê(bi, p) such that
individual i stays in (opts out of) the public system if e ≥ (<) êi.35 The critical level is
34Interestingly, though Frank (1985a) advocates taxes on other luxury items such as yachts and
jewelry, he does not suggest this price instrument to regulate overspending in education, maybe since
this involves the contra-intuitive result that education should be taxed rather than subsidized.
35To see this, note that at e = 0, V iout > V
i
in by the assumption that both goods are essential.
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implicitly determined by
u(êi, bi) + êi − ri = u(cd(bi, p), xd(bi, p)) + cd(bi, p)− ri. (3.26)
As individuals must buy the positional good at own expenses when they opt out, êi <
cd(b
i, p). Further, êi is increasing in net income.36
For a given policy, individual demand functions can thus be expressed as:
ci(bi, p, e) =
 cd(bi, p) if e < êi,e if e ≥ êi, (3.27)
xi(bi, p, e) =
 xd(bi, p) if e < êi,bi if e ≥ êi. (3.28)
Denote the number of individuals who choose public provision by N ∈ [0, 2]. As unique
critical levels êi exist, N is uniquely determined for every given policy, and we can write
it as a function of policy variables, i.e., N = N(b1, b2, e, t). We define an equilibrium of
the economy as follows:
Definition 3.2 An allocation C = (c1, c2, x1, x2), a corresponding pair of reference
levels (r1, r2) and a policy P = (b1, b2, e, t) constitute an equilibrium if
(i) for every i, (ci, xi) solves the individual maximization problems at stages 2 and 3




i + ci − yi) = 0,
(iii) for every i 6= j, ri = hi(ci, cj),
(iv) y1 − b1 + tc1 + y2 − b2 + tc2 −N(b1, b2, e, t)p e = 0.




ci(bi, p(t), e), xi(bi, p(t), e)
)
(3.29)
+ ci(bi, p(t), e)− hi
(




for i 6= j,
This inequality is reversed when e is sufficiently large: if e is set equal to cd(b




i, p). By the continuity of V iout and V
i
in, ê
i exists. Since V iout is independent of e while V
i
in
strictly increases, êi is unique.
36This is seen by implicitly differentiating (3.26) respect to bi and use the fact that, along an
indifference curve, the marginal utility of good c is declining when both goods are normal (for a
detailed proof, see Epple and Romano, 1996a).
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where a ∈ {in, out} indicates whether an individual chooses public provision or opts
out.
3.7.2 Results
Our benchmark is the laissez-faire or the optimal tax solution P0, depending on whether
the government can tax the positional good or not. The efficiency effects of public pro-
vision crucially depend on the behavior of high-income individuals at a given provision
level. If the rich are not attracted by the public system when e is set to the respec-
tive level the poor consume in the laissez-faire or at the optimal tax solution, we can
derive conditions on relative consumption preferences for public provision to be Pareto-
improving:
Proposition 3.6 Assume that c1LF < ê(y
2, 1) and c10 < ê(b
2
0, p0). Then,
i) without consumption taxes, there always exist a Pareto-improving policy with e > 0
if ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0,
ii) if a tax on good c is available, for a given P0 ∈ S, there exists a Pareto-improving
policy if and only if Γ1|C0 6= Γ
2|C0.
The logic behind Proposition 3.6 is as follows. When the benchmark is the laissez-faire,
the government can always reduce the positional good consumption of the poor by
setting the public provision level slightly below c1LF and lowering net income b
1 by an
equal-valued amount. If the rich stay out of the public system at this provision level,
their consumption choice is not affected, and a Pareto improvement is attained if c1
matters for social comparisons.
A similar argument applies when governments can tax the positional good. If the public
provision level is set to c10 and combined with an equal-value reduction in b
1, the poor are
always attracted to the public system. If the rich continue to consume on the market,
a Pareto improvement over policies P0 is always possible if both groups’ social harms
differ. In cases where Γ2 > Γ1, the optimal tax t0 is “too high” for the poor in the sense
that they would under-consume the positional good. Hence, by marginally increasing
the provision level, the government can encourage c1. In the reverse case, however,
the optimal tax induces the poor to over-consume good c at the optimal tax solution,
and lowering their positional consumption is desirable. In contrast to Section 3.5, a
reduction in c1 is possible through public provision since individuals cannot top up the
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level e on the market; in an “opt out” provision system the government has perfect
control over the consumption choices of the poor – without affecting the rich.
Whenever the rich are driven into the public system at provision levels of c1LF or c
1
0, we
cannot derive conditions for public provision to be efficiency-enhancing that depend only
on relative consumption preferences: while the rich’s positional good consumption will
be reduced in such cases, they would at the same time be pushed away from their desired
consumption bundle. To assess which of these opposing effects dominates, information
on the form of individual preferences and the parameters of the model is necessary.
3.8 Conclusion
The public provision of specific private goods is often justified by paternalistic or merit
good arguments: from the perspective of some“outside observer”– e.g., the government,
an altruistic donor, or even a person’s own future self – consumers spend insufficient
on goods like education, health care, or old-age consumption when left to their own
devices. After reviewing the available empirical evidence, Currie and Gahvari (2008)
conclude that paternalism or merit goods indeed seem to be the leading explanation
for public provision. However, a common criticism against paternalistic policies is that
they conflict with principles of consumer sovereignty.
In this paper, we offered an alternative rationale that fully respects individual prefer-
ences. In line with recent empirical evidence, people who care for relative positions
devote inefficiently high shares of their budgets to positional or status goods, while
spending “too little” on other, welfare-enhancing uses (Frank and Heffetz, 2011). By
publicly providing (non-positional) private goods, governments can correct such ineffi-
cient consumer choices. In contrast to paternalistic approaches, individuals would then
agree with the introduction of some form of public provision system – as it constitutes a
device to collectively reduce wasteful spending while maintaining relative consumption
or status positions.
One might object that the inefficiencies from relative consumption are better addressed
by taxing the source of the inefficiency directly, rather than applying indirect policies
like public provision (Sandmo, 1975). Our results reveal, however, that the public
provision of private goods can play an important role even if taxes on positional goods
are available. In particular, this happens in all scenarios where the marginal social
harms of positional good consumption differ across social groups, which is satisfied for
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sufficiently asymmetric upward, downward, or within-group comparisons. Moreover,
we identified situations where the indirect instrument of public provision may even
dominate the direct taxation of the positional good.
Our paper can therefore be seen as a first step towards an analysis of the relative merits
of price vs. quantity instruments in environments where people have status concerns -
a question that has received considerable attention in the broader field on behavioral
economics (see, e.g, Farhi and Gabaix, 2015). But in order to provide robust policy
recommendations, further research is necessary. First, (more) information about the
intensities of marginal social harms is needed. Whereas existing empirical evidence
suggests that people are indeed upward, downward, or within-group oriented, we are
not aware of any estimates of the relative strength of the different types of social com-
parisons. Second, a thorough comparison of different policy instruments would require
a more general model. In fact, with more than two income classes or goods, an optimal
combination of consumption taxes and public provision would generally be second-best
in that it cannot implement Pareto efficient allocations. A characterization of such op-
timal second-best policies as well as an analysis of alternative policy instruments (taxes




3.A.1 Pareto efficient allocations
We can identify Pareto efficient allocations C∗ by maximizing U
1
∗ given that (i) U
2
∗ does
not fall below a level Ū2 and (ii) the economy’s resource constraint holds. Varying Ū2




1, x1, c2) s.t. (3.30)




(yi − ci − xi) ≥ 0.
Since U1∗ is strongly quasi-concave and the constraint set in convex, closed and bounded,
there exists a unique Pareto efficient allocation for every given Ū2. Define P as the set
of allocations C∗ such that there exists Ū
2 and the allocation solves (3.30).
The Lagrangian for problem (3.30) is
L = U1∗ (c
1, x1, c2) + µ
[
U2∗ (c





(yi − ci − xi),
(3.31)
where µ and λ denote the Lagrange-multipliers associated with the utility and resource
















− λ∗ = 0, (3.32)
∂L
∂x1












− λ∗ = 0, (3.34)
∂L
∂x2
= µ∗u2x − λ∗ = 0. (3.35)
From (3.33) and (3.35), we have λ∗ = u1x and µ
∗ = λ∗/u2x. Plugging these expressions
into (3.32) and (3.34) gives condition (3.7).
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3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
We have to prove that under the conditions stated in Proposition 3.1, there always
exists a policy P = (b1, b2, g) with g > 0 that achieves a Pareto improvement over
the laissez-faire with PLF = (y
1, y2, 0). Consider the policy scheme where bi = yi − g
for i = 1, 2. We will show that under this scheme, setting the public provision level g
slightly above x1LF raises the utility of at least one type compared to PLF if ∂h
1/∂c1 > 0
or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0.
To see this, note that with bi = yi − g, we have xd(bi + g) = xd(yi) = xiLF . Hence,
an individual of type i is crowded out by public provision if g ≥ xiLF . Consider a




r, gr) = (y
1 − x1LF , y2 − x1LF , x1LF ). At Pr, both
types choose the same consumption bundle as in the laissez-faire: since gr = x
1
LF ,
by demand functions (3.12) and (3.13), individuals of type 1 are just crowded out by
public provision and choose x1 (b1r, gr) = gr = x
1
LF and c
1 (b1r, gr) = b
1
r = y
1−x1LF = c1LF .
As y2 > y1, normality of good x implies gr < xd (y
2). Thus, demanded quantities of
type 2 individuals are c2 (b2r, gr) = cd (y
2) = c2LF and x
2 (b2r, gr) = xd (y
2) = x2LF . As a
consequence, at Pr each type’s utility is the same as in the laissez-faire. Substitution of
policy Pr into the government budget constraint yields y
1−c1LF−x1LF+y2−c2LF−x2LF = 0.
Therefore, Pr is feasible.




p, gp) = (b
1
r + db
1, b2r + db
2, gr + dg),
where dg > 0 and dg → 0. As dbi = −dg for both types, policy Pp is feasible. Since
gp > x
1
LF , under the one-to-one policy scheme, individuals of type 1 remain crowded
out after the policy change. By the continuity of demand functions (3.12) and (3.13),
individuals of type 2 are not crowded out by public provision at Pp. Hence, at the
two policies Pr and Pp, both types’ demands are, respectively, given by c
1(b1, g) = b1,
x1(b1, g) = g, c2(b2, g) = xd(b
2 + g) and x2(b2, g) = xd(b
2 + g). Inserting these demands
into (3.14) gives indirect utilities
V 1(b1, b2, g) =u(b1, g) + b1 − h1(b1, cd(b2 + g)), (3.36)
V 2(b2, b1, g) =u(cd(b
2 + g), xd(b
2 + g)) + cd(b
2 + g)− h2(cd(b2 + g), b1). (3.37)
Using bi = yi − g, the change in indirect utilities induced by the switch from policy Pr
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to Pp can be represented by differentiating (3.36) and (3.37) with respect to g at Pr:
dV 1
dg










Since −(uic + 1) + uix = 0 at Pr (see the first-order condition (3.11)) and ∂h1/∂c1 ≥ 0
and ∂h2/∂c1 ≥ 0, dV 1/dg ≥ 0 and dV 2/dg ≥ 0. Hence, no income type is worse off
when g is raised slightly above x1LF . If ∂h
1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0, dV i/dg > 0 for
at least one type, and Pp achieves a Pareto improvement over PLF . This proves the
proposition. 
3.A.3 Proofs for Section 3.4
3.A.3.1 Derivations for KUJ and RAJ
We will show that the sign of ∂MRS(ci, xi, ri)/∂ri is equivalent to the sign of ∂cid/∂r
i if
an individual is not constrained by public provision, i.e., if xi > g. To see this, consider
individuals’ maximization problem for a given g:
max
ci,xi
Ũ(ci, xi, ri) s.t. (ci, xi) ∈ B̃ig. (3.40)
A solution to (3.40) with xi > g must satisfy
−Ũ ic + Ũ ix = 0 and ci + xi = yi. (3.41)




Ũ icr − Ũ ixr
−Ũ icc + 2Ũ icx − Ũ ixx
, (3.42)
where we abbreviated Ũ icc := ∂
2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂c2, Ũ icx := ∂2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂c∂x,
Ũ ixx := ∂
2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂x2, Ũ icr := ∂2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂c∂r, and
Ũ ixr := ∂
2Ũ(ci, yi − ci, ri)/∂x∂r. Since Ũ is strongly quasi-concave, the denominator in
(3.42) is positive (Barten and Böhm, 1982). The sign of ∂ci/∂ri is therefore determined
by the sign of Ũ icr − Ũ ixr. It remains to show that ∂MRSi (ci, xi, ri) /∂ri > (<) 0 ⇐⇒
Ũ icr − Ũ ixr > (<) 0. To see this, differentiate MRSi (ci, xi, ri) = Ũ ic/Ũ ix with respect to
72






















x = 1 at a solution to (3.40), ∂MRS
i (ci, xi, ri) /∂ri > (<) 0⇐⇒ ∂ci/∂ri >
(<) 0.
3.A.3.2 Proof of local uniqueness
To prove that Assumption 3.1 implies local uniqueness of equilibria, rewrite (3.20) as
F (r, g) = 0, where F : R2 × R1 → R2, (r, g) 7→ F (r, g) = (F1(r, g), F2(r, g)) with
Fi(r, g) = r
i − hi(ci(g, ri), cj(g, rj)). By the continuity of demand functions and hi,
F is continuous. However, as demand functions are not differentiable at points where
g = xid(y
i, ri) for one or both types, the standard implicit function theorem does not
apply. However, local uniqueness can be ensured by applying an implicit function
theorem for non-differentiable mappings by Kumagai (1980).
To see this, let (r̂1, r̂2, ĝ) be a point such that F (r̂1, r̂2, ĝ) = 0. If there exist open
neighborhoods of (r̂1, r̂2) and ĝ on which F (·, g) is locally one-to-one, the theorem
ensures that we can express references levels as an implicit function of g. When no
individual is crowded-out at (r̂1, r̂2, ĝ) (which includes the laissez-faire with g = 0),
F (·, g) is locally one-to-one: by Assumption 3.1, the determinant of the Jacobian of
F with respect to r, given by A, is non-zero such that F is invertible. Now consider
a solution to F (r, g) = 0 where one type i is just crowded out (g = xid(y
i, ri)). If we
go into an ε-environment of ĝ and keep r fixed at (r̂1, r̂2), type i will either be strictly
crowded-out (g > xd(y
i, ri)), or she will top up (g < xid(y
i, ri)). This will remain true
for a sufficiently close ball around (r̂1, r̂2). Since in either these cases, the determinant
of the Jacobian of F with respect to r exists and has the same sign, we can conclude
that F is also one-to-one around a solution where F (r, g) = 0 is non-differentiable.
Hence, Kumagai’s theorem applies, and equilibria are locally unique. 
3.A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 3.1. Consider a given


















Set the public provision level to gr = x
1
LF . By the assumption that reference levels do
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not jump, policy gr leads to the same consumption allocation CLF as in the laissez-
faire; as gr = x
1
LF , by demand functions (3.18) and (3.19), individuals of type 1 choose
c1(gr, r̂
1) = y1 − gr = c1LF and x1(gr, r̂1) = gr = x1LF . Since x1d(y1, r1) < x2d(y2, r2)
by assumption, we have gr < x
2




2, r̂2) = c2LF and x
2(gr, r̂
2) = c2d(y
2, r̂2) = x2LF . Therefore, at gr, individuals of
type 1 [type 2] are [not] crowded out by public provision, and system (3.20) reads
r1 − h1(y1 − g, c2LF ) = 0
r2 − h2(c2LF , y1 − g) = 0.
(3.44)
Given (r̂1, r̂2), indirect utilities can be expressed as
V 1(g) = U(y1 − g, g,∆1(y1 − g, r̂1(g))), (3.45)
V 2(g) = U(c2d(y
2, r̂(g)), x2d(y
2, r̂(g)),∆2(c2d(y
2, r̂(g)), r̂2(g))). (3.46)
Consider a change in the public provision level from gr to gp = gr + dg, where dg > 0






























by Assumption 3.1. Using (3.47), (3.48) and the first-order conditions of the individual
maximization problems (3.40), the change in indirect utilities induced by the change




























where U i∆ := ∂U(c
i, xi,∆i)/∂∆ and (3.49) and (3.50) are evaluated at gr. Under KUJ,
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∂c2d/∂r
2 > 0. Hence, dV 1/dg and dV 2/dg are non-negative at gr. If ∂h
1/∂c1 > 0 or
∂h2/∂c1 > 0, we have dV 1 > 0 or dV 2 > 0.
To complete the proof, we have to show that individuals of type 1 [type 2] are still
[not] crowded out by public provision after the policy change from gr to gp. As demand
functions are continuous and we require x2LF > x
1
LF , individuals of type 2 are not
crowded out by public provision at gp. Type 1 individuals remain crowded out if the
difference Ω1(g, r1) := g − x1d (y1, r1) is greater or equal to zero at gp (see demand
functions (3.18) and (3.19)). This holds if




dr1 ≥ 0, (3.51)


















From individuals’ budget constraints, KUJ implies ∂xi/∂ri = −∂ci/∂ri < 0. Hence,








































Dividing by D1 and rearranging leads to (3.53). Hence, individuals of type 1 stay
crowded out after the change to policy Pp. This proves Proposition 3.2. 
3.A.4 Derivation of optimal consumption taxes in the absence
of public provision
For a given policy P = (b1, b2, g, t), each individual’s budget set is given by
Bit = {(ci, xi) : (1 + t) ci + xi − g ≤ bi, xi ≥ g}. The unique solution to the individual
maximization problem (3.6) must satisfy the first-order conditions









Demand functions for goods c and x can be expressed as follows:
ci(bi, g, p) =
 cd(bi + g, p) if g < xd(bi + g, p),bi/p if g ≥ xd(bi + g, p), (3.56)
xi(bi, g, p) =
 xd(bi + g, p) if g < xd(bi + g, p),g if g ≥ xd(bi + g, p). (3.57)
The functions cd(I, p) and xd(I, p) again give individuals’ ordinary or unconstrained
demands, and solve problem (3.6) for Bu := {(c, x) : pc+ x ≤ I}. Using that p = p(t),
we define indirect utility of type i as
V i(bi, bj, g, p(t)) := ui(ci(bi, g, p(t)), xi(bi, g, p(t))) + ci(bi, g, p(t)) (3.58)
− hi(ci(bi, g, p(t)), cj(bj, g, p(t))).
Optimal policies in the absence of public provision solve
max
b1,b2,t
V 1(b1, b2, 0, p(t)) s.t. (3.59)
(i) : V 2(b1, b2, 0, p(t)) ≥ Ū2,
(ii) : y1 − b1 + tc1 + y2 − b2 + tc2 ≥ 0.
We define S as the set of policies P0 = (b10, b20, 0, t0) such that there exists a level Ū2
and the policy solves (3.59).
Denote the Lagrangian to problem (3.59) by
L = V 1(b1, b2, 0, p(t)) + µ
[




y1 − b1 + tc1 + y2 − b2 + tc2
]
, (3.60)
where µ and λ are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints (i) and (ii) of




0, 0, t0) in S must satisfy the first-order
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where p0 = 1 + t0. Solving (3.61) and (3.62) for µ













































































































































In (3.68) and (3.69), c̃ i (p, g, v̄i) denotes individual i’s Hicksian or compensated demand
function for good c for a given utility level v̄i.37 The assumption that U i∗ increases in
ci implies that the terms in parentheses in (3.68) and (3.69) are, respectively, positive.
Since ∂c̃ i/∂p < 0, we have β < 0 and γ < 0. As Γi < 0 for at least one income type,





(3.67) can be written as
t0 =
[
αΓ1 + (1− α) Γ2
]
> 0,
which coincides with (3.23).
3.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Consider an optimal policy P0 ∈ S. If Γ1|C=C0 = Γ
2|C=C0 at P0, (3.23) implies t0 =
Γ1|C=C0 = Γ









0)− Γi|C=C0 = 1 for i = 1, 2, which coincides
with (3.7). As the utility function U i∗ is strongly quasi-concave, any allocation that
satisfies (3.7) is Pareto efficient. Conversely, if Γ1|C=C0 6= Γ
2|C=C0 at P0, we have
MRS(ci, xi) − Γi 6= 1 for at least one type, and condition (3.7) does not hold. Hence,
policy P0 implements an efficient allocation if and only if Γ
1|C=C0 = Γ
2|C=C0 . 
3.A.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4
The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 3.1. Consider a given policy
P0 ∈ S. We will show that if Γ1 > Γ2 at P0, there exists a feasible policy that achieves
37Formally, c̃ i (p, g, v̄) are obtained from the expenditure minimization problem
min
ci,xi
p · ci + xi − g s.t. ui(ci, xi) + ci − ri ≥ v̄i, (3.70)
xi ≥ g, ci ≥ 0.
Given our assumptions on preferences, there exists a unique c̃ i(p, g, v̄i) for every (p, g, v̄i).
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a Pareto improvement over P0.
We first prove that there exists a feasible policy with g > 0 which leads to the same












0, 0, t0). Specifically, consider
the policy Pr with
b1r = b
1
0 − gr, b2r = b20 − gr, gr = x10, tr = t0. (3.71)
At Pr, we have xd(b
1
r + gr, pr) = xd(b
1




r + gr, pr) = xd(b
2
0, p0) = x
2
0.




0, by (3.56) and (3.57), it follows that types 1 and 2 respectively
choose c1(b1r, gr, pr) = br/pr = c
1
0, x
1(b1r, gr, pr) = gr = x
1
0, c
2(b2r, gr, pr) = cd(b
2
0, p0) = c
2
0
and x2(b2r, gr, pr) = xd(b
2
0, p0) = x
2
0. Thus, consumption allocations and individuals’
indirect utilities at P0 and Pr coincide.
Substitution of policy Pr into the government budget constraint (3.22) gives
y1 − b10 + t0c10 + y2 − b20 + t0c20 = 0. (3.72)
As (3.72) must hold at P0, policy Pr is feasible. Since individuals of type 1 [type 2]
are [not] constrained by public provision at Pr, we can express indirect utilities and the
government budget as
V 1(b1, b2, g, p) =u(b1/p, g) + b1/p− h1(b1/p, cd(b2 + g, p)), (3.73)
V 2(b2, b1, g, p) =u(cd(b
2 + g, p), xd(b
2 + g, p)) (3.74)
+ cd(b
2 + g, p)− h2(cd(b2 + g, p), b1/p),
G =y1 − b1 + tb1/p+ y2 − b2 + tcd(b2 + g, p)− 2g. (3.75)




2, gr+dg, p0), where dg >
0 and dg → 0. Net incomes are adjusted such that (i) the government budget G remains
balanced and (ii) the indirect utility of type 2 does not change. The consumption tax
is held constant at t = t0. Using (3.74) and (3.75), requirements (i) and (ii) can be
represented by








































dg = 0, (3.77)
where we abbreviated ∂cid/∂I := ∂cd(b
i + g, p)/∂I and used that (u2c + 1)/u
2
x = p at
79
APPENDIX 3.A
policy Pr. Solving for db




























































 > 0. (3.80)
The first term in (3.80) is positive as U i∗ increases in c
i. The same holds for the second
term since (−1 + t∂c2d/∂I) < 0.38
The policy change from Pr to Pp achieves a Pareto improvement if the indirect utility
of type 1 increases. Using (3.73), we can represent the change in V 1 by



























where we used that (u1c + 1)/u
1
x = p and factored out u
1
x. Making use of (3.78), (3.79)
and the definitions of Γ1 and Γ2, (3.81) can be rewritten as
























Substitution of the expression for the optimal tax in the absence of public provision
(3.23) in (3.82), and taking into account that consumption allocations at P0 and Pr
coincide, yields















38From individuals’ budget constraint, cd(I
2, p) = 1/p(I2 − xd(I2, p)). Differentiating with respect












As both goods are normal, we must have (−1 + t∂c2d/∂I) < 0.
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The sign of D4 follows since, at the optimal policy P0, the Lagrange multiplier associ-
ated with the government budget constraint, λ0, must be larger than zero. Thus, the
proposed policy achieves a Pareto improvement, i.e., dV 1 > 0, if Γ1 > Γ2 at P0.
To complete the proof, we must show that individuals of type 1 [type 2] indeed remain
[not] crowded out by public provision if we change the policy from Pr to Pp. By the
continuity of demand functions, this is satisfied for type 2. Individuals of type 1 are
crowded out at Pp if the difference Ω
1(b1, g, p) := g − x1d (b1 + g, p) is greater or equal






















The first term of the right hand side of (3.84) is positive as both goods are normal. The
sign of the second term follows since db1 < 0 by (3.78). Hence, type 1 individuals are
crowded out at Pp. As similar arguments apply for all P0 ∈ S, this finishes the proof of
Proposition 3.4. 
3.A.7 Example 2
Assume that the sub-utility function u and reference functions hi are respectively given
by






− ri, h1(c1, c2) = c2, h2(c2, c1) = 0.
Hence, Γ2 > Γ1 = 0. We choose parameters y1 = 10, y2 = 15, σ = 0.8 and δ = 0.4.
Setting Ū2 = 10.7189 to laissez-faire level enjoyed by the rich, the optimal tax in the
absence of public provision is t0 = 1.04, and the poor obtain indirect utility V
1 = −0.35.
Now, consider a switch to a policy P ′ = (b1, b2, g, 0), where b1 = y1−1.1g, b2 = y2−0.9g
and g = 6.05. At this policy, both types are constrained by public provision and obtain
utilities V 1 = −0.32 and V 2 = 10.7193. Hence, under policy P ′, the poor and the rich
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are better off compared to P0.
3.A.8 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Consider a given Pareto efficient allocation C∗ ∈ P .













∗ − g∗, g∗ = x1∗. (3.85)




∗) if they are (just) con-
strained by public provision and do not buy additional units of x on the market. This
happens if and only if
MRS(c1∗, x
1
∗) ≥ 1. (3.86)
From condition (3.7) we know that MRS(c1∗, x
1
∗) = 1 + Γ
1. Hence, as Γ1 > 0, condition
(3.86) holds. Individuals of type 2 can afford their intended bundle: by (3.85), their
disposable income is effectively I2∗ = b
2





since we consider only C∗ ∈ P where x1∗ < x2∗, by demand functions (3.12) and (3.13),
we have g < xd(I
2
∗ ) = x
2
∗ such that individuals of type 2 are not constrained at P∗.
Hence, (c2∗, x
2
∗) is the optimal choice: utility-maximization requires MRS(c
2, x2) = 1.
By (3.7) and strict convexity of preferences, this condition can only hold at (c2∗, x
2
∗).







∗ − y1 − y2 = 0, (3.87)
which must hold for any C∗ and therefore proves feasibility.
To prove the “only if” part, note that if Γ2 > 0 policy P∗ can never implement C∗:




2 by (3.7), they would always choose a consumption bundle different
from (c2∗, x
2
∗) when income is b
2
∗.
Further, there exist no other policies that might lead to C∗. Implementation with
policies where g > x1∗ is impossible since, by monotonicity, individuals never forego the
publicly provided amount g. Hence, at least one income type would not consume the
efficient level of good x. We can also rule out policies where g < x1∗: if one or both types
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are constraint, Pareto efficiency cannot be attained when x1∗ < x
2
∗; if both individuals
are not crowded out, they would top-up to a bundle that is not Pareto efficient, since
both choose goods c and x such that MRS (ci, xi) = 1.




∗, g∗, t∗) with












We first show that individuals choose C∗ under P∗ if and only if Γ
1 > Γ2. We then
verify that P∗ is feasible if individuals were to choose C∗ at this policy. In a last step,
we proof that P∗ is the only policy that can achieve C∗.
To see that C∗ is consistent with utility maximization, consider first the decision problem
of type 1 individuals. The bundle (c1∗, x
1
∗) is affordable since g = x
1
∗ and the net income
b1∗ is designed such that c
1
∗ can be just attained if x






∗) ≥ p = 1 + t∗. (3.89)




∗)−Γ2 ≥ 1. From condition
(3.7) we know that MRS(c1∗, x
1
∗) = 1 + Γ
1. Thus, (c1∗, x
1
∗) is optimal for individuals of
type 1 if and only if Γ1 ≥ Γ2.
The rich can also afford their intended bundle: by (3.88), their disposable income is
effectively I2∗ = b
2




∗). Moreover, since we consider
only C∗ ∈ P where x1∗ < x2∗, we have g < x2∗, and the rich are not constrained at P∗.
Hence, (c2∗, x
2
∗) is the optimal choice: utility-maximization requires MRS(c
2, x2) = p =
1 + t∗. As t∗ = Γ
2, by (3.7) this condition can only hold at (c2∗, x
2
∗).







∗ − y1 − y2 = 0, (3.90)
which must hold for any C∗ and therefore proves feasibility.
P ∗ is the only policy that may support C∗. Implementation with policies where g > x
1
∗
is impossible since, by monotonicity, individuals never forego the publicly provided
amount g. Hence, at least one income type would not consume the efficient level of
good x. We can also rule out policies where g < x1∗: if one or both types are constraint,
Pareto efficiency cannot be attained when x1∗ < x
2
∗; if both individuals are not crowded
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out, they would top-up to a bundle that is not Pareto efficient, since in the case where
Γ1 6= Γ2, the uniform tax rate can never be set such that private optimization yield
MRS + Γi = 1 for i = 1, 2 for any given net incomes. 
3.A.9 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Item (i): If consumption taxes are not feasible, t = 0 and p = 1. Consider a switch






1 − er; b2r = y2. (3.91)
This policy induces individuals to choose the same consumption bundles as in the
laissez-faire. Since ê(b1r, p) < cd(b
1
r, p) < cd(y
1, p) = c1LF , type 1 individuals choose
public provision at Pr. Hence, by (3.27) and (3.28), c
1(b1r, p, er) = er = c
1
LF and




LF . By the assumption c
1
LF < ê
2(y2, p), individuals of type 2
opt out and, as b2r = y
2, select c2(b2r, p, er) = c
2
LF and x
2(b2r, p, er) = x
2
LF , respectively.
Policy Pr is also feasible: substituting it into the government budget constraint (see
Definition 3.2) gives
y1 − c1LF − x1LF + y2 − c2LF − x2LF = 0,
which holds since CLF satisfies the economy’s resource constraint.
Now, marginally decrease e at Pr and finance it by de = −db1. By the continuity of
utility functions, type 2 stays out of the public system after this policy change. The
effect on both types’ indirect utilities is








Hence, decreasing e benefits at least one type if ∂h1/∂c1 > 0 or ∂h2/∂c1 > 0.
Item (ii): If a tax on the positional good is available, the benchmark is policy P0 =
(b10, b
2







0 − p0er, b2r = b20, tr = t0. (3.94)
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r, p0) < cd(b
1
0, p0) = c
1
0. Thus, type 1 opts in when e = c
1
0. By assumption (e =
c10 < ê(b
2
0, p0)), individuals of type 2 opt out. Consequently, both types choose the same
consumption bundle as in the situation without public provision and are thus equally
well-off. Further, we have N = 1, and the proposed policy satisfies the government
budget constraint.
We now show that if Γ1 6= Γ2 at P0, a Pareto-improving policy always exists. To see
this, marginally change e by de and adjust net incomes bi such that (i) the government
budget remains balanced and (ii) utility type 2 individuals Ṽ 2out does not change. Since
de→ 0, the continuity of utility functions ensures that type 1 (type 2) individuals are


















de = 0, (3.96)









































The above policy change achieves a Pareto improvement if the utility of type 1 increases.
Total differentiation of Ṽ 1in, combined with ∂c
1/∂b1 = 0, ∂c1/∂e = 1, ∂Ṽ 2out/∂e = 0 at
Pr, (3.97) and (3.98) gives











































where D4 < 0 is defined as in the proof of Proposition 3.4. Thus, if Γ
1 < (>) Γ2, a
marginal increase (decrease) in e from Pr yields a Pareto improvement over policy P0.
This proves item (ii) of the proposition. 
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Present-Bias, Price Subsidies, and Public Provision
4.1 Introduction
When making intertemporal decisions, many people are biased towards the present:
they assign higher relative weight to well-being in the current period than they did
if asked in any period before (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2001).1 Such present-biased
preferences are time-inconsistent and capture the idea that people may have self-control
problems: due to a tendency to take immediate rewards and to avoid immediate costs,
people’s actions may deviate from what they had originally planned.
Self-control problems have important implications for the consumption of essential
goods like education, health care, or old-age consumption. A common feature of these
goods is that they involve up front costs but sizeable parts of their benefits arise in the
future. For example, investments in education require considerable current expenses
in exchange for an increased prospective earnings potential. Likewise, taking preven-
tive medication, routine check-ups, medical advice, or a proper diet – although offering
some immediate benefits – mainly affect one’s health status in the long-run. Savings for
retirement increase consumption in old-age but come at the cost of less consumption at
present.
From a long-run perspective, people with a present-bias undervalue delayed benefits
when deciding how much to consume and therefore act against their own long-run
interests: asked in advance, they preferred a different consumption bundle than the one
actually chosen, and would be better off if they could have committed themselves to
1For recent empirical evidence, see Ashraf et al. (2006), Brown et al. (2009), Dupas and Robinson
(2013) or Augenblick et al. (2015).
4.1. INTRODUCTION
do so. As a consequence, unregulated consumption allocations are inefficient.2 People’s
current consumption imposes a positive “internal effect” on their long-run “selves”, and
they tend to under-consume goods that provide future benefits.3 The presence of self-
control problems might therefore justify corrective government interventions.
In this paper, we study the optimal form of such policies. Basically, governments employ
two different types of policy instruments. First, most countries publicly provide goods
like education, health care, or old-age consumption – typically at uniform levels and free
of charge.4 Second, private purchases of these goods are often subsidized by lowering
market prices. In Germany, for example, up to 30 percent of tuition fees for private
schools can be deducted from parents’ taxable income. Likewise, many countries offer
tax benefits for participants in private pension schemes. Further, it is common practice
to implicitly subsidize pharmaceutical products by applying lower value-added tax rates
(Pirttilä and Tuomala, 2004). Across countries, the usage of the two policy instruments
differs: while price subsidies and public provision co-exist in some countries, others
rely on only one instrument. E.g., Australia employs a public health care system, but
citizens who buy private health insurance receive a rebate that covers part of the costs
for their premiums. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, health care is exclusively
publicly provided through the National Health service.
Both price subsidies and public provision can in principle correct inefficient consumer
choices. While subsidies act through the price mechanism, public provision effectively
imposes minimum quantities on each individual’s consumption: by providing a private
good and financing it through an equal-sized reduction in net incomes, governments
can force individuals to consume more of goods that provide future benefits.5
An important question is then whether the two instruments are substitutes or comple-
2Time-inconsistent preferences raise the philosophical question of which preferences to use for wel-
fare comparisons. In this paper, we follow related literature and apply a “long-run criterion” (Bernheim
and Rangel, 2007). An allocation is called efficient if it maximizes people’s long-run preferences. We
therefore treat each individual’s present-bias as an error (see Section 4.2 below).
3It is convenient to consider present-biased individuals as consisting of different selves (Laibson,
1997). In every period, choices are made by the respective current self. The term “internality” is used
to distinguish the phenomenon from standard externality problems. With present-biased preferences,
the external effect does not emerge across different individuals, but between different selves of the same
individual (Herrnstein et al., 1993).
4In OECD countries, public spending on private goods and services ranges from 10 to 25 percent
of GDP (Currie and Gahvari, 2008). By public provision we mean that the government finances a
certain level of a private good. The actual provision may take place in public or private institutions.
5This argument requires that people cannot resell their provision levels, which is satisfied for goods
like education or health care (Currie and Gahvari, 2008). Otherwise, public provision would be the
same as a cash transfer and could not distort consumption choices.
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ments in order to address people’s self-control problems. Is one instrument superior
compared to the other or should governments employ a combination of both? We con-
sider a dynamic economy with two private goods. One good is standard, the other
requires immediate expenses but yields utility in the future (e.g., health, education,
etc.). The government can publicly provide or subsidize the good with delayed ben-
efits. Subsidy rates and public provision levels must be identical for all individuals.
Both policies are financed by taxes on exogenous gross incomes. People may differ in
gross incomes and in the strength of their self-control problems, which we model as
time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).
We find that optimal policies depend on the dimension of heterogeneity among individ-
uals. In an economy with homogenous consumers, price subsidies and public provision
are equivalent – in the sense that both can fully correct internal effects and implement
an efficient allocation. With heterogeneous individuals, this equivalence disappears.
In particular, when people only differ in their present-bias, public provision strictly
dominates price subsidies. In this case, people are identical from a long-run perspec-
tive, and – as long as the government does not want to redistribute between identical
individuals – the efficient consumption bundle is the same for all. However, due to
differences in present-bias, people’s short-run preferences (and thus, choices) differ. As
a consequence, sustaining the efficient allocation through price subsidies would require
type-specific subsidy rates – which is impossible when policies must be uniform. In con-
trast, by setting the provided amount to the efficient level, public provision can always
restore efficiency.
When individuals have different biases and gross incomes, price subsidies and pub-
lic provision can be complements. In the special case with only two income groups,
this happens if and only if the poor have the stronger present bias. Moreover, op-
timal policies implement efficient consumption allocations. In the reverse case where
the present-bias is more pronounced among the rich, price subsidies and public pro-
vision are substitutes: optimal policies include only one of the two instruments and
are second-best in that efficient allocations cannot be achieved. In scenarios with more
than two types, our results generalize if the strength of present-bias is monotonically
related to individuals’ gross incomes. I.e., governments should employ a combination of
both instruments if self-control problems weaken with rising income. If the present-bias
intensifies as individuals become richer, it is optimal to implement either a price sub-
sidy or public provision. Optimal policies are, however, generally second-best: in the
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presence of more than two types of present-bias, one cannot correct all internal effects
with only two uniform instruments.
The relevance of our analysis is supported by recent empirical evidence. For example,
as argued by Oreopoulos (2007), present-biased preferences can help to explain why
students in the U.S., Canada, or UK drop out of high school even though an additional
year of schooling increases their lifetime spending by 15 percent. Likewise, a grow-
ing literature tries to understand why in developing countries investments in health,
education, or physical capital – although offering high returns – remain relatively low
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2007). One possible explanation is that people have self-control
problems and understate the positive benefits of such investments. E.g., using data
from a field experiment in Kenya, Dupas and Robinson (2013) find that an important
fraction of their sample was present-biased and benefited from a commitment device
forcing participants to increase investments in preventative health care.6
Our paper makes three contributions. First, we complement the discussion on whether
governments should use price- or quantity-based instruments for policy interventions
(see, for example, Guesnerie and Roberts, 1984; Blomquist and Christiansen, 1998;
Boadway et al., 1998; Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). Two recent studies address this
question from a behavioral economics perspective. In Farhi and Gabaix (2015), quantity
regulations may be superior to taxes when consumers misperceive prices. Heutel (2015)
studies optimal policies for externality-generating durable goods and finds that energy
efficiency standards may dominate fuel economy taxes if consumers are present-biased.
As in our model, quantity instruments may complement or even outperform taxes and
subsidies only if consumers are heterogeneous in the behavioral failure.
Second, we contribute to a growing literature on optimal public policies when people
have present-biased preferences (Gruber and Köszegi, 2001; O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2003, 2006; Alcott et al.,2014; Guo and Krause, 2015). Previous work has shown that
both price subsidies (Aronsson and Thunström, 2008) and public provision (Amador
et al., 2006; Aronsson and Granlund, 2014) can mitigate the under-consumption of
goods like health care or old-age consumption. However, as our results reveal, an
analysis of optimal policies should consider both instruments simultaneously: when
people have different present-biases, efficient allocations are typically not achievable by
a single instrument, and a combination of price subsidies and public provision might be
useful. In fact, as shown in the present paper, both instruments are complementary in
6Similar evidence is provided in Ashraf et al. (2006) or Duflo et al. (2011).
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important cases.
Finally, our analysis is related to the “older” literature on paternalism and merit goods
where for some reason, the government’s and individuals’ preferences differ (Sandmo,
1983; Besley, 1988; Blomquist and Micheletto, 2006; Pirttilä and Tenhunen, 2008). In
our approach, however, although people’s short-run tastes are disrespected, individuals
would agree with the government’s policies from a long-run perspective (Cremer and
Pestieau, 2011). In fact, present-biased preferences provide a foundation for why people
spend insufficiently on education or health care when left to their own devices. Closest
to our paper is Munro (1992), who shows that public provision can complement taxes
and subsidies in scenarios where governments and individuals hold different views about
the probabilities of uncertain events. However, he does not characterize the optimal mix
of public provision and price instruments.
The paper has the following structure. Section 4.2 introduces the theoretical framework,
presents the basic problem, defines the set of government policies and provides a simple
example. Section 4.3 studies optimal policies when people differ only in present-bias. A
scenario with differences in present-bias and gross incomes is considered in Section 4.4.




General: Consider a dynamic economy in discrete time, indexed by t = 1, ..., T . The
economy is populated by a large number N of individuals who can be of different types
i = 1, ..., I. The number of each type is normalized to one, such that I = N . There
are two private goods, denoted c and x. In every period t, an individual of type i
has an endowment or gross income yi of good c. The second good, x, is produced in
a competitive industry that uses a linear technology and c as the only input. Hence,
producer prices are fixed, and we normalize units such that prices equal one for both
goods. Individuals cannot save and must divide their income in period t on goods
c and x. Denote by cit and x
i
t the consumption levels of type i in period t, and a





















Preferences: Individuals have preferences over the two private goods. Good x has
properties of an investment good in the sense that (part of) its benefits accrue in the
future. This feature applies to goods like education, health care, old-age consumption,
or (healthy) food. For simplicity, we assume that the consumption of xt in period t solely
yields utility in the subsequent period. Good c is a standard consumption good and has
no effect on future well-being. Specifically, in period t, individuals enjoy instantaneous
utility
ut(ct, xt−1) := v(ct) + h(xt−1). (4.1)
Functions v and h are strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable and strictly










t−1. In addition, we require v
′(ct)→∞ as
ct → 0, v′(ct) → 0 as ct → ∞, h′(xt) → ∞ as xt → 0 and h′(xt) → 0 as xt → ∞. As
a consequence, goods c and x are normal and individuals choose positive amounts of
both when endowed with a positive level of income.
Beyond instantaneous utility, individuals care about future well-being. An individual’s
intertemporal preferences at time t are represented by (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997)





The parameter 0 < βi ≤ 1 captures the idea that individuals may have a self-control
problem: if βi < 1, there is an “extra bias” in t favoring t over all future periods.
As t arrives, individual i gives higher relative weight to t than in every period before.
Individuals may differ in the intensity or strength of their present-bias – reflected in the
magnitude of βi. We assume that βi < 1 for at least one i.
Present-biased preferences represented by (4.2) are time-inconsistent. To see this, con-
sider individual i’s preferences over consumption bundles (cit, x
i
t). In period t, the in-
dividual’s marginal rate of substitution between cit and x
i
t is given by β
ih′(xit)/v
′(cit),
which differs from the marginal rate of substitution h′(xit)/v
′(cit) in any period prior to
t. Hence, if βi < 1, preferences in t are not consistent with preferences in any previous
period. By (4.1) and (4.2), the choice of (cit, x
i
t) is independent of all past and future
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4.2.2 Efficient allocations
When individuals have different preferences at different points in time, any normative
analysis faces the problem of which preferences should be used for welfare comparisons.
In this paper we follow earlier literature and adopt a “long-run” criterion to evaluate
consumption allocations (see, e.g., O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2003, 2006; Gruber
and Köszegi, 2001). In particular, we assume that individuals have long-run preferences
given by




and we compare any two allocations according to (4.3). From a long-run perspective,
individuals would therefore maximize u∗(ct, xt) := v(ct) + h(xt) in period t, and we
treat their present-bias (βi < 1) as an “error”. As an alternative interpretation, one can
think of every individual as consisting of different selves who are indexed by the period
where they make a consumption choice (see, e.g., Laibson, 1997). E.g., a person’s
period-t-self chooses (cit, x
i
t) to maximize U
i
t . In every period, the preferences of an
individual’s current self then deviate from the preferences of her earlier selves. In the
same way as a Samuelson-Bergson social welfare function aggregates preferences of
different individuals, we can set up a welfare function that assigns different weights to
the preferences of different selves of the same individual (Bernheim and Rangel, 2007).
The long-run criterion is then a special case where the present-biased preferences of the
current self receive zero weight.












t) for at least one i. We define an
allocation as efficient if each individual allocates a given income according to u∗ (c, x),
i.e., makes no errors when choosing a consumption bundle. Formally, any efficient
allocation must satisfy
−v′(cit) + h′(xit) = 0 for all i = 1, ..., I. (4.4)
We define the set of efficient allocations E as all feasible allocations Ct that satisfy (4.4).




Applying (4.3) as a welfare criterion implies a gap between individuals’ unregulated









t ) in a laissez-faire without government intervention. In the laissez-
faire, each individual chooses (ĉit, x̂
i
t) to maximize v(c
i
t)+β






A comparison of the first-order condition
−v′(ĉit) + βih′(x̂it) = 0 (4.5)
with (4.4) shows that, in every period, laissez-faire allocations are inefficient. Moreover,
individuals with a present-bias under-consume [over-consume] good x [c] – in the sense
that a marginal increase in x accompanied by a marginal decrease in c increases their
long-run utility. Intuitively, the consumption of good x in period t positively affects
utility in the subsequent period. When individuals suffer from a present-bias, their
period-t-selves – who actually decide how much to consume – only take a fraction β
of the benefits into account. As a consequence, xt imposes a positive internal effect on
individuals’ long-run selves. By implicit differentiation of (4.5), it follows that the under-
consumption intensifies when people have a stronger present-bias, i.e., ∂x̂/∂β > 0.
The inefficiency of the laissez-faire allocations does not depend on the choice of the long-
run criterion for welfare comparisons. In fact, Ĉ would be inefficient for any welfare
function where long-run preferences (4.3) receive positive weight. As individuals have
the same preferences and endowments in every period, they effectively face the same
choice in all t < T .7 Unless stated otherwise, we will drop the time index in what
follows.
4.2.4 Available policies and individual behavior
As laissez-faire allocations are inefficient, government interventions in markets for edu-
cation, health care, or old-age consumption may be justified. Two policy instruments
can be used to correct consumer behavior: price subsidies and public provision. Specif-
ically, in every period t, the government may provide an amount g of good x free of
charge. While individuals are allowed to purchase additional units on a market at
7In the last period T , individuals make no forward-looking decisions and spend their entire net
income on good c. As this choice is efficient, we henceforth neglect T .
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price q, g cannot be resold (i.e., xi ≥ g).8 In addition, a per-unit subsidy or tax s on
good x can be employed, such that the consumer price is q = 1 + s. Due to infor-
mational asymmetries, implementation problems, arbitrage opportunities, or political
constraints, subsidy rates and public provision levels must be identical across individu-
als. Both policies can be financed through income taxes T i = T (yi). An individual’s net
income is then given by bi = yi − T i. We will denote a policy by P = (T 1, ..., T I , s, g).
The government announces the sequence of policies (P1, ..., PT ) before period 1 and can




(T i + sxi)−Nqg = 0. (4.6)
For a given policy, an individual of type i solves
max
ci,xi
v(ci) + βih(xi) s.t. ci + q(xi − g) ≤ b and xi ≥ g. (4.7)
By strict concavity of v and h, (4.7) has a unique solution for every P , and there exist
demand functions ci = c(bi, q, g; βi) and xi = x (bi, q, g; βi). Let
V i(T i, s, g; βi) := u∗(c(bi, q, g; βi), x(bi, q, g; βi)) (4.8)
be the indirect long-run utility of type i. To simplify the exposition, we express indirect
utilities in terms of policy variables. We call a policy P superior to a policy P̃ if
V i(T i, s, g; βi) ≥ V i(T̃ i, s̃, g̃; βi) for all i = 1, ..., I and V i(T i, s, g; βi) > V i(T̃ i, s̃, g̃; βi)
for at least one i. A policy P is called optimal if there is no other feasible policy P̃ that
is superior to P .
We can obtain the set of optimal policies by maximizing the indirect utility of type 1
given that (i) indirect utilities of the other types do not fall below levels ūi and (ii) the
8This may hold due to specific characteristics of the good or a legal ban. Without this assumption,
any analysis of public provision becomes meaningless as g were equivalent to a cash transfer.
9In some situations, it may be optimal for the government to deviate from the announced policy
in some future period after individuals have revealed information about their self-control type. In
this case, not only individuals but also governments would behave time-inconsistent. In the context
of optimal non-linear income taxation, such problems have been recently analyzed by, e.g., Guo and
Krause (2015). To make the analysis tractable we assume full commitment on part of the government
and leave such extensions for future research.
95
4.2. THE MODEL
government budget is balanced. Formally, any optimal policy solves
max
T 1,...,T I ,s,g
V 1(T 1, s, g; β1) s.t. (4.9)




(T i + sxi)−Nqg ≥ 0.
We define P as the set of policies P such that there exist levels ūi and the policy solves
(4.9). We have to distinguish between optimal policies in P and efficient allocations in
E . In deriving E , we assumed a social planner who had full discretion over the economy’s
resources: he could achieve all feasible allocations by directly assigning consumption
bundles to different types of individuals. In contrast, with the restricted set of policies
– uniform subsidies and public provision levels – governments cannot support every
feasible allocation. As a consequence, optimal policies in P may be second-best in the
sense that they cannot implement allocations in E .
4.2.5 A simple example
To get an intuition why price subsidies and public provision are both valuable to correct
the under-consumption of good x, consider a simple example with a single individual
who has a present-bias. In this scenario, the unique efficient allocation (c∗, x∗) maxi-
mizes u∗(c, x) subject to c + x = y. In the next lemma, we show that each of the two
policies – combined with appropriate income taxes – can support this allocation. While
a subsidy corrects individuals’ consumption choices through a change in relative prices,
a public provision system effectively imposes a minimum consumption constraint.
Lemma 4.1 The efficient allocation (c∗, x∗) can be implemented by either
P s = (s∗x∗, s∗, 0) or P
p = (g∗, 0, g∗), where s∗ = β − 1 and g∗ = x∗.
Proof: The efficient allocation (c∗, x∗) must satisfy
−v′(c∗) + h′(x∗) = 0. (4.10)
When the individual chooses (c∗, x∗), P
s is feasible: inserting P s into (4.6) yields c∗ +
x∗ = y. To see that policy P
s supports (c∗, x∗), note that the individual chooses (c, x)
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according to
−qv′(c) + βh′(x) = 0. (4.11)
Using s∗ = β − 1 and T∗ = s∗x∗, it follows that (4.11) coincides with (4.10). Hence, P s
implements (c∗, x∗).
A public provision system can induce an efficient allocation by setting g = x∗ and
T = x∗. This requires that the individual takes g and does not buy additional units of
good x on the market, i.e., that ci = bi = yi − T i = c∗ and xi = g = x∗. An individual






′(c∗) = 1 by (4.10), this never holds when β < 1. Thus, (c∗, x∗) can also be
implemented through P p. 
Lemma 4.1 easily generalizes to the case of many homogeneous individuals. Price
subsidies and public provision are then equally effective in order to correct internalities,
as both could implement an efficient allocation. However, while illustrative, a scenario
with identical individuals seems unrealistic. If fact, available empirical evidence suggests
that the intensity of self-control problem varies across individuals and social groups (see,
e.g., Paserman, 2008). In the following, we will therefore consider an economy where
individuals are heterogeneous.
4.3 Differences in present-bias
We start with a scenario where individuals solely differ in the strength of their present-
bias. To simplify the exposition, we consider a simple case with two different types
i = 1, 2, where β1 < β2 ≤ 1 and y1 = y2 = y.10 Denote the average demand for
good x by x̄ = (x1 + x2)/2. We first show that price subsidies and public provision
can achieve superior consumption allocations compared to the laissez-faire Ĉ. We then
study whether both instruments are substitutes or complements.
10All the results in this section easily extend to the case with a finite number of types I.
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4.3.1 Price subsidies
Our first proposition gives a sufficient condition such that the introduction of a subsidy
is superior to the laissez-faire policy P̂ := (0, 0, 0, 0):
Proposition 4.1 There exists a policy P = (T 1, T 2, s, 0) with s < 0 that is superior to
P̂ if at Ĉ,





Proof: Starting from the laissez-faire policy P̂ , consider the introduction of a marginal
subsidy on x, i.e., ds < 0 and small, accompanied by an increase in T 1 = T 2 = T that
balances the government budget (4.6). At P̂ , this is equivalent to
2dT + (x̂1 + x̂2)ds = 0 or dT = −x̄ds, (4.14)
To analyze how the marginal subsidy affects individuals’ long-run utilities, totally dif-
ferentiate V i with respect to T and s. This yields
dV i =−
[



































where A := v′′(ĉi) + βih′′(x̂i). Since ds < 0 and v and h are strictly concave, dV i > 0
is equivalent to





For individuals of type 2, (4.17) is positive since x̂1 < x̄ < x̂2 and β2 ≤ 1. Hence, they
always benefit from the introduction of a marginal subsidy. For individuals of type 1,
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the first term in (4.17) is positive while the second is negative. Hence, dV 1 > 0 if and
only if condition (4.13) holds. This proves the proposition. 
To get an intuition for Proposition 4.1, consider the introduction of a marginal subsidy
at P̂ and note that it must be financed through income taxation. Such a policy has two
effects on indirect long-run utilities. First, the subsidy lowers the relative price of good
x and induces individuals to consume more (in compensated terms) of it. As types
with a present-bias under-consume x in the laissez-faire, the change in the relative price
ceteris paribus benefits them.11 This “corrective” effect is represented by the first term
in (4.13). Second, since the income tax payment is the same for both types, any uniform
subsidy redistributes from individuals who consume more to those who consume less of
good x. As the consumption of good x increases with β, we have x̂1 < x̄ < x̂2 in the
laissez-faire. As a consequence, individuals of type 2 unambiguously benefit from the
introduction of a marginal subsidy. Type 1 is better off if the corrective effect outweighs
the redistribution effect reflected in the second term in (4.13).
The question is when condition (4.13) is satisfied. Ceteris paribus, it holds when (i) the
demand for good x is sufficiently responsive to price changes and (ii) the consumption
dispersion reflected by (x̄− x̂1) is small. The next example shows that (4.13) can indeed
hold under reasonable assumptions on parameters.
Example: Assume that v(ci) = ln ci and h(xi) = lnxi. Then, (4.13) reduces to
β1β2 < 1, which always holds as β1 < β2 ≤ 1. 
4.3.2 Public provision
We next ask whether the publicly providing good x can correct the under-consumption
of good x. To study the efficiency effects of public provision, first consider the demand
functions ci and xi obtained from problem (4.7). They have a piecewise form and can
be expressed as follows:12
ci = c(bi, q, g; βi) =
 cd(bi + qg, q; βi) if g < xd(bi + qg, q; βi),bi if g ≥ xd(bi + qg, q; βi), (4.18)
11When β2 = 1, individuals of type 2 were induced to consume “too much” of good x. However,
since they are consuming optimally at s = 0, this effect is of second-order and therefore negligible.
12Demand functions (4.18) and (4.19) are continuous and differentiable in bi, q and g with the
exception that they have a non-differentiability when g = xd(b
i + qg, q;βi). However, at such points
the one-sided partial derivatives exist, which will suffice for all our proofs below.
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xi = x(bi, q, g; βi) =
 xd(bi + qg, q; βi) if g < xd(bi + qg, q; βi),g if g ≥ xd(bi + qg, q; βi). (4.19)
In (4.18) and (4.19), cid = cd(I
i, q; βi) and xid = xd(I
i, q; βi) represent individual i’s
“ordinary demands” when disposable income is I i and there is no public provision. The
term xd(b
i + qg, q; βi) then gives the amount of good x an individual with net income
bi demands if it receives the value of public provision in cash. When xid > g, public
provision acts as an income or cash transfer: since individual i demands more than g
when endowed with an income of bi + qg, she tops up public provision and purchases
additional units on the market. If xid < g, however, the individual desires less than
the publicly provided amount. Since reselling is not feasible, she takes g and spends
her entire net income on good c. In this case, public provision constrains consumption
choices.
Any feasible provision level must be financed through income taxes. In the absence of
price subsidies (q = 1) and with identical gross incomes, running a balanced budget
requires T = g or b = y− g. It follows that xd(b+ g, q; βi) = xd(y, q; βi) = x̂i is equal to
individual i’s laissez-faire consumption. Hence, if g < x̂i, public provision has no effect
on individual behavior and long-run utility; individuals reduce their private purchases
of x by the amount g, but their total consumption levels do not change. In contrast, by
setting g > x̂i the government can force individuals to consume more of good x than
in the laissez-faire. The next proposition shows that there always exists a policy with
positive public provision that is superior to P̂ .
Proposition 4.2 Public provision of g = x̂i + dg is superior to P̂ , where dg > 0 and
small.
Proof: Consider a change from P̂ to P e = (T 1e , T
2
e , 0, ge) with ge = x̂
1 and T 1e = T
2
e = ge.
By demand functions (4.18) and (4.19), we have
x1 = g = x̂1, c1 = b = ĉ1, x2 = xd(y, 1; β
2) = x̂2, and c2 = cd(y, 1; β
2) = ĉ2.
I.e., both types choose the same consumption bundle and obtain the same long-run
utility as at P̂ . At P e, individuals’ indirect long-run utilities are
V 1(T 1, 0, g; β1) = v(b) + h(g), (4.20)
V 2(T 2, 0, g; β2) = v(cd(y, 1; β
2)) + h(xd(y, 1; β
2)). (4.21)
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Inserting P e into the government budget constraint (4.6) proves that P e is feasible.
Now, consider a marginal increase in g such that g = x̂1 +dg, where dg → 0. Feasibility
then requires that dT = dg. By (4.20) and (4.21), the effect on long-run well being of
both types is
dV 1 = (1− β1)h′(g)dg > 0, (4.22)
dV 2 = 0, (4.23)
where we used that −v′(ĉi) + βih′(x̂i) = 0 at P e. Since individuals of type 1 are
better off compared to P̂ , the policy with g = x̂i + dg is superior to P̂ . This proves
Proposition 4.2. 
Intuitively, the government can force individuals of type 1 to consume more of good x
by setting the public provision level marginally above x̂1. While individuals of type 2
are not affected by this policy (x̂1 < x̂2), those of type 1 benefit from a long-run
perspective. Such a policy satisfies what some behavioral economists call “minimal in-
terventions”: when governments want to help individuals overcome their self-control
problems, policies should not hurt people with full self-control.13 Here, a public provi-
sion level slightly above x̂1 has no impact on individuals with βi = 1 as they had chosen
this amount anyway.
4.3.3 Price subsidies vs. public provision
We now analyze optimal policies when the government can employ both price subsidies
and public provision. Any optimal policy that solves (4.9) should ideally implement an
efficient consumption allocation defined by (4.4). Individuals who differ only in β are
identical from a long-run perspective: they have the same preferences (4.3) and gross
incomes y. If governments do not want to redistribute between identical individuals,
there is a unique, symmetric efficient allocation C∗s where both types receive the same
consumption bundle (c∗, x∗) and long-run utility ū
∗ := u∗(c∗, x∗). In the next propo-
sition, we show that there exists exactly one policy P that supports C∗s . This policy
includes public provision but no price subsidy. We have
Proposition 4.3 When individuals differ only in βi, for all ū2 ≤ ū∗ the optimal policy
13See, e.g., Camerer et al. (2003) or Sunstein and Thaler (2003).
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is P ∗ = (T 1∗ , T
2




∗ = g∗ and g∗ = x∗. This policy implements the
symmetric efficient allocation C∗s where (c∗, x∗) is the same for both types.
Proof: The proof proceeds as follows. We first show that P ∗ implements C∗s and is
feasible. We then proof that P ∗ is the only policy that supports (c∗, x∗). In a last step,
we show that for all utility levels ū2 ≤ ū∗, P ∗ solves problem (4.9).
Under P ∗, both types choose (c∗, x∗): as β
2 ≤ 1, we have g∗ ≥ xd(y, 1, β2). By (4.18)
and (4.19) it follows that x2 = g∗ and c2 = b∗. Since ∂xid/∂β
i > 0, x1 = g∗ and c1 = b∗.
Inserting P ∗ into (4.6) implies that it is feasible.
To see that P ∗ is the only policy that can implement (c∗, x∗), note that any policy with
g > x∗ clearly cannot induce efficiency. In addition, policies where s < 0 and g = 0
cannot support (c∗, x∗) either: By (4.5), efficiency requires −v′(ci) + h′(xi) = 0. This
necessitates a subsidy of s = (βi − 1) for type i. Since individuals differ in βi, type-
specific subsidies are needed. However, this is impossible when s is uniform. Finally,
any policy with s < 0 and g < x∗ can be ruled out: when x
i
d > g for both types, at least
one of them does not choose (c∗, x∗) as ∂x
i
d/∂β
i > 0. If x2d > g > x
1
d, type 1 consumes




d, the same holds for both types.
Finally, note that (c∗, x∗) maximizes long-run utility u
∗(c, x) of type 1 when ū2 = ū∗.
As this allocation can be implemented if and only if P = P ∗, P ∗ solves (4.9) when
ū2 = ū∗. Further note that V 1(T, s, g; β1) ≤ V 2(T, s, g; β2) for every P . Hence, P ∗
maximizes V 1(T, s, g; β1) also for ū2 < ū∗. 
To correct the inefficiencies from people’s present-bias, governments should publicly
provide goods like education or health care and not use price subsidies. The intuition is
simple. When individuals differ in β but have identical incomes, a price subsidy cannot
implement the efficient allocation C∗s : inducing both types to choose the bundle (c∗, x∗)
would require type-specific subsidy rates and income transfers – which is impossible
since s must be uniform. In contrast, with g = x∗ and net incomes adjusted accordingly,
a public provision system can always support (c∗, x∗) for both types. As a consequence,
the policy P ∗ is optimal if the government does not intend to redistribute between
identical types 1 and 2, i.e., if ū2 ≤ ū∗.14
14When ū2 > ū∗, any optimal policy that solves (4.9) includes a subsidy but no public provision and
cannot implement an efficient allocation C∗ ∈ E : by setting ū2 > ū∗, resources need to be redistributed
from individuals of type 1 to those of type 2. As income transfers are infeasible for individuals with the
same y, the only policy instrument that can achieve redistribution is the uniform subsidy (as x1d < x
2
d).
However, as we abstract from redistributive motives and focus on policies that correct inefficiencies, this
102
CHAPTER 4. PRESENT-BIAS, PRICE SUBSIDIES, AND PUBLIC PROVISION
We therefore have a situation where a quantity-based policy strictly dominates price
instruments. A related result appears in Farhi and Gabaix (2015). They find that
quantity regulations may outperform taxes when consumers misperceive prices. As in
our model, the quantity instrument can be superior only if consumers are heterogeneous
in the behavioral failure (in their case, inattention to prices). More generally, Guesnerie
and Roberts (1984) showed that in second-best situations where Pareto efficient allo-
cations are not attainable, quantity constraints like in-kind transfers or rationing may
complement taxes and subsidies. In their model, inefficiencies originate from the pres-
ence of distortionary taxes. In the present analysis, consumer choices are inefficient in
the absence of government intervention, but the inefficiency can be eliminated through
public provision of good x.
4.4 Differences in present-bias and income
The set-up of the previous section is admittedly simple. In particular, individuals
varied only in present-biases and were identical from a long-run perspective. This
assumption might drive the superiority of public provision over price subsidies, as public







this section, we allow individuals also to have different gross incomes. In general,
efficient consumption bundles will then differ across types and a combination of policy
instruments might be valuable. To keep the analysis tractable, we consider a finite
number of types i = 1, ..., I who differ in yi and (possibly) βi, where y1 < y2 < ... < yI .
We assume that x1d < ... < x
I
d always holds.
15 In addition, we restrict the set of efficient
allocations E such that c1∗ < ... < cI∗ and x1∗ < ... < xI∗.16
4.4.1 Preliminaries
When individuals have different gross incomes, both price subsidies and public provision
can always achieve superior allocations compared to policies P = (T 1, ..., T I , 0, 0) where
case is of minor interest. In fact, it is hard to justify why the government should intend to redistribute
between identical individuals.
15Since both goods are normal and ∂xid/∂β
i > 0, this is always satisfied when β1 ≤ ... ≤ βI .
However, as we will allow for βi > βj for i < j, type i might have a higher ordinary demand xid than
type j. We henceforth exclude such cases.
16We make this assumption so that our distinction of the different types by their gross incomes
remains meaningful. However, the assumption only serves to simplify the exposition and is not essential
for any of our results.
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governments only use income taxes:
Lemma 4.2 There always exist policies P s = (T 1, ..., T I , s, 0) with s < 0 and P p =
(T 1, ..., T I , 0, g) with g > 0 that are superior to any policy where P = (T 1, ..., T I , 0, 0).
Proof: The proof proceeds along the same lines as proofs of Propositions 4.2 and 4.1
and is therefore omitted. 
Note that Lemma 4.2 includes the laissez-faire P̂ as a special case. In contrast to the
set-up of Section 4.3, a price subsidy is always useful as it does not redistribute within
income classes.
In the following, we want to characterize optimal policies. We assume that subsidy rates
and public provision levels cannot be made contingent on gross incomes yi. Although
this seems to be common in most countries, relying on anonymous policies requires
some outside argument: as the government can observe gross incomes, it is not using
the available information in a consistent manner (see, e.g., Anderberg, 2001). For
example, administrative costs may prevent governments from implementing a complex
system of income-dependent policies. Moreover, such policies might be infeasible due
to equity or political economy considerations.17
It is instructive to start with the following question: is it possible to implement efficient
allocations by using only one of the two instruments? Obviously, as we assumed x1∗ <
... < xI∗ and the provision level is uniform, the government cannot achieve allocations
in E by a public provision system alone. However, the next lemma highlights a special
case where uniform subsidies can support efficient allocations.
Lemma 4.3 Efficient allocations in E can be achieved through a policy
P s = (T 1, ..., T I , s, 0) with s = (β − 1) if and only if β is identical for all i = 1, ...I.
Proof: Consider a given efficient allocation C∗ ∈ E . We show that this allocation can
be implemented with policy P s = (T 1s , ..., T
I
s , ss, 0), where
T is = y
i − ci∗ + qsxi∗, ss = β − 1 for i = 1, ..., I.
To proof that P s is feasible if each type chooses (ci∗, x
i
∗), insert P
s into (4.6). This yields
I∑
i=1
(yi − ci∗ − xi∗) = 0, (4.24)
17If one could condition subsidy rates and public provision levels on incomes, any efficient allocation
C∗ ∈ E can be achieved by either applying income-dependent subsidies or public provision levels.
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which necessarily holds at any element in E∗. Recall that individuals choose ci and xi
such that
−qv′(ci) + βih′(xi) = 0 and bi = ci + qxi. (4.25)
Inserting βi = β, ss = β − 1 and T is , we get
−v′(ci) + h′(xi) = 1 and ci∗ + q∗xi∗ = ci + qxi. (4.26)
This holds if and only if ci = ci∗ and x
i = xi∗. To prove the only if part, note that if
βi 6= βj for at least two i 6= j and s is uniform, for at least one type, we have
−v′(ci) + h′(xi) 6= 1, (4.27)
and C∗ cannot be implemented. The same arguments apply for all C∗ ∈ E , which proves
the lemma. 
If all income groups have the same present-bias, each individual’s consumption imposes
the same marginal internality β − 1. Hence, a subsidy of s = β − 1 can induce all
individuals to choose efficient consumption levels. This result is in line with findings
from the literature on the taxation of consumption externalities. In particular, when all
individuals exert the same marginal external effect, a Pigouvian tax on the externality-
generating good can achieve Pareto efficient allocations (see, e.g., Myles, 1995) – pro-
vided that no other distortions exist. An important implication of Lemma 4.3 is that,
as long as individuals differ in their present bias, public provision may be useful as an
additional instrument. In the following, we characterize optimal policies when βi differs
across income groups.
4.4.2 Two income types
To illustrate our main points, we start with the special case with only two types i = 1, 2
of gross incomes. As y1 < y2, we speak of type 1 as “the poor” and of type 2 as “the
rich”. We can state:
Proposition 4.4 (i) If β2 > β1, optimal policies in P are such that g > 0 and s ≤ 0.
Each P ∈ P can implement an efficient allocation C∗ ∈ E.
(ii) If β1 > β2, optimal policies in P are such that either g > 0 and s = 0 or g = 0
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and s < 0. Optimal policies in P cannot implement efficient allocations C∗ ∈ E.
Proof: See Appendix 4.A.1. 
According to Proposition 4.4, whether price subsidies and public provision are comple-
ments or substitutes depends solely on the relative strength of both groups’ present-bias.
If the present-bias is stronger among the poor, an optimal policy typically consists of
a combination of both instruments and implements an efficient allocation. Intuitively,
the government can assign the efficient level x1∗ to the poor through direct public pro-
vision; by setting s = β2 − 1, it can induce the rich to choose x2∗, which works since
x1∗ = g∗ < x
2
∗. Therefore, both types’ marginal internal effects can be separately tar-
geted by using a price subsidy and public provision. An exception arises when the
rich have no self-control problem, i.e., β2 = 1. In this case, their consumption choices
need not be “corrected”, and the government can support any C∗ ∈ E if and only if it
exclusively employs public provision.
In the reverse case where the rich have the stronger self-control problem, optimal policies
include either a price subsidy or public provision, but a combination is never optimal.
This result is striking: although there are two sources of inefficiency and the government
has two instruments at it’s disposal, only one instrument is used in a policy optimum.
The intuition is as follows. By the assumption x1d < x
2
d, the poor are constrained by
lower levels of public provision. Hence, any policy mix must be such that x1d < g < x
2
d
and s = (β2− 1); the consumption choice of the poor must be distorted through public
provision, while choices of the rich are corrected by the subsidy.18 When β1 > β2,
however, such a policy is not incentive-compatible: the subsidy s = (β2 − 1) is so large
(in absolute terms) that the poor would always top up g to a larger level. In that case,
a mix of public provision and subsidies cannot do better than a system of taxes and
subsidies. Nevertheless, as each of the two instruments can attain a superior allocation
compared to policies where P = (T 1, T 2, 0, 0), optimal policies contain one of the two
instruments. By the arguments made at the beginning of this section, such policies
are second-best and cannot support efficient allocations. Which instrument is actually
optimal depends on the form of individual preferences and the parameters of the model.
18If both types were constrained by public provision, i.e., x1d < x
2
d < g, any price subsidy would be
redundant as individual demands are not responsive to price changes.
106
CHAPTER 4. PRESENT-BIAS, PRICE SUBSIDIES, AND PUBLIC PROVISION
4.4.3 More than two income types
We now study the general case with a finite number of income types. As the policy
space is restricted to uniform subsidy rates and provision levels, optimal policies are
generally second-best: with more than two βi’s, the government could restore efficiency
only if it distorted individual’s consumption behavior to different extents. However,
this is impossible with only two policy instruments. 19
As shown in the next proposition, the remaining results of Section 4.4 survive if βi is
monotonic in gross incomes:
Proposition 4.5 (i) If β1 < ... < βI , optimal policies in P are such that g > 0 and
s ≤ 0.
(ii) If β1 > ... > βI , optimal policies in P are such that either g > 0 and s = 0 or
g = 0 and s < 0.
Proof: See Appendix 4.A.2. 
When βi evolves non-monotonically across income groups, a characterization of optimal









. However, as this condition is not
necessary, price subsidies and public provision can be complementary also in scenarios
where it is violated. Whether the two instruments are complements or substitutes
therefore depends on the specific parameters of the model.
4.5 Non-separable preferences
So far, instantaneous preferences over goods c and x were additively separable. This
assumption simplified the analysis considerably, as individuals’ current behavior was
independent of all past and future decisions. As a consequence, it is immaterial whether
people know that their self-control will persist in the future or not (O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 2006). When preferences are non-separable, however, the consumption choices
of different selves of a single individual interact. For example, a person’s choice of
(cit, x
i
t) in period t depends on (i) the level x
i
t−1 chosen in period t− 1 and (ii) what the
individual expects her future selves to select in all subsequent periods.
19The only exception is a special case where β1 < β2 = ... = βI . Then, a combination of public
provision and a price subsidy can support efficient allocations in E . The proof of this result is identical
to the proof of Proposition 4.4 and therefore omitted.
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It then becomes important whether individuals are aware of their future present-bias
or not. In general, there are two polar cases. If individuals are naive, they incorrectly
believe that their self-control problem will disappear from the next period onwards,
i.e., that their future selves will choose consumption bundles according to long-run
preferences (4.3). On the other hand, individuals can be sophisticated and anticipate
to be also present-biased in future periods. In this case, they know that future selves
will maximize short-run preferences (4.2). As the behavior of future selves depends on
current choices, a sophisticated individual might use current consumption strategically
to manipulate the choices made by other selves in the future.20,21 In this section,
we analyze how optimal policies are affected if we drop the assumption of separable
preferences.
4.5.1 Framework
Individuals’ instantaneous preferences are represented by
ut = ut(ct, xt−1), (4.28)
where u is strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave.
In addition, we require ∂u(ct, xt−1)/∂ct → ∞ as ct → 0 , ∂u(ct, xt−1)/∂xt−1 → ∞ as
xt−1 → 0, ∂u(ct, xt−1)/∂ct → 0 as ct → ∞ and ∂u(ct, xt−1)/∂xt−1 → 0 as xt−1 → ∞.
For simplicity, there are just three periods, i.e., T = 3. Moreover, we consider a
scenario with two types i = 1, 2 who differ in β but have identical gross incomes. In
the first period, individuals are endowed with an exogenous level x0 of good x. Denote








t ) and the entire allocation
by C := (C1, C2, C3).





t , st, gt) and a sequence of policies by P = (P1, P2, P3). The government
announces the sequence of policies P before period 1.
20Empirical evidence on the awareness of self-control problems is mixed (Fredrick et al., 2002). E.g.,
in experiments conducted by Hey and Lotito (2009), the majority of subjects were naive, while only a
few were sophisticated. In contrast, Augenblick et al. (2015) report that 59 percent of the subjects in
a real-effort experiment demanded a commitment-device, which suggests that many people know that
they will have self-control problems in the future.
21As has been argued by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), there may also be intermediate types of
sophistication. We leave such an extension for future research.
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4.5.2 Individual behavior and laissez-faire
Since consumption choices are interdependent, each individual’s behavior can be in-
terpreted as the outcome of a sequential game between her different period-t-selves.
Given a sequence of policies, we can characterize behavior by backward induction. In-
dividual i’s period-3-self does not make any forward-looking decisions. Consequently,
whatever happened earlier, it spends the entire net income on current consumption,




3 = 0. In period 2, individual i takes x
i
1 as fixed. Moreover, as it
anticipates that ci3 = b
i
3, it cannot use x
i
2 to influence choices in the next period. By our
assumptions on preferences, there exist demand functions ci2 = c2(b
i















i).22 In the first period, individual i takes the demand





































1 − g1), xi1 ≥ g1.
To ensure a unique solution to (4.29), we assume that U1 is strictly quasi-concave in ci1
and xi1.
In the next lemma, we show that the laissez-faire allocation Ĉ = (Ĉ1, Ĉ2, Ĉ3) is inef-
ficient. In addition, while naive individuals always under-consume good x, those who
are sophisticated may even over-consume good x in the first period.
Lemma 4.4 If βi < 1 for at least one type, Ĉ is inefficient. Moreover, individuals
(i) under-consume [over-consume] good x [c] in period 2,
(ii) under-consume [over-consume] good x [c] in period 1 if they are naive,
(iii) may over-consume [under-consume] good x [c] in period 1 when they are sophis-
ticated.
Proof: See Appendix 4.A.3. 




















2 − g2), xi2 ≥ g2.
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In period 2, individuals cannot influence the choices of their period-3-selves. Therefore,
irrespective of whether they are naive or sophisticated, they behave qualitatively similar
as in the case of non-separable preferences. In period 1, however, there may be incentives
to influence one’s future behavior through the choice of xi1. To see this, consider the































The first two terms in (4.30) capture the intratemporal distortions due to self-control
problems. Since the individual is present-biased, it’s period-1-self takes only a fraction
βi of the positive marginal benefits of xi1 into account, which is harmful from a long-
run perspective. This effect was also present in previous sections and ceteris paribus
calls for under-consumption of x. The incentive effects due to strategic interaction
between individual i’s period-1- and period-2-selves are reflected in the third term of
(4.30). For naive individuals, the term vanishes as they expect their future selves to
choose (ci2, x
i
2) according to −∂u2 (ci2, xi1) /∂ci2 + ∂u3(ci3, xi2)/∂xi2 = 0. When individu-
als are sophisticated, the bracketed term in (4.30) is positive. Hence, if ∂xi2/∂x
i
1 < 0,
the presence of incentive effects strengthens the inefficiencies caused by present-biased
preferences. However, if ∂xi2/∂x
i
1 is positive and strong enough, sophisticated individ-
uals may over-consume good x in the first period. Formally, ∂xi2/∂x
i







If individuals under-consume good x in both periods, optimal policies have the same
properties as in Proposition 4.3. In this section, we therefore study the (more inter-
esting) case where some people over-consume good x in the laissez-faire. We abstract
from redistributive motives and focus on the efficient allocation C∗s where both types
receive the same consumption bundle (c∗t , x
∗
t ). For simplicity, only individuals of type 1
are present-biased (i.e., β2 = 1). One might expect that the government needs to tax
good x in the first period to induce individuals of type 1 to lower x11. However, as the
next proposition shows, this intuition is incorrect:
Proposition 4.6 Assume that β1 < β2 = 1 and that individuals of type 1 over-consume
good x in the laissez-faire. Then, the optimal sequence of policies (P1, P2, P3) is such
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2 , 0, g2) and P3 = (0, 0, 0, 0), and implements an
efficient allocation.
Proof: See Appendix 4.A.4. 
Intuitively, as soon as individuals are forced to consume the efficient consumption bundle
(c∗2, x
∗
2) in period 2, their period-1-selves have no incentive to use x
i
1 strategically. Public
provision thus eliminates the incentives of each individual’s period-1-self to self-commit
in future periods. As a consequence, there is no over-consumption in period 1 and
(c∗1, x
∗
1) can be achieved by exclusively relying on public provision.
4.6 Conclusion
When people have present-biased preferences, they tend to under-consume goods that
entail up front expenses and offer future benefits. We studied optimal public policies to
correct inefficient consumption choices. In particular, we analyzed the relative merits
of price subsidies for and public provision of goods like health care, education, or old-
age consumption. We find that public provision strictly dominates price subsidies when
people only differ in the severity of their self-control problem. In scenarios where people
are also heterogeneous in gross incomes, it is crucial how the strength of individuals’
present-bias evolves across income groups. If the present-bias intensifies as individuals
become poorer, an optimal policy includes a combination of price subsidies and public
provision. In the reverse case, it is optimal to use only one of both instruments.
Differences in the distribution of self-control problems might therefore provide a ratio-
nale for the different arrangements of public policies for education or health care across
countries. However, empirical evidence on how the intensity of present-biases corre-
lates with individuals’ incomes or wealth is scarce. In experiments with Vietnamese
Villagers, Tanaka et al. (2010) find no correlation between present-bias and wealth. In
contrast, Paserman (2008) and Meier and Sprenger (2015) provide evidence suggesting
that self-control problems are more pronounced among low- compared to high-income
groups. As these results are inconclusive, further evidence is necessary to provide robust
policy recommendations.
The set-up of our theoretical analysis is admittedly simple and could be extended in
several directions. For example, we restricted available policies to price subsidies and
public provision. However, when people differ along multiple dimensions, optimal poli-
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cies identified in Section 4.4 are generally second-best and cannot implement efficient
allocations. As a consequence, it might be useful to consider additional instruments
like nudges in an analysis of optimal policies to correct internalities (see, e.g., Farhi and
Gabaix, 2015).
Moreover, in Section 4.4 we abstracted from heterogeneity within income classes. If
we allowed individuals with the same gross income to differ in present-bias, a charac-
terization of optimal policies is more challenging.23 The reason is that, within each
income class, a uniform subsidy redistributes from individuals with a severe to those
who have a relatively mild (or even no) present-bias. When such redistributive effects
are strong, it may happen that both public provision and price subsidies are used in a
policy optimum even if self-control problems intensify with rising income. We plan to
study this extension in future work.
From a more general perspective, our results might also be relevant in other important
contexts. For example, a growing literature deals with the implications of present-biased
preferences for the consumption of “sin goods” like tobacco, alcohol, or unhealthy food.
Unlike education or health care, these goods offer immediate benefits but may cause
significant health costs in the future. People with a present-bias tend to over-consume
sinful goods, and some government regulation is desirable. O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2006) show that taxes on sin goods can improve people’s long-run utilities – even for
those who have no self-control problem. As the results of Sections 4.3 and 4.4 suggest,
quantity restrictions might also be valuable for sin good regulation. In particular,
when individuals differ in the intensity of self-control problems, maximum consumption
constraints may complement or even outperform sin taxes.
A prominent example of a quantity restriction is the Sugary Drinks Portion Cap Rule,
which prohibited the sale of many sweetened drinks exceeding a volume of 0,5 Liters in
New York City. However, while specific taxes on tobacco or alcohol are indeed levied
in many countries, quantity regulations are rare. Hence, depending on whether a good
provides future benefits or future cost, we observe marked differences in the application
of quantity restrictions in practice.24 Whether these differences can be rationalized
within a theoretical model is left as a question for future research.
23This, of course, only holds for uniform policies. When governments could condition policies on
gross incomes, all results of Section 4.3 apply.
24One explanation might be that maximum quantities for certain goods are more difficult to enforce
than minimum restrictions: compared to the provision of a minimum level of education or health care,
governments need information about consumption levels of every single individual to prevent them
from consuming more than certain amounts of specific goods such as tobacco or alcohol.
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Appendix 4.A
4.A.1 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Consider a given efficient allocation C∗ ∈ E where c1∗ < c2∗ and x1∗ < x2∗.







∗) can be supported by a policy P
∗ = (T 1∗ , T
2






1 − c1∗, T 2∗ = y2 − c2∗ − q∗(x2∗ − g∗), (4.31)
s∗ = β
2 − 1,
where q∗ = 1 + s∗. We then argue that P
∗ is feasible and there are no other policies
that implement C∗. Hence, P ∗ must be optimal.
First, note that, at P ∗, (c1∗, x
1
∗) is optimal for type 1 if g∗ > xd(b
1
∗ + q∗g∗, q∗; β
1), i.e.,
type 1 does not want to buy additional units of x on the market (see demand functions




< 1 + s∗ = β
2. (4.32)
We know that h′(x1∗)/v
′(c1∗) = 1, since C
∗ is efficient (see (4.4)). Thus, (4.32) reduces
to
β2 > β1. (4.33)
Hence, type 1 chooses (c1∗, x
1
∗) at P
∗. For type 2, we have xd(b
2







2) = x2∗ and cd(b
2






2) = c2∗. The reason is




∗ is the disposable income necessary to induce individuals of type 2
to choose (c2∗, x
2
∗) on the market when there is no public provision and the subsidy is
s = β2 − 1. Since x2∗ > x1∗ = g∗ by assumption, (4.18) and (4.19) imply that x2 = x2d






Plugging P ∗ into (4.6), we get
y1 − c1∗ − x1∗ + y2 − c2∗ − x2∗ = 0. (4.34)
By monotonicity of preferences, (4.34) holds at any C∗, and policy P ∗ is feasible.











∗) only if s = β
2 − 1. In this case, however, type 1 does
never choose (c1∗, x
1
∗). If g = x
1
∗, no other combination of subsidies and net incomes can
induce type 2 to select (c2∗, x
2
∗). This proves item (i).
Item (ii): We first show that a policy mix cannot be optimal when β1 > β2. To see
this, note that any optimal policy P ∗ solves (4.9). If the optimum P ∗ were interior in






d < g∗, demand
functions (4.18) and (4.19) imply that ci = bi and xi = g for both types, and levying a




d, public provision is cash equivalent for both types,
so one can achieve the same allocation through a system of income taxes and price
subsidies alone.
If policy P ∗ were such that x1d < g∗ < x
2
d, it must satisfy the first-order conditions
∂L
∂T 1

































= h′1 + µ
[













where we abbreviated v′i := v
′(ci) and h′i := h
′(xi) and used that ∂x1/∂b1 = ∂x1/∂q = 0




= h′1 − v′1 = 0. (4.39)





= −qv′1 + β1h′1 + (1− β1)h′1 − sv′1 = 0. (4.40)
Since x1d < g by assumption, it follows from individuals’ optimization problem (4.7)
that −qv′1 + β1h′1 < 0. Hence, we must have
(1− β1)h′1 − sv′1 > 0. (4.41)
Multiplying (4.36) by x2 and combining it with (4.37) implies s = β2− 1. From (4.39),
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we have h′1 = v
′
1. Substituting these two expressions in (4.41) we get
β2 > β1, (4.42)
which contradicts β1 > β2. As a consequence, the optimal policy P ∗ cannot have g > 0
and s < 0.
By Lemma 4.2, for every ū2, a policy where P = (T 1, T 2, 0, 0) cannot be optimal.
Hence, either a subsidy or public provision is used in an optimum. The second part of
item (ii) follows since one instrument alone cannot implement C∗ when β1 6= β2 and
β1 > β2. The same arguments apply for all efficient allocations C∗ ∈ E where c1∗ < c2∗
and x1∗ < x
2
∗. This proves Proposition 4.4. 
4.A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.5
To shorten the presentation, we first prove Proposition 4.5 for a special case with I = 3.
We then argue that the logic of the proof extends to any finite number of types I.
4.A.2.1 Three types
Consider given utility levels ū2 and ū3. Individuals’ demand functions are given by
(4.18) and (4.19). Any optimal policy P ∗ solves problem (4.9). Denote the Lagrangian
by:
L = V 1(T 1, s, g; β1) + µ2
[











(T i + sxi)−Nqg
]
,
where µ2 and µ3 are the Lagrange multipliers for the minimum utility constraints and
λ is the multiplier for the government budget constraint.
115
APPENDIX 4.A



















































































































Denote, respectively, the optimal policies in the absence of public provision (g = 0)




s , ss, 0) and in the absence of a price subsidy (s = 0) by P
p =




p , 0, gp).
Proof of item (i): To prove item (i), we show that if β1 < β2 < β3, there always
exists a policy P = (T 1, T 2, T 3, s, g) with g > 0 [s < 0] that is superior to P s =




s , ss, 0) [P




p , 0, gp)].
We start with a situation where only s is used. Note that P s is obtained by setting
g = 0 in (4.9). It must satisfy (4.44), (4.45), (4.46) and (4.47). By combining (4.44),






α1 + (1− β2)h′2
∂x̃2
∂q





















































and x̃ i is the compensated demand for good x with ∂x̃i/∂q = ∂ci/∂q + xi∂xi/∂bi < 0.
As 0 < βi ≤ 1, ss ∈ (−1, 0). Denote an individual’s demanded quantities at P s by
cis = c (b
i
s, qs, 0; β
i) and xis = x (b
i
s, qs, 0; β
i).




r , sr, gr) with
T 1r = T
1









sr = ss, gr = x
1
s,



















d, by demands functions (4.18) and (4.19)
individuals choose
c1 = b1r, x
1 = gr, c
2 = c2d = c
2
s, x
2 = x2d = x
2
s, (4.53)
c3 = c3d = c
3
s and x
3 = x3d = x
3
s.
Hence, at policy P r, all types choose the same consumption bundle and obtain the same
long-run indirect utility as at P s.




T is + ssx




The equality follows as (4.54) must bind at any solution to problem (4.9). Thus, P r is
feasible.
At P r, individuals of type 1 are just constrained by public provision, while those of
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types 2 and 3 are not constrained. We can therefore express indirect long-run utilities
by
V 1(T 1, s, g; β1) = v(b) + h(g), (4.55)
V 2(T 2, s, g; β2) = v(c2d(b
2 + qg, q; β2)) + h(x2d(b
2 + qg, q; β2)), (4.56)
V 3(T 3, s, g; β3) = v(c3d(b
3 + qg, q; β3)) + h(x3d(b
3 + qg, q; β3)). (4.57)
Now, consider a change from P r to a policy P r
′
= (T 1r +dT
1, T 2r +dT
2, T 3r +dT
3, sr, gr+
dg), where dg > 0, dg → 0, dT 1 = dg, dT 2 = qsdg and dT 3 = qsdg. Using, demand
functions (4.18) and (4.19), it can be shown that individuals of type 1 are constrained
by public provision also at P r
′
, while those of types 2 and 3 are not. Plugging policy
P r
′
into the government budget constraint (4.6) implies that P r
′
is feasible.
The change in indirect long-run utilities induced by the change from policy P r to P r
′
can thus be obtained by totally differentiating (4.55), (4.56) and (4.57) with respect to
T i and g at P r
dV 1 = [ssv
′
1 + (1− β1)h′1] dg, (4.58)
dV 2 = 0, (4.59)
dV 3 = 0, (4.60)
where we use that dT i = −dbi and −qv′(cis) + βih′(xis) = 0 at P r.
From (4.58), it follows that introducing a public provision system is superior to P s if
ss > −(1− β1)h′1/v′1 (4.61)



















which holds as ∂x̃i/∂q < 0 and β1 < β2 < β3. Consequently, there always exists a
policy P = (T 1, T 2, T 3, s, g) with g > 0 that is superior to P s.
Now, we turn to the reverse case where, initially, only public provision is in place (s = 0).
We obtain policy P p by setting s = 0 in (4.9). P p satisfies (4.44), (4.45), (4.46) and
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(4.48).
We show that a change to a policy with s < 0 can always be superior to P p. Note that
P p can be of three different types. In the first, only individuals of type 1 are constrained






d < g, by (4.18) and (4.19), we
have ∂x1/∂b1 = 0 and ∂x1/∂q = 0. Consider the introduction of a marginal subsidy at
P p, financed through a rise in income taxes. The effect of this policy change on type 1’s
long-run utility is −∂L/∂s. Differentiation of (4.43) with respect to s and combination










Hence, introducing a marginal subsidy is superior to P p. The same argument applies
for the second type of optimum, where x1d < x
2
d < gp < x
3
d.




d < gp. Since individuals’
demands then are xi = g and ci = bi, introducing a marginal subsidy has no effect
on individuals’ long-run utilities. However, there always exists a superior policy that




2 and u∗(c3∗, x
3
∗) = ū
3. Note that, by monotonicity of preferences, at any
optimal policy, the utility restrictions V 2(T 2p , 0, gp; β
2) = ū2 and V 3(T 3p , 0, gp; β
3) = ū3




∗ but all types consume the same x
i = g, the
optimum is second-best and we have V 1(T 1p , 0, gp; β
1) < u∗(c1∗, x
1
∗). Denote by R
m the
minimal resources needed to attain utility levels ū2 and ū3. Since policy P p is second-
best, the resources necessary to achieve ū2 and ū3, denoted Rp, exceed Rm. We now
show that there always exists a policy that satisfies the utility restrictions with lower
resources than Rp. As a consequence, the resources for type 1 are higher than at P p,
and an increase in type 1’s long-run utility is possible.
We have to consider two different subcases. In the first, the optimum is such that
gp > x
2
∗. Consider a switch from P






2 − c2∗, sn = (β3 − 1), (4.64)
T 3n = y
3 − c3∗ − (1 + sn)(x3∗ − gn).
The income tax of type 1 is adjusted such that the government budget constraint (4.6)
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holds. At P n, type 3 chooses the bundle (c3∗, x
3








< 1 + sn ⇐⇒ β3 > β2. (4.65)
At P n the resources to attain ū2 and ū3 are equal to Rm and thus, minimal. Conse-





by monotonicity and strict convexity of preferences, type 1 benefits from the proposed
policy change.
In the second case, we have gp < x
2
∗. Then, we can introduce a policy P
n with




p , sn = (β
3 − 1), T 3n = y3 − c3∗ − (1 + sn)(x3∗ − gn).
As individuals of type 3 choose (c3∗, x
3
∗) at P
n, the resources to attain ū2 and ū3 are
again lower than at P p. Hence, the income tax of individuals of type 1 can be reduced,
which benefits them as g remains constant. Hence, P n is superior to P p. This proves
item (i) of Proposition 4.5.
Proof of item (ii): We show that if β1 > β2 > β3, an optimal policy P ∗ cannot be








d < g∗ < x
3
d and s∗ < 0. To see this,
assume the contrary. P ∗ must satisfy (4.44), (4.45), (4.46), (4.47) and (4.48).
























Combining (4.44), (4.45), (4.46) with (4.48) gives
∂L
∂g
= h′1 − qv′1 + λs = 0. (4.67)




= −qv′1 + h′1 + (1− β1)h′1 + sv′1 = 0. (4.68)
As x1d < g we have −qv′1 + h′1 < 0. Hence, (1 − β1)h′1 + sv′1 > 0. Inserting (4.66) and
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α2 + (β3 − β1)h′3
∂x̃3
∂q
α3 < 0, (4.69)
which cannot hold when β1 > β2 > β3. Thus, we have a contradiction, and an optimum




d. and s∗ < 0.
If the optimum were such that x1d < x
2
d < g∗ < x
3
d and s∗ < 0, combination of (4.44),
(4.45), (4.46) with (4.47) would imply
s∗ = (β
3 − 1). (4.70)
Combining (4.44), (4.45), (4.46) with (4.48) yields
∂L
∂g
= h′1 − qv′1 + λs+ µ2 [h′2 − qv′2] + λs = 0. (4.71)
By (4.44) and (4.45) we get






























+ 2s = 0. (4.73)
Since x1d < x
2











+ 2s > 0. (4.74)





















+ 2β3 > 0. (4.75)
















which is a contradiction as β1 > β2 > β3. Consequently, we cannot have an interior
optimum were both g∗ > 0 and s∗ < 0.
By Lemma 4.2, for given ū2 and ū3, a policy where P = (T 1, T 2, T 3, 0, 0) cannot be
optimal. Hence, either a subsidy or public provision is used in an optimum. This
completes the proof of item (ii).
4.A.2.2 Finite number of types
Now consider the case of a finite number of types i = 1, ..., I. The proof follows the
same logic as in the three-types case.
Item (i): To show that there exists a policy P with g > 0 that is superior to policy P s
where only a subsidy is employed, we can derive an expression similar to (4.62), which
now involves I − 1 terms, which are all smaller than zero as β1 < βi for all i = 2, ..., I.
By the same arguments as before, introducing a marginal subsidy is superior to the
initial public provision system P p if at least one income type is not constrained, i.e.,
gp < x
i
d for at least one i. When all types are constrained at the initial optimum, we can
switch to a policy with a subsidy (βI−1) such that the richest income type chooses the
efficient consumption bundle (cI∗, x
I
∗). This policy always requires less resources than
the initial policy P p, and individuals of type 1 can be made better off without harming
the remaining I − 1 types.
Item (ii): The proof of item (ii) easily extends to the case of I types: by combining
the now I + 2 first-order conditions for each type of potential optimum, we reach a
contradiction to the hypothesis that a combination of s and g is optimal. 
4.A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.4




























CHAPTER 4. PRESENT-BIAS, PRICE SUBSIDIES, AND PUBLIC PROVISION
Denote the set of efficient allocations by E and an element in E by C∗. In the laissez-














































Comparing (4.77) and (4.79) and (4.78) and (4.80), respectively, proves that C∗ and Ĉ
do not coincide. Hence, the laissez-faire allocation Ĉ is inefficient.
Item (i) follows since, from a long-run perspective, individual i’s marginal rate of sub-










































> 1 ⇐⇒ βi < 1. (4.82)
Hence, the marginal rate of substitution exceeds the marginal rate of transformation
(which is equal to one) and an increase in x financed by a reduction in c can increase
individual i’s long-run utility.
To prove item (ii), an analogous argument applies. Note that naive individuals expect
their period-2-self to choose xi2 and c
i
2 such that −∂u2(ci2, xi1)/∂ci2 +∂u3(ci3, xi2)/∂xi2 = 0.






















> 1 ⇐⇒ βi < 1. (4.83)































































In that case, marginally reducing good x would increase type i’s long-run utility. 
4.A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.6












3) can be im-
plemented if and only if P = P ∗. Note that in the last period, it is optimal to have
c∗3 = y. Hence, P
∗
3 = (0, 0, 0, 0). In periods 1 and 2, consider the feasible policies P
∗
1


























In both periods, public provision levels equal the efficient values. However, individuals
are allowed to buy additional units of good x on the market. Hence, we have to check




t is indeed their optimal choice. In period 2, an individual




























= 1 and βi ≤ 1 (4.88)
















































































CHAPTER 4. PRESENT-BIAS, PRICE SUBSIDIES, AND PUBLIC PROVISION
(4.89) simplifies to βi > 1, which is impossible as βi ≤ 1. Thus, in both periods,
individuals select (c∗t , x
∗






3 ) implements the Pareto efficient
allocation. By the same arguments made in the analysis of separable preferences, no
other policy supports this allocation. 
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